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Abstract
The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008 is considered to have been the worst economic
recession since the Great Depression. Its beginning is associated with the bursting of the
US housing bubble in 2007 and the ﬁnancial panic of 2008. It led to a collapse of many
ﬁnancial institutions and others were prevented from bankruptcy by the bailouts provided
by national governments. Malfunctioning debt markets and increased uncertainty played
a crucial role in transmission of the ﬁnancial disturbances to the real sector. This in
turn caused large drops in output and dramatic hikes in unemployment rates across the
developed countries that persisted for a long period of time after the onset of the ﬁnancial
crisis. Economic slowdown triggered an unprecedented response of central banks (through
balance sheet expansions) and governments (through ﬁscal stimuli). In this thesis I address
topics that are associated with three subsequent stages of the crisis.
In Chapter 1, I analyze a question that concerns the origins of the ﬁnancial collapse.
More precisely, I study the impact of changes in competition in the banking industry
on ﬁnancial stability and business cycle dynamics. This paper is motivated by a heated
debate that started in aftermath of the crisis: many economists pointed out that the
ﬁnancial deregulation of the 1970s and the 1980s was one of the main causes of the global
crisis of 2007-2008. Chapter 2 is related to economic phenomenon that is characteristic
for the stage that follows the ﬁnancial turmoil - high unemployment. In particular, I
construct unemployment decomposition method based on the DSGE model that enables
to divide the observed rate of unemployment into frictional and Keynesian components.
I use this procedure to analyze the unemployment structure in four European economies:
Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The last part of my thesis - Chapter 3 - is devoted to the
stage of crisis in which government takes actions that are aimed at ﬁghting the negative
macroeconomic consequences of ﬁnancial collapse. More speciﬁcally, I build a tractable
framework with search frictions in the market for products and simple supply structure
within the manufacturing sector to discuss the impact of an increase in government spending
on aggregate output and consumption.

1 Competition in the Financial Sector and Financial Crises in
a Business Cycle Model
Abstract
In this theoretical work, I study a dynamic general equilibrium model with ﬁnancial sector
in which aggregate activity depends on the conditions of intermediaries' balance sheets. This
environment is used to demonstrate the business cycle consequences of changes in competition
in the ﬁnancial industry. On the one hand competitive banking sector is associated with higher
average level of aggregate output. On the other hand, however, monopolistic ﬁnancial industry
increases ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability. This trade-oﬀ is present both in the short-run and
in the long-run. Additionally, the impact of changes in aggregate risk on performance of various
market structures is studied. Despite the model's dynamic structure and agents' heterogeneity the
results presented in this paper are analytical.
1.1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate a controversial questions that have arisen during the recent
ﬁnancial crisis: is ﬁnancial stability enhanced or weakened by the competition in the ﬁnancial industry?
What are the business cycle implications of changes in the ﬁnancial sector's market structure?
A signiﬁcant increase in competition in the US ﬁnancial sector started in early 1970's when many
nondepository ﬁnancial institutions began to oﬀer ﬁnancial services that were closely related to those
oﬀered by standard ﬁrms (e.g., commercial banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions).1 Ac-
tivities of the latter, however, were heavily regulated which decreased their ability to compete with the
new ﬁnancial products oﬀered by nondepository ﬁrms. For instance, brokerage ﬁrms started to oﬀer
credit for real estate and related purposes or Cash Management Accounts (CMA) - services that were
directly competitive with those oﬀered by depository ﬁnancial institutions. Another example of ﬁnan-
cial innovations provided by nondepository ﬁrms that resembled the services of depository institutions
were those oﬀered by money market funds. They originated in 1970's and oﬀered savers a market rate
of interest at a time when the rates available at traditional depository institutions were constrained
by the so called Q ceilings. Money market funds invested their funds in short-term, high-quality
money market instruments as T-bills or commercial paper. The process of ﬁnancial innovation made
depository institutions (that were heavily regulated) press for change in the ﬁnancial system and seek
legislative changes that would allow them to compete with nondepository institutions. These actions
were strengthened by pressures of consumer groups on Congress. For instance, the elderly argued that
Q ceilings discriminated small savers and postulated elimination of those constraints on depository
institutions. Finally, in 1980 and 1982 two reform legislations that deregulated the ﬁnancial system
1A comprehensive description of this process can be found in [Cooper and Fraser (1986)].
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were signed by President Carter and President Reagan. The ﬁrst one, the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 began the process of elimination of Regulation Q
interest rate ceilings on deposit accounts at depository institutions. Moreover, it authorized all depos-
itory institutions to oﬀer interest-bearing transaction accounts which broke the traditional monopoly
of commercial banks on these instruments. Additionally, savings and loans were allowed to commit
a signiﬁcant fraction of their assets to consumer loans. The second reform - the Garn - St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 gave further powers to savings and loans: they were permitted to
oﬀer demand deposits to commercial, agricultural and corporate customers and to expand their lending
activities. On the top of that, the 1982 legislation allowed the depository institutions to create money
market deposit accounts so that they are able to compete with money market funds. The deregulation
introduced by those two acts increased the competition in the ﬁnancial sector in a signiﬁcant way.
Conventional wisdom links the deregulation of ﬁnancial markets that started in 1980's with ﬁnancial
instability and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 and 2008: The severity of today's ﬁnancial crisis is blamed
by some on the pressure of competition on banks. (...) the lifting of restraints, such as interest-rate
caps on deposits or rules that prevent banks from operating in certain markets, leads to more intense
competition. That is good for borrowers, but it also hurts banks' proﬁt margins.2 Lower margins
led to lower proﬁts and made it harder for banks to collect equity. This in turn resulted in ﬁnancial
instability and was one of the causes of the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
A longer time perspective that concerns the relationship between business cycle ﬂuctuations and
competition in the ﬁnancial industry was presented by [Gorton (2010)]. As he points out: The period
from 1934, (...), until the current crisis is somewhat special in that there were no systemic banking
crises in the United States. According to Gorton, one reason for which the banking system in the
United States was panic-free between 1934-2007 was: In addition to bank regulation, bank charters
were valuable because of subsidies in the form of limited entry into banking, local deposit monopolies,
interest rate ceilings (...). But the value of a bank charter eroded in the 1990s with increased competition
from nonbanks. Gorton adds that: The period of quiescence is related to what macroeconomists call
The Great Moderation, a view associated with the observation that the volatility of aggregate economic
activity has fallen dramatically in most of the industrialized world. One explanation for this is that
there were no longer banking panics. Figure 1 presents the relationship between the number of bank
failures/suspensions and GDP per capita in the US between 1864 and 2010.3
Motivated by these examples, I study the impact of changes in competition in the banking sector
on ﬁnancial stability and business cycle performance of economy. To conduct my analysis I construct
a tractable business cycle model with a single source of aggregate uncertainty - shocks to preferences
of capital buyers. It has several features that make it useful from the point of view of the goal of
this paper. First, it includes ﬁnancial sector and its role is to transfer funds from agents who do not
have investment opportunities to those who have them. Second, the amount of aggregate investment
2Deliver us from competition, The Economist, 25.06.2009
3To construct the series for bank suspensions/failures before 1933 I have used Historical Statistics of the United
States: colonial times to 1970 published by the US Department of Commerce and for period after 1934 I have used the
FDIC data on Failures and Assistance Transactions. The data on GDP per capita are taken from the Angus Maddison's
database.
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Figure 1: The period of quiescence in banking and The Great Moderation
is associated with conditions of banks' balance sheets. In particular, if equity of ﬁnancial institutions
is drained by adverse aggregate shock then intermediation activities are impeded. This in turn means
that less resources are transferred to investors and hence the level of aggregate investment drops. Third,
intermediaries provide depositors with safe assets with return that does not depend on realization of
aggregate shocks.4 Fourth, my speciﬁcation allows for comparisons of market structures characterized
by diﬀerent intensities of the monopoly power of ﬁnancial institutions. From technical point of view
my model is related to two well-established frameworks in the literature. The ﬁrst one is the model of
[Kiyotaki and Moore (2012)] and the second one is [Bigio (2015b)].
Results are theoretical and can be divided into three subgroups. First of them contains analytic
outcomes that describe the short-run trade-oﬀ between competitive and monopolistic banks.5 In par-
ticular, it focuses on the interplay of two opposite forces: on the one hand, competitive banks channel
more funds to investors which leads to higher production of investment goods, increases accumulation
of capital and boosts output. On the other hand, however, competitive bankers exhibit greater risk
exposure and hence incur more severe losses during recessions which drain their equity and may impede
intermediation activities in the future.
Second subgroup analyzes the long-run behavior of economies with two diﬀerent ﬁnancial sectors
(competitive and monopolistic banks). More precisely, it concentrates on properties of ergodic distri-
butions of aggregate state variables - aggregate capital and banks' equity under both ﬁnancial regimes.6
As we shall see later, the level of capital pins down the level of aggregate output and the amount of
banks' equity determines ﬁnancial stability and vulnerability to ﬁnancial disturbances. Through the
4This feature implies that ﬁnancial intermediaries in my model are similar to standard banks as they provide agents
with services that bear resemblance to deposits.
5This situation is dubbed short-run as both regimes - the one with monopolistically competitive banks and the one
with competitive banks start with the same initial values of state variables.
6Capital and banks' equity are the only state variables in my model.
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lens of the model, I evaluate the plausibility of the following hypotheses that describe the long-run
interaction between capital and equity:
Hypothesis 1. Competitive banks provide entrepreneurs with more intermediation services and at
the same time they earn lower margins per each unit of capital that is channeled by them (because of the
absence of monopolistic wedge). The former factor raises aggregate investment, increases capital and
output. This in turn boosts demand for intermediation services and the volume of capital transferred by
banks grows. Extensive margin of intermediation services is greater which compensates lower intensive
margin earned by competitive banks. As a result competitive banks generate higher proﬁts and are able
to accumulate more equity than monopolistic intermediaries. This means that competitive ﬁnancial
sector is more stable and guarantees better macroeconomic outcomes (higher aggregate output) than
the monopolistic one.
Hypothesis 2. Monopolistic banks exercise their market power and generate higher proﬁts. The
latter enables them to build greater equity cushion. Since the amount of ﬁnancial services is positively
related to amount of banks' equity then banks channel more funds which increases investment and
output. This force, as a consequence, outweighs the impact of the monopolistic distortion on the
amount of intermediation services. This means that monopolistic ﬁnancial sector guarantees both
higher stability and higher output and hence is more beneﬁcial than the competitive market structure.
Hypothesis 3. There is a trade-oﬀ in the long-run. Competitive banks provide entrepreneurs with
larger amount of cheaper intermediation services but lower proﬁt margins generated by them hinder
accumulation of equity. This in turn deteriorates ﬁnancial (and macroeconomic) stability which gives
rise to trade-oﬀ that is similar to the one present in the short-run perspective.
My analysis rejects Hypotheses 1 and 2 and predicts that Hypothesis 3 is true.
Third subgroup of results concerns the impact of aggregate risk on the behavior of two regimes.
In particular, I check how the magnitude of bad shocks aﬀects the long-run trade-oﬀ discussed
above. It may appear that competitive ﬁnancial sector is signiﬁcantly outperformed (in terms of
ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability) by the monopolistic sector as ﬁnancial disturbances become
more severe (this may occur because competitive banks are not able to accumulate suﬃcient equity
cushion to buﬀer adverse aggregate shocks). This intuition ignores the response of competitive bankers
to changes in aggregate environment: since they predict the devastating impact of deeper bad shocks
on their balance sheets, their behavior becomes more precautionary. More precisely, they decide to
channel less resources to entrepreneurs that hold investment opportunities and as a result ergodic
distribution of banks equity under competitive banks converges to the one that characterizes economy
with monopolistic regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 I discuss the literature that is related
to my analysis and I present contributions of this work. In Section 1.3 the business cycle model with
perfectly competitive banks is shown and the transmission mechanism of aggregate shocks is presented.
Section 1.4 describes the model with monopolistically competitive intermediaries - it is formulated in
such a way that the model with perfectly competitive banks is a special subcase of this construction.
In Section 1.5 an analytic comparison of two regimes: economy with perfectly competitive ﬁnancial
institutions and economy with monopolistically competitive banks is made and two types of trade-oﬀs
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(that emerge in the short-run and in the long-run) are presented. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 study the
impact of exogenous changes in aggregate risk on both regimes and sources of ineﬃciency of allocation
in economy with competitive banks, respectively. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Literature
The paper is related to several strands in the literature.
Market structure and ﬁnancial stability. The ﬁrst, theoretical strand, concerns the eﬀects of
changes in banking sector's market structure on stability of the banking sector. There are two main
approaches within this literature: the risk-shifting view and the charter value view. The risk-shifting
theory, represented by the article of [Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)] (that builds on the seminal work of
[Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]), assumes that higher interest rates (on bank loans), that are associated
with an increase in the monopoly power of the banking sector, will make ﬁrms invest in riskier projects
which in turn translates into higher banks' portfolio risk and gives rise to ﬁnancial instability. The
charter value hypothesis, originated with the article by [Keeley (1990)], postulates that a decrease in
competition in the banking industry increases banks' future proﬁts generated by the market power.
This in turn makes banks more cautious when making their investment decisions, since bankruptcy
means that they lose the valuable stream of future rents. [Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010)] try to
reconcile the two aforementioned views. They claim that on the one hand when (as a result of decrease
in intermediaries' monopoly power) banks charge lower rates, their borrowers choose safer investments,
so their portfolios are safer (like in [Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)]). On the other hand, lower interest
rates on loans decrease banks' proﬁts which serve as a buﬀer against loan losses. Those two opposite
forces give rise to an U-shaped relationship between the monopoly power and the risk of bank failure.
My analysis intermediaries operate under an implicit no-default constraint and hence there are no
bank failures. This does not mean, however, that the issue of ﬁnancial stability does not emerge
because the amount of intermediation (and aggregate investment) depends positively on banks' equity
(i.e., accumulated earnings in my model).7 If aggregate level of equity is low then so is the resource
reallocation and aggregate investment. Financial shocks drain banks' equity, lead to lower aggregate
investment and recessions. If ﬁnancial intermediaries' have monopoly power then they are able to
accumulate an equity cushion that buﬀers potential ﬁnancial shocks. So the ﬁrst part of the trade-
oﬀ in my model is similar to the force described by [Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010)]. The second
part, however, has nothing to do with investment risk choice made by ﬁrms. It is a standard result
that makes monopolistic banks less favorable: monopolistic intermediaries channel less resources and
they impose higher spreads than competitive bankers. As a result, in normal times level of aggregate
investment is lower which in turn decreases capital stock and output.
To my best knowledge, there are no papers that describe the impact of ﬁnancial intermediaries'
market structure on the real economy in the context of business cycle ﬂuctuations. This work is in-
tended to ﬁll in this gap by incorporating a simple banking system into otherwise standard neoclassical
7This means that the notion of ﬁnancial stability is associated with the volatility of resources channeled by interme-
diaries in my analysis and not with the bank failures.
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framework. Additionally, the analysis captures both dynamic and general equilibrium eﬀects that were
ignored in some articles cited above that have a static or a partial-equilibrium character.
Dynamic equilibrium models. There is an immense literature on ﬁnancial frictions and the
role of the banking sector in the RBC framework. I would like to concentrate on two articles that
are closely related to my work (i.e., they use similar formalization techniques to address the issues of
trades in capital and the role of banks in the economy).
Firstly, my model builds on the construction presented by [Kiyotaki and Moore (2012)]. To give
rise to trade in assets (capital), [Kiyotaki and Moore (2012)] split the population of entrepreneurs
into two segments: investors (that hold investment opportunities) and those who do not have such
opportunities in the current period. Investors issue equity claims (that entitle their holders to capital
income streams) to ﬁnance their projects and non-entrepreneurs purchase those claims as they cannot
invest. This division of population gives rise to trade in assets. I use a similar construction to generate
the endogenous reallocation of resources. There is, however, a fundamental diﬀerence between their
work and mine. In [Kiyotaki and Moore (2012)] agents do not need services provided by intermediaries
to sell/purchase capital whereas in my model only banks can channel capital between entrepreneurs
and hence they are central actors in the drama.
From the technical point of view, the most closely related article to mine is [Bigio (2015b)]. Simi-
larities between my work and [Bigio (2015b)] entail: the presence of two types of entrepreneurs (con-
sumption goods and investment goods producers) and banks that transfer capital sold by investment
goods producers to consumption goods producers.
There are, however signiﬁcant diﬀerences: I do not include asymmetric information about capital
quality that gives rise to multiplicity of equilibria and the rocking boat dynamics that follows ﬁnancial
crises in [Bigio (2015b)]. To avoid the problem of multiplicity and to generate strictly increasing supply
of capital in the model, I assume that investment goods producers have diﬀerent productivity levels
and hence some of them are more willing to sell their capital than the others. Another diﬀerence is
associated with the source of aggregate uncertainty. In [Bigio (2015b)], there are two aggregate shocks:
the standard productivity shock and the one that aﬀects capital depreciation. I do not have the shock
that aﬀects the technology level in my model and the only aggregate shock inﬂuences the demand for
capital sold by intermediaries: sudden drops in demand induce balance sheet losses of banks and drain
their equity. Not only have these disturbances a clear interpretation (shifts in preferences/panics in
capital markets) but also admit a tractable and illustrative analysis.
1.3 Economy with perfectly competitive intermediaries
In this section I study the allocation generated by economy with perfectly competitive banking sector.
1.3.1 Environment
Time. Time is inﬁnite and divided into discrete periods. Each period consists of two subsequent
stages.
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Agents. The model is populated by three classes of agents: inﬁnitely-lived entrepreneurs (that are
called producers as well), inﬁnitely-lived ﬁnancial intermediaries (called banks, too) and workers. First
two populations have measures normalized to one. Population of workers has measure L. Financial
intermediaries are identical and there are two types of entrepreneurs: consumption goods producers
and investment goods producers that have measures piC and piI = 1− piC , respectively.8
Shocks. There is one aggregate shock: an i.i.d. shock Zt ∈ R+. It aﬀects demand (of c-producers)
for capital transferred by intermediaries and gives rise to portfolio risk faced by banks. Moreover, there
is an idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by entrepreneurs: at the beginning of ﬁrst stage, entrepreneurs
are randomly segmented into two subgroups: c-producers and i-producers. This division generates two
separate populations of entrepreneurs: those who consider selling their capital to ﬁnance their invest-
ment projects (i-producers) and those who want to purchase capital (c-entrepreneurs). Additionally,
every i-entrepreneur draws the productivity level that is associated with his investment opportunity
which is an additional source of idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by producers. It will be clear later
that introducing investment opportunities of diﬀerent productivity levels gives rise to a diﬀerentiable
and monotonically increasing supply of capital. In contrast to i-entrepreneurs, all c-producers operate
identical production technology.
In what follows I assume that idiosyncratic shocks are independent of individual capital holdings
which greatly simpliﬁes the analysis - it enables me to aggregate individual demands and supplies of
capital. It is because aggregates become independent of distribution of capital.9
Goods, technologies and trade. There are two types of goods: capital goods and consumption
goods and two production factors: capital and labor. C-entrepreneurs use their capital holdings k and
hire l workers (that are paid wage w) to produce consumption goods. They operate the Cobb-Douglas
technology ACk
αl1−α where AC is technology level that is equal across c-entrepreneurs. C-producers
are not able to manufacture capital goods. Since their capital holdings depreciate (this occurs between
periods at rate δ), they are willing to increase it and hence they have incentives to purchase capital.
Consumption goods can be transformed into capital by i-entrepreneurs. They have an access to a
linear technology that generates AI i capital goods (that increase the i-producers capital holdings in
the next period) out of i consumption goods. I assume that AI varies across i-producers. In particular
AI is drawn from the probability distribution described by a continuous density function f(AI) that
satisﬁes EAI < +∞ and supp(f) = R+.10 By PAI I denote the probability measure associated with
AI . Amount of consumption goods used to generate capital is called investment.
11 I-entrepreneurs are
unable, however, to use their capital holdings to produce consumption goods. To get them, they have
to sell their capital holdings.
Workers are identical. Each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically and I assume that they
do not have access to ﬁnancial markets so they simply consume their wages each period. I introduce
workers to the model to guarantee that c-producers' proﬁts are linear in capital holdings (that enables
8I refer to them as c-producers/c-entrepreneurs and i-producers/i-entrepreneurs, too.
9There are some additional assumptions that are necessary to obtain this aggregation result that are discussed later.
10I assume that f is continuous because it guarantees that aggregate supply of capital is a smooth (diﬀerentiable)
function.
11For example, at individual level, i is called investment and AI i is ﬁnal output of capital goods.
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Figure 2: Financial intermediation
me to derive analytic formulas for c-entrepreneurs' policies) and to ensure that my environment is
stationary (since the production technology of consumption goods is concave in capital given the
Cobb-Douglas technology).
C-entrepreneurs and i-entrepreneurs cannot trade capital and consumption goods directly, they have
to use services provided by banks instead. In equilibrium, during the ﬁrst stage, intermediaries buy
capital from i-producers (capital sellers) at price qS and they ﬁnance their purchases with riskless IOUs
that they issue. At the same time, c-producers generate consumption goods. At the end of the ﬁrst
stage value of aggregate shock Z is realized. During the second stage, banker transfers capital to capital
buyers. Intermediary gets qB consumption goods produced by capital purchasers (c-entrepreneurs) for
one unit of capital resold by banks. At the end of the second stage banker transfers consumption
goods to sellers to settle their debt (IOUs). All agents consume at the end of the second stage and i-
entrepreneurs produce capital using consumption goods received from banks as an input. The sequence
of transactions is presented in Figure 2. I assume that intermediaries cannot default on their debt
(i.e., IOUs held by capital sellers) and that they are not able to store capital.12 The latter implies that
they transfer the total amount of capital purchased from i-entrepreneurs.13 On the other hand, banks
have technology to store consumption goods so they are able to accumulate equity over time (which
means that physically it is a stock of consumption goods). The only storage technology available to
producers is capital storage technology. Notice that the no-default constraint has an implication for
the character of the contract between capital sellers (i-entrepreneurs) and intermediaries: it resembles
a standard deposit because it does not depend on changes in aggregate conditions.
Preferences. Workers, bankers and i-entrepreneurs have preferences over lifetime consumption
12If one relaxes this assumption then the portfolio risk faced by banks decays: if market conditions are poor then
banks decide to store capital and they sell it later. This implies that they do not generate large losses after adverse
aggregate shocks, their equity is not drained and slow recoveries after ﬁnancial disturbances are eliminated. This in turn
means that the dynamics that is typical for ﬁnancial/banking crises cannot take place in such a model. Therefore, the
assumption that intermediaries cannot store capital is essential for generating ﬁnancial crisis episodes in my environment.
13This assumption makes their portfolio marked-to-market.
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streams {ct}+∞t=0 described by:
E0
(
+∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
)
,
where u is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of ct and 0 < β < 1 is their discount factor.
Observe, that it is common for models that can be found in the literature about ﬁnancial markets to
assume linear preferences for intermediaries. However, concave intermediary's utility function u can be
justiﬁed by dividend-smoothing motives (applied to entrepreneurs by [Jermann and Quadrini (2012)]).
Recent use of concave preferences of bankers can be found in [Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)]. I
make this assumption because it guarantees the existence of interior solution to the banker's problem
and hence it enables comparative statics exercises.
C-producers have preferences that depend on the aggregate shock Zt:
E0
(
+∞∑
t=0
βt · Zt · u(ct)
)
.
This dependence is introduced to give rise to shifts in demand for capital purchased from intermediaries.
If Zt is high then c-entrepreneurs value consumption more and their demand for capital drops.
Assumptions made in this section are discussed in a more detailed way in Appendix A.
1.3.2 Optimization problems
Workers. As it has been mentioned before, workers are hand-to-mouth. This means that they simply
consume their wages wt:
ct = wt. (1)
It is assumed that their utility function has a logarithmic speciﬁcation.
I-producers. I start with the dynamic problem of i-producer that begins period with capital
holdings k and is aﬀected by productivity shock AI . From the description of the intermediation
process we know that it makes its decisions in the ﬁrst stage. The corresponding Bellman equation
reads:
V I(k,K,E,AI) = max
c>0,i≥0,kS>0,k′>0
{
log(c) + βEZ,Z′,A′I
(
piI · V I(k′,K ′, E′, A′I)
+piC · V C(k′,K ′, E′, Z ′)|K,E
)}
. (2)
subject to :
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
c+ i = qS(K,E) · kS ,
k′ = AI · i+ (1− δ)(k − kS),
E′ = E′(K,E,Z),
K ′ = K ′(K,E),
where V I is value function associated with the dynamic maximization problem of i-entrepreneur and
V C is value function associated with the problem of c-producer and prime symbols denote next period
values of variables. Observe that arguments of V I and V C are diﬀerent: it is because i-entrepreneur
makes its decisions (about selling capital) in the ﬁrst stage, before realization of Z and because c-
producers do not face idiosyncratic uncertainty associated with their productivity levels. By E I denote
the aggregate stock of banks' equity (that alternatively can be treated as reserves of liquid assets held
by banks, too). First equation that determines the set of possible actions is the budget constraint
of i-entrepreneur: it says that i-producer sells kS units of its capital holdings at price qS(K,E) and
uses the proceedings (consumption goods) for investment i and consumption c. Second constraint is
the law of motion for individual capital holdings. Observe that amount of capital generated out of
i consumption goods depends on the productivity level AI . Expression (1 − δ)(k − kS) denotes the
unsold capital that depreciates at rate δ. Third and fourth constraints describe perceived laws of
motion for aggregate banks' equity E and aggregate capital K (i.e., it captures an implicit assumption
about agents' rational expectations).
Notice that I assume the logarithmic form of utility. I will show that this assumption guarantees
that entrepreneurs' (intermediaries') policy functions are linear in capital holdings k (or bank's equity
holdings e). This coupled with assumption about capital holdings' independence of productivity shocks
means that distribution of entrepreneurs' capital holdings is not a state variable.
Observe that if i-entrepreneur's productivity AI is suﬃciently high then he may decide to sell all
his capital holdings k to ﬁnance his investment i (and consumption). On the other hand, if it is low
enough, then i-producer decides to reduce the amount of capital that is sold - kS and sets i = 0. The
following lemma formalizes this intuition:
Lemma 1. Suppose that i and kS solve 2. If AI ≥ A∗I(qS) then i > 0 and kS = k. If AI < A∗I(qS)
then i = 0 and 0 < kS < k.
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix B14. The critical value A∗I(qS) satisﬁes:
A∗I(qS) =
1− δ
qS(K,E)
.
Lemma 1 is useful as it allows me to split the i-producer's problem 2 into two separate problems that
admit interior solutions.
The ﬁrst problem pertains to i-entrepreneur that has productivity AI that satisﬁes AI ≥ A∗I(qS):
V IP (k,K,E,AI) = max
c>0,i≥0,k′>0
{
log(c) + βEZ,Z′,A′I
(
piI · PAI (AI ≥ A∗I(q′S)) · V IP (k′,K ′, E′, A′I)
14All proofs are moved into Appendix B.
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+piI · PAI (AI < A∗I(q′S)) · V I0(k′,K ′, E′) + piC · V C(k′,K ′, E′, Z ′)|K,E
)}
.
subject to :
c+ i = qS(K,E) · k,
k′ = AI · i,
E′ = E′(K,E,Z),
K ′ = K ′(K,E),
where V IP is value function associated with the problem of i-entrepreneur whose current productivity
level is AI ≥ A∗I(qS) and who produces new capital, V I0 is value function that corresponds to the
problem of i-producer that has a relatively low productivity (i.e., AI < A
∗
I(qS)) and it sets its invest-
ment at the level i = 0. Budget constraint indicates that i-entrepreneur with AI ≥ A∗I(qS) sells his
entire capital k and law of motion for his capital shows that his future capital holdings come entirely
from creation of new capital.
The second problem corresponds to i-producer that has low productivity: AI < A
∗
I(qS). Budget
constraint shows that i = 0 and entrepreneur does not sell his entire capital holdings as k′ > 0.
According to the law of motion, unsold capital depreciates and becomes producer's capital holdings in
the next period:
V I0(k,K,E) = max
c>0,kS>0,k′>0
{
log(c) + βEZ,Z′,A′I
(
piI · PAI (AI ≥ A∗I(q′S))V IP (k′,K ′, E′, A′I)
+piI · PAI (AI < A∗I(q′S))V I0(k′,K ′, E′) + piC · V C(k′,K ′, E′, Z ′)|K,E
)}
.
subject to :
c = qS(K,E) · kS ,
k′ = (1− δ) [k − kS ] ,
E′ = E′(K,E,Z),
K ′ = K ′(K,E).
C-producers. This group of entrepreneurs makes decisions in the second stage, after the realiza-
tion of aggregate shock Z. They choose their consumption, capital purchases and number of workers
hired:
V C(k,K,E,Z) = max
c>0,kB∈R,k′>0,l>0
{
Z · log(c) + βEZ′,A′I
(
piI · PAI (A′I ≥ A∗I(q′S))V IP (k′,K ′, E′, A′I)
+piI · PAI (A′I < A∗I(q′S))V I0(k′,K ′, E′) + piC · V C(k′,K ′, E′, Z ′)|K,E
)}
. (3)
subject to :
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
c+ qB(K,E,Z)kB = ACk
αl1−α − w(K) · l,
k′ = (1− δ) [k + kB ] ,
E′ = E′(K,E,Z),
K ′ = K ′(K,E),
where qB(K,E,Z) is price at which c-entrepreneurs buy assets from intermediaries and kB is amount
of purchased capital. We will see that in equilibrium kB > 0. Observe that Z aﬀects the c-producer's
preferences which gives rise to changes in demand for asset purchases kB .
Since l enters only the RHS of c-producer's budget constraint, problem 3 can be analyzed in two
stages: ﬁrst, I maximize c-producer's proﬁts ACk
αl1−α − w(K) · l with respect to l and then I solve
the maximization problem with respect to the remaining variables: c > 0, kB ∈ R, k′ > 0. The value
of l that solves the ﬁrst maximization problem satisﬁes:
l∗ =
(
(1− α)AC
w(K)
) 1
α
· k. (4)
Plugging this solution l∗ into dynamic problem 3 yields:
V C(k,K,E,Z) = max
c>0,kB∈R,k′>0
{
Z · log(c) + βEZ′,A′I
(
piI · PAI (A′I ≥ A∗I(q′S))V IP (k′,K ′, E′, A′I)
+piI · PAI (A′I < A∗I(q′S))V I0(k′,K ′, E′) + piC · V C(k′,K ′, E′, Z ′)|K,E
)}
.
subject to :
c+ qB(K,E,Z)kB = G(K) · k,
k′ = (1− δ) [k + kB ] ,
E′ = E′(K,E,Z),
K ′ = K ′(K,E),
where G(K) satisﬁes GK < 0.
15 This means that the RHS of c-entrepreneur's budget constraint is
linear in his capital holdings k. This property is useful in the next subsection in which I characterize
policy rules and value functions of entrepreneurs.
Characterization of decision rules. I will show that given logarithmic preferences and budget
constraints that are linear in asset holdings, policy functions associated with maximization problems
listed above are linear in producer's capital holdings k. This enables me to aggregate the decisions made
15The exact formula for G(AC , w(K)) is:
G(K) = (1− α) 1α ·
(
α
1− α
)
·A
1
α
C · w(K)1−
1
α
= αAC (piC · [K/L])α−1
where I have used equation 12.
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by all producers within each segment (of i-entrepreneurs and c-entrepreneurs) and derive aggregate
supply of capital and aggregate demand for assets. The following proposition characterizes policy
functions:
Proposition 1. Decision rules and value function of an i-producer that has productivity level AI <
A∗I(qS) are: c =
φ
1+φωI0 , k
′
= 11+φ
(1−δ)ωI0
qS
, V I0 = ΨI0(K,E) +
(
1 + 1φ
)
logωI0 where ωI0 = qSk
and φ = 1−ββ(piI+piC ·EZ) . Decision rules and value function of an i-producer that has productivity level
AI ≥ A∗I(qS) are: c = φ1+φωIP , k
′
= 11+φAIωIP , V
IP = ΨIP (K,E,AI) +
(
1 + 1φ
)
logωIP where
ωIP = qSk. Decision rules and value function of a c-producer are: c =
φZ
1+φZωC , k
′
= 11+φZ
(1−δ)ωC
qB
,
V C = ΨC(K,E,Z) +
(
Z + 1φ
)
logωC where ωC = (G(K) + qB) k.
Proposition 1 enables the derivation of aggregate demand for labor, aggregate supply and aggregate
demand for capital.
Aggregate demand for labor. Aggregation of 4 across the c-producers yields:
LD(w(K),K) =
(
(1− α)AC
w(K)
) 1
α
· piC ·K.
Function LD is decreasing in wages and increases with technology level AC .
Aggregate supply of capital. First observe that i-entrepreneurs with higher productivity (i.e.,
those AI ≥ A∗I(qS)) sell their entire capital. The total measure of those agents is piI ·PAI (AI ≥ A∗I(q′S)).
There is piI ·PAI (AI < A∗I(q′S)) of i-producers that set i = 0. Individual supply of capital of the latter
is:
kS = k − k
′
1− δ
= k − 1
1− δ ·
1
1 + φ
· (1− δ)
qS
· qSk
=
φ
1 + φ
k
where I have used Proposition 1. Since the idiosyncratic shock that divides the pool of entrepreneurs
into i-producers and c-producers is independent of individual capital holdings (shock AI satisﬁes this
property, too) then I get the following formula for aggregate supply of capital S(qs):
S(qs,K) =
{
PAI (AI < A∗I(qS))
φ
1 + φ
+ PAI (AI ≥ A∗I(qS))
}
· piI ·K. (5)
Since 0 < φ1+φ < 1 then SqS (qs,K) > 0. This is because as qS decreases then A
∗
I(qS) =
1−δ
qS
falls
and there is more i-entrepreneurs that sell their entire capital holdings. Observe that because density
f(AI) was assumed to be continuous then by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus SqS (qs,K) exists
and is continuous in qS . Notice that limqS→0 S(qs,K) =
φ
1+φ · piI ·K, limqS→+∞ S(qs,K) = piI ·K for
any value of K. The case of limqS→0 S(qs,K) > 0 seems to be surprising. This happens because if
qS → 0 then A∗I(qS)→ +∞ and measure of i-producers that set i = 0 converges to piI . Since they are
not able to produce consumption goods they sell a non-zero proportion φ1+φ of their capital holdings.
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Figure 3: Aggregate supply of capital (ﬁxed K)
It is because they need to consume due to the logarithmic utility function. Figure 3 illustrates the
aggregate supply of capital.16
Aggregate demand for capital. Individual demand for capital of c-entrepreneur can be derived
using the formula for k′ in Proposition 1:
kB =
k′
1− δ − k
= k ·
[
1
1 + φZ
· G(K)
qB
+
1
1 + φZ
− 1
]
.
Again, I use the assumption about independence of idiosyncratic shocks of individual capital holdings
which means that the aggregate demand for capital has the following form:
D(qB ,K, Z) =
[
1
1 + φZ
· G(K)
qB
+
1
1 + φZ
− 1
]
· piC ·K. (6)
It is clear that: DqB < 0 and DZ < 0. The latter implies that increase in Z translates into lower
amount of assets demanded by c-producers. This in turn decreases the price of assets that are held
by intermediaries (since amount of capital is ﬁxed as intermediaries buy assets from i-entrepreneurs
during the ﬁrst stage as it is shown in Figure 2).
Observe that limqB→0D(qB ,K, Z) = +∞ and limqB→+∞D(qB ,K, Z) = − φZ1+φZ · piC · K < 0.
Additionally, if qB = q
0
B(K,Z) =
G(K)
φZ then D(qB ,K, Z) = 0. Aggregate demand function is presented
in Figure 4.
Aggregate law of motion for capital. To derive the aggregate law of motion for capital let
16To plot Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 I use the following parameter values piI = 0.2, AC = 1, a = b = 0.3, ZL = 1, ZH = 2,
β = 0.99, L = 100, δ = 0.025, α = 0.33, L = 100, pi(ZH) = 0.2,  = 1.1. For Figures 5, 6 and of the ﬁxed levels of K or
E is the long run level of K (or E) after a long time of normal times (Z = ZL).
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Figure 4: Aggregate demand for capital (for low and high realizations of Z, ﬁxed K)
us start with investment decision made by i-entrepreneurs whose productivity satisﬁes AI ≥ A∗I(qS).
Amount of new capital generated by such an entrepreneur is (according to Proposition 1):
AI · i = k′ = 1
1 + φ
·AI · qS · k.
Aggregation across diﬀerent values of AI and individual capital holdings yields:
17
I(qS ,K) =
[ˆ +∞
A∗I (qS)
1
1 + φ
·AI · qS · f(AI)dAI
]
piI ·K. (7)
Let us analyze the eﬀects of qS on aggregate eﬀective investment I(qS ,K).
18 Formula 7 shows that
there are two forces at play. First, an increase in qS causes a drop in A
∗
I(qS). This means that
more i-producers decide to sell their entire capital and invest a part 11+φ of their proceedings (this
is the extensive margin). Second, it boosts i-entrepreneurs wealth ωIP = qSk, so that they are able
to get more consumption goods in exchange for the capital that is sold. Since their technology uses
consumption goods to generate capital and since the proportion of goods that are invested 11+φ is
17An alternative, equivalent formulation of I(qS ,K) is:
I(qS ,K) = piI · PAI
(
AI ≥ A∗I (q′S)
) · E( 1
1 + φ
·AI · qS |AI ≥ A∗I (q′S)
)
·K
= piI · PAI
(
AI ≥ A∗I (q′S)
) · 1
PAI
(
AI ≥ A∗I (q′S)
) ˆ +∞
A∗
I
(qS)
1
1 + φ
·AI · qS · f(AI)dAI ·K
=
[ˆ +∞
A∗
I
(qS)
1
1 + φ
·AI · qS · f(AI)dAI
]
piI ·K.
18Observe that I(qS ,K) is the aggregate amount of capital produced by i-entrepreneurs and not the amount of
consumption goods used for producing capital.
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constant, then it leads to increase in I(qS ,K) (intensive margin). This means that qS depends crucially
on the condition of banks' balance sheets and hence the discussed eﬀects constitute a mechanism
through which ﬁnancial disturbances are transmitted to real economy.
Since the remaining capital depreciates at rate 0 < δ < 1 then the aggregate law of motion for K
is:
K ′ = (1− δ)K + I(qS ,K). (8)
1.3.3 Intermediaries
Banks are competitive and take prices qS and qB as given. They begin the period with e consumption
goods (called equity) - this amount is determined by their decision made in the previous period.19 In
the ﬁrst stage they decide how much capital kF they are going to transfer and during the second stage
(after the realization of Z) they choose how much consumption goods c they consume and how much
becomes their equity in the next period - e′. Since decisions are made in both stages, I need to specify
two maximization problems. In the ﬁrst stage bank solves:
W1(e,K,E) = max
kF
EZ (W2(kF , e,K,E,Z)) , (9)
where W1 is value function corresponding to the maximization problem solved in the ﬁrst stage and
W2 is associated with the second stage problem that reads:
W2(kF , e,K,E,Z) = max
c,e′
{log(c) + βW1(e′,K ′, E′)} (10)
subject to :

c+ e′ = e+ (qB(K,E,Z)− qS(K,E)) · kF ,
E′ = E′(K,E,Z),
K ′ = K ′(K,E).
The ﬁrst constraint is bank's budget constraint and it captures the implicit assumption that banks
cannot default on their liabilities qS(K,E)kF .
It will become clear later (see Lemma 2) that in equilibrium both positive and negative spreads
qB(K,E,Z) − qS(K,E) are possible (where the sign depends on the realization of Z). This in turn
implies that the decision about kF is risky: not only does qB(K,E,Z) vary with Z but also qS(K,E)·kF
that has to be repaid to capital sellers at the end of the second stage is unaﬀected by the realization
of aggregate uncertainty. This gives rise to the portfolio risk that is faced by intermediaries.
To get analytic formulas for policies and value functions the following condition needs to be satis-
ﬁed:
A1 Aggregate shock Z takes two values: Z ∈ {ZL, ZH}. Probabilities P(Z = ZL) = pi(ZL)
19An alternative interpretation for this variable is amount of liquid reserves held by intermediaries.
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and P(Z = ZH) = pi(ZH) satisfy pi(ZL) + pi(ZH) = 1.
This assumption is made for clarity of exposition (it is easier to analyze spreads in this case) and it
simpliﬁes the problem of uniqueness of the RCE with competitive banking sector. Observe, that since
DZ < 0 then the state in which Z = ZH can be referred to as crisis in which demand for capital held
by intermediaries drops (which causes a decrease in price qB(K,E,Z)) and hence the value of banks'
assets qB(K,E,Z) · kF falls.
Additionally, assumption A1 allows to transform 10 into a standard consumption-savings problem
(and hence admits analytical solution). It is because A1 implies that the optimal choice of kF is a
linear function of e, i.e.: kF = Φ(K,E) · e. This means that the budget constraint in problem 10 takes
the form that is analogous to the one in a standard consumption-savings problem:
c+ e′ = (1 + (qB − qS) · Φ(K,E)) · e.
This is the main intuition behind the proof of the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If A1 holds then decision rules and value function of intermediary are: c = (1−β)ωF ,
e′ = βωF , W2 = ΨF (K,E,Z) + 11−β logωF , kF = Φ(K,E) · e, where ωF = e+ (qB − qS)kF .
Proposition 2 will be useful when I characterize and investigate the equilibrium allocation with
competitive banking sector. The exact analytic formula for Φ(K,E) is presented in Appendix B. It is
easy to check that kF = Φ(K,E) · e can be rewritten as:
pi(ZL) · qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)
e+ [qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)] kF (11)
+pi(ZH) · qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)
e+ [qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)] kF = 0,
which is the FOC that describes the optimal choice of kF during the ﬁrst stage.
1.3.4 Equilibrium
In this subsection I present the deﬁnition of recursive competitive equilibrium. To distinguish between
consumption and capital choices of diﬀerent types of agents, I use subscripts IP , I0, C and F (for
i-producer with AI ≥ A∗I(qS), i-producer with AI < A∗I(qS), c-producer and ﬁnancial intermediary,
respectively).
Deﬁnition 1. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium with competitive banking sector consists of: pricing
functions qB(K,E,Z), qS(K,E), w(K) perceived law of motion for intermediaries' equity E
′(K,E,Z)
and aggregate capitalK ′(K,E), decision rules kF (e,K,E), e′(e,K,E,Z), cF (e,K,E,Z), cC(k,K,E,Z),
k′C(k,K,E,Z), kB(k,K,E,Z), l(k,K,E,Z), cIP (k,K,E,AI), k
′
IP
(k,K,E,AI), i(k,K,E,AI), cI0(k,K,E),
k′I0(k,K,E), kS(k,K,E), associated value functions W1(e,K,E), W2(kF , e,K,E,Z), V
C(k,K,E,Z),
V IP (k,K,E,AI), V
I0(k,K,E) and stochastic processes that determine the evolution of Z, AI and
producer's type over time such that:
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1) Decision rules kF (e,K,E), e
′(e,K,E,Z), cF (e,K,E,Z) and W1(e,K,E), W2(kF , e,K,E,Z)
solve the the dynamic ﬁnancial intermediary given: qB(K,E,Z), qS(K,E), E
′(K,E,Z), K ′(K,E)
and stochastic processes,
2) Decision rules cC(k,K,E,Z), k
′
C(k,K,E,Z), kB(k,K,E,Z), l(k,K,E,Z) and value functions
V C(k,K,E,Z), V IP (k,K,E,AI), V
I0(k,K,E) solve the the dynamic problem of c-producer given:
qB(K,E,Z), w(K), E
′(K,E,Z), K ′(K,E) and stochastic processes,
3) Decision rules cIP (k,K,E,AI), k
′
IP
(k,K,E,AI), i(k,K,E,AI) and value functions V
C(k,K,E,Z),
V IP (k,K,E,AI), V
I0(k,K,E) solve the the dynamic problem of i-producer for whichAI ≥ A∗I(qS(K,E))
given qS(K,E), E
′(K,E,Z), K ′(K,E) and stochastic processes,
4) Decision rules cI0(k,K,E), k
′
I0
(k,K,E), kS(k,K,E) and value functions V
C(k,K,E,Z), V IP (k,K,E,AI),
V I0(k,K,E) solve the the dynamic problem of i-producer for which AI < A
∗
I(qS(K,E)) given qS(K,E),
E′(K,E,Z), K ′(K,E) and stochastic processes,
5) Consistency conditions hold: e′(e,K,E,Z) = E′(K,E,Z) andK ′(K,E) = (1−δ)K+I(qS(K,E),K),
where:
I(qS(K,E),K) =
[ˆ +∞
A∗I (qS(K,E))
i(k,K,E,AI) · f(AI)dAI
]
piI .
6) Markets clear, i.e.: kF (e,K,E) = S(qS(K,E),K), kF (e,K,E) = D(qB(K,E,Z),K, Z), LD(w(K),K) =
L.
Characterization. Suppose that values are K and E are given. I will discuss how can one obtain
K ′ and E′ using model's equations and the current realization of Z.
First, notice that we can use the labor market clearing condition LD(w(K),K) = L to get the
expression for wages:
w(K) = (1− α) ·AC · (piC ·K)α · L−α. (12)
Let us combine bank's FOC 11 with reformulated market clearing conditions and the consistency
condition E = e ( I suppress arguments of policy and pricing functions to economize on notation):20
pi(ZL) · D
−1 (S(qS ,K),K, ZL)− qS
E + [D−1 (S(qS ,K),K, ZL)− qS ]S(qS)
pi(ZH) · D
−1 (S(qS ,K),K, ZH)− qS
E + [D−1 (S(qS ,K),K, ZH)− qS ]S(qS) = 0. (13)
Or shortly:
EZ
(
D−1 (S(qS ,K),K, Z)− qS
E + [D−1 (S(qS ,K),K, Z)− qS ]S(qS)
)
= 0. (14)
Observe that the LHS of 14 is a function of qS and state variables E and K which are taken as given
in the current period. This means that 13 can used to pin down the equilibrium value of qS . Given qS
we can calculate I(qS ,K) and the next period value of aggregate capital: K
′.
20I use the fact that S−1 (with respect to ﬁrst argument of function S) exists as S is strictly increasing and I apply
similar arguments to D−1.
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Figure 5: Price formation in equilibrium
Once we have computed qS , we are able to calculate kF (from the market clearing condition
kF = S(qS ,K)). Given the current realization of Z, qB = D
−1 (S(qS ,K),K, Z) we are able to pin
down banker's wealth ωF which together with Proposition 2 enables to compute E
′. This means that
it is possible to calculate the path of exogenous state variables analytically, without the need of using
any global or any local solution methods. Price-formation in equilibrium is presented in Figure 5.21
It is clear that if the solution to 13 exists and is unique then given K, E, Z the values of K ′ and
E′ are well-deﬁned (i.e., there is only one pair that is consistent with the equilibrium path). This in
turn implies the existence and uniqueness of the RCE described in Deﬁnition 1.22
Before I show the main result of this section, I prove the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 2. If A1 holds then the following inequalities hold in equilibrium: D−1(S(qS),K, ZL) > qS,
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) < qS.
I am in position to formulate the following theorem:
Theorem 1. If A1 holds then solution to equation 13 exists and is unique.
I ﬁnish this subsection with observation that characterizes the dependence of kF on E.
Claim 1. Aggregate reallocation of capital kF increases with E.
21Solid lines denote decisions/objects that result from choices made in the ﬁrst stage of the period and dashed lines
denote objects that are determined in the second stage.
22This result follows because given the existence and uniqueness of qS that solves 14 (given values K ∈ K and E ∈ E,
where K and E are spaces of state variables) we are able to compute qB(K,E,ZL) and qB(K,E,ZH). In other words,
for all K ∈ K and E ∈ E the dynamic programming problem described by 9 and 10 is well-deﬁned as we know the
prices that are taken as given by the intermediary. It is therefore suﬃcient to apply the standard ﬁxed-point argument
(Banach theorem) to the dynamic programming problem characterized by 9 and 10 to argue that its solution exists and
is unique.
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Observe that Claim 1 gives rise to a direct link between condition of banks' balance sheets and the
amount of capital reallocation in economy.
Transmission mechanism. Let us discuss the channels through which changes in Z aﬀect the
economy. Let us consider the situation at the and of the ﬁrst stage, i.e., before the realization of Z.
Observe that kF is already chosen by banks and hence the value of deposits that needs to be repaid
in the second stage - qS · S(qS ,K) is ﬁxed, too. Since qS is deﬁned in the ﬁrst stage as well, then K ′
will remain unaﬀected by Z (see equation 8).
Suppose that the current realization of Z is Z = ZH . By Lemma 2, this implies that qB(K,E,ZH) <
qS . Since kF is already ﬁxed, the value of ωF drops (i.e., ﬁnancial wealth of intermediaries falls). Since
e′ = βωF (by Proposition 2), then lower ωF translates into decreased level of banks' equity in the
next period. This in turn has adverse eﬀects on the amount of intermediated capital k′F (by Claim 1):
k′F decreases and the market clearing condition for deposits kF = S(q
′
S) implies that q
′
S falls. This
has two eﬀects: ﬁrst, i-producers obtain less consumption goods q′S · S(q′S) that can be transformed in
capital. Second, since q′S is lower then A
∗
I(q
′
S) grows and the proportion of i-producers that produce
investment goods P(AI ≥ A∗I(q′S)) falls. Both factors mean that I ′ is lower and hence the level of capital
in the subsequent periodK ′′ deteriorates which means that the aggregate output of consumption goods
- i.e., AC (piCK
′′)α L1−α is lower.23 It is therefore clear that the condition of banks' balance sheets -
e′ is the only channel through which a decrease in demand for capital held by intermediaries (caused
by Z = ZH) aﬀects the real economy.
The role of intermediaries. I ﬁnish this subsection with a comment on the role played by
intermediaries. Notice that the decision about kF is risky as it is made before the realization of
Z.24 This means that intermediaries absorb the risk that would be otherwise faced by capital sellers
(i-entrepreneurs). More precisely, if banks were absent then capital sellers would sell capital to c-
producers after the realization of Z and the price of this transaction would depend on the realization
of aggregate uncertainty. If, however, banks are in place then i-entrepreneurs are insured against
shifts in asset prices as they are oﬀered riskless deposit contracts so that they purchase qSS(qS) of
consumption goods at price qS that is independent of Z.
1.4 Monopolistically competitive intermediaries
In this section I study the economy in which intermediaries have a certain degree of monopoly power.
I use a standard construction called the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator which is applied in the market on
which capital is sold to c-producers which gives rise to monopolistic competition in this market. Such
formalization of intermediaries' monopoly power gives rise to their impact on prices (and quantities)
of capital traded in economy and enables to calculate explicit formulas for banks' policy functions
and do comparative statics exercises.25 It is because the amount of channeled resources kF remains a
23It is easy to see that this aggregation result holds. It follows if one combines individual output ACk
αl1−α with
equations 4 and 12 and integrates this result over c-entrepreneurs.
24Recall, that the choice of kF is risky because it is assumed that banks do not have access to the storage technology
of capital.
25For instance, it is not possible to do qualitative exercises analogous to those conducted for the RCE with competitive
banks if one considers a single monopolist instead of using the Dixit-Siglitz aggregator.
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linear function of equity e and thus the bank's budget constraint is linear in equity so that we can use
the results shown by [Alvarez and Stokey (1998)] again. Following the literature, I do not introduce
monopoly power in the market for deposits.
Observe that considerations about the intermediaries' market structure do not aﬀect producers'
sector - this implies that entrepreneurs' policy functions, aggregate demand for capital D(qS ,K, Z)
and aggregate supply S(qS ,K) of assets remain unchanged.
1.4.1 Capital retailers
To analyze the problem I introduce a new type of agent to the model: perfectly competitive retailers
that earn zero proﬁts, buy capital from monopolistic intermediaries and sell it to c-entrepreneurs. All
these actions take place in the second stage.
In order to produce capital good kF , a retailer must purchase a great many of wholesale capital
goods kF,j indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] (where j is an index assigned to a single banker). Retail good can
be treated as a bundle/package of wholesale assets. Additionally, capital provided by intermediaries
is diﬀerentiated and hence various capital goods are imperfect substitutes. This idea is formalized by
the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
kF =
[ˆ 1
0
k
1

F,jdj
]
,  > 1, (15)
where  > 1 measures the substitutability of diﬀerent pieces of capital supplied by intermediaries.
Proﬁt function of the retailer reads:
qBkF −
ˆ 1
0
qB,jkF,jdj. (16)
Plugging 15 into 16 and deriving the FOC with respect to kF,j good yields:
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qB
[ˆ 1
0
k
1

F,jdj
]−1
k
1
−1
F,j = qB,j .
I use 15 again to get the demand for capital of banker j:
kF,j =
(
qB,j
qB
) 
1−
kF . (17)
Relationship described by 17 is taken as given by the monopolistic intermediary.
26I am aware that from the point of view of measure theory, the derivative of both integrals is 0. It is because index j
has measure zero so any change to function kF,j at point j has no eﬀect on the integral. However, I use this formulation
because it is common in the literature and it leads to the same FOC as: kF =
(∑N
j=1 k
1

F,j
)
.
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1.4.2 Monopolistic intermediaries
Bankers purchase capital in perfectly competitive market and sell it to retailers in a monopolistically
competitive environment. In the ﬁrst stage bank j solves:
W1(e,K,E) = max
kF,j
EZ (W2(kF,j , e,K,E,Z)) , (18)
and the second stage problem reads:
W2(kF,j , e,K,E,Z) = max
c,e′
{log(c) + βW1(e′,K ′, E′)} (19)
subject to :
c+ e′ = e+
[
qB(K,E,Z) ·
(
kF
kF,j
)1− 1
− qS(K,E)
]
kF,j ,
E′ = E′(K,E,Z),
K ′ = K ′(K,E),
where a reformulated version of 17 - qB,j = qB ·
(
kF
kF,j
)1− 1
has been plugged into the budget constraint.
Let me concentrate on the symmetric case in which kF = kF,j . The following proposition characterizes
policy functions of the monopolistic intermediary:
Proposition 3. If A1 holds then decision rules and value function of the monopolistic intermediary
are: c = (1 − β)ωF , e′ = βωF , W2 = ΨF (K,E,Z) + 11−β logωF , kF,j = Φ˜(K,E) · e, where ωF =
e+ (qB − qS) kF,j.
Analytic form of Φ˜ is presented in Appendix B.
1.4.3 Equilibrium
I do not present the full deﬁnition of Recursive Competitive Equilibrium with monopolistically com-
petitive banks - it is analogous to the case of equilibrium with perfectly competitive intermediaries.
Calculating K ′ and E′ given K, E and Z requires analogous steps as in case of economy with competi-
tive banking industry. Similarly to the previous case, equation that combines bank's FOC (with respect
to kF ) and market clearing conditions plays a crucial role. The following formula is the equivalent of
20 in environment with monopolistically competitive banks:
pi(ZL) ·
1
D
−1 (S(qS(K,E)),K, ZL)− qS(K,E)
e+ [D−1 (S(qS(K,E)),K, ZL)− qS(K,E)]S(qS(K,E))
pi(ZH) ·
1
D
−1 (S(qS(K,E)),K, ZH)− qS(K,E)
e+ [D−1 (S(qS(K,E)),K, ZH)− qS(K,E)]S(qS(K,E)) = 0. (20)
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Observe, that the only diﬀerence between 13 and 20 is presence of fraction 1 in 20. Under A1 I am
able to prove the following result:
Theorem 2. Under A1, solution to equation 20 exists and is unique.
I ﬁnish this subsection with observation that characterizes the dependence of kF on E:
Claim 2. In the RCE with monopolistically competitive intermediaries aggregate reallocation of capital
kF increases with E.
1.5 Comparison of economies with competitive and monopolistically com-
petitive intermediaries
In this part I compare two economies - the with competitive banks and the one monopolistically
competitive intermediaries. It is instructive to divide the analysis into two subsections.
First, I show the potential advantages and disadvantages of the competitive banking sector in
comparison to the monopolistic industry in the situation when state variables: K and E are the same
in both economies. Second, I describe the long-run trade-oﬀ that is associated with the features of
ergodic distributions of K and E.
1.5.1 The short-run trade-oﬀ
Competition and the amount of intermediated capital. Suppose that both economies have
the same initial value of aggregate banks' equity - E and the same aggregate capital stock K. Next
proposition characterizes the relationship between kCF and k
MC
F .
Proposition 4. If the initial value of aggregate intermediaries' equity E and aggregate capital K
are the same in both economies: the one with competitive banks and the one with monopolistically
competitive intermediaries, then the amount of intermediated capital is strictly higher in economy with
competitive banks.
This result is illustrated in Figure 6.
Banks' losses in the crisis. Again, consider the situation when both economies have the same
initial stock of banks' equity - E and aggregate capital K. Recall that in economy with competitive
banks (by Lemma 2)27:
qCB(ZH)− qCS = D−1(S(qCS ),K, ZH)− qCS < 0,
This means that losses incurred by competitive banks when Z = ZH are:
LCE(ZH) =
(
qCB(ZH)− qCS
) · S(qCS ) < 0. (21)
Let us compare 21 with losses generated by monopolistic intermediaries. There are two eﬀects that
magnify the losses of competitive industry in comparison to monopolistically competitive bankers.
27I suppress the dependence of pricing functions qB and qS on K and E for notational convenience.
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Figure 6: Capital intermediated in economy with monopolistically and in economy with competitive
banks
First, by Proposition 4 and market clearing condition for deposits we get S
(
qCS
)
> S
(
qMCS
)
and
hence:
qCB(ZH) = D
−1 (S (qCS ) ,K, ZH) < D−1 (S (qMCS ) ,K, ZH) = qMCB (ZH).
This together with the fact that qCS > q
MC
S implies:
qCB(ZH)− qCS < qMCB (ZH)− qMCS < 0. (22)
Inequality 22 means that one reason for which competitive intermediaries generate higher losses than
monopolistic banks is due to the fact that they do not internalize the inﬂuence of their portfolio
decisions (i.e., the decision about kCF ) on prices.
Second, since S
(
qCS
)
> S
(
qMCS
)
the uninternalized eﬀect on prices is ampliﬁed even further which
means that:
LC(ZH) =
(
qCB(ZH)− qCS
)
S
(
qCS
)
<
(
qMCB (ZH)− qMCS
)
S
(
qMCS
)
= LMC(ZH).
These considerations are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 5. If the initial value of aggregate intermediaries' equity E and the capital stock K
are the same in both economies: the one with competitive banks and the one with monopolistically
competitive intermediaries, then aggregate losses generated by banks for Z = ZH (i.e. crisis) are
higher in economy with competitive intermediaries.
Proposition 5 has an important dynamic consequence: if Z = ZH occurs in the initial period
then ωMCF > ω
C
F and hence monopolistically competitive banks accumulate higher equity E
′. This
coupled with results presented in Propositions 1 and 2 means that the amount of capital transferred
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from i-producers to c-entrepreneurs in the subsequent period can be strictly lower for the economy
with competitive banks than in economy with monopolistically competitive intermediaries.28 These
considerations are shown in Figure 6.
1.5.2 The long-run trade-oﬀ
In this subsection I analyze ergodic distributions of K and E under two diﬀerent regimes (perfectly
competitive and monopolistically competitive banks). First, I present analytic characterization of the
upper and lower bounds of the support of ergodic densities. Second, I use numerical simulations to
explore some additional features of those distributions that are tightly associated with the results
concerning the bounds. First of all, however, let us modify the model to make the analysis more
tractable. In particular, to simplify the exposition I assume that P(AI = 1) = 1, i.e. all i-producers
have the same level of productivity.29 This assumption holds throughout this section and Sections 1.6
and 1.7.
To guarantee that equilibrium with P(AI = 1) = 1 exists, I assume that parameters satisfy the
following inequality: [
(1 + φZL)
piI
piC
+ φZL
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
]
1 + φ
piI
>
1
δ
− 1. (23)
It is easy to see that the set of parameters which satisﬁes 23 is non-empty - it is because the LHS
of 23 is always strictly positive and the limit of the RHS when δ → 1 is zero. First, notice that the
necessary condition for existence of equilibrium is:
∀K G(K)
(1 + φZH)
piIK
piCK
+ φZH
> 1− δ. (24)
The LHS of 24 is the inverse demand function evaluated at piIK (amount of capital supplied by i-
entrepreneurs when qS(K,E) > 1− δ). Condition 24 says that the aggregate demand curve for capital
channeled by banks (that corresponds to realization ZH of the aggregate shock) intersects the S(qS ,K)
scheme for such value of qS that S(qs,K) = piI ·K > 0. It is because I want to exclude the situation
in which D(qB ,K, ZH) and S(qs,K) cross each other at qB = qS < 1 − δ if Z = ZH (which would
imply that the supply of capital is 0). The following lemma shows that 24 is true when condition 23
is satisﬁed:
Lemma 3. Condition 24 holds if parameters satisfy 23.
The economy with P(AI = 1) = 1 is described in Appendix A in a more detailed manner. It is easy
to extend those result to describe the model with P(AI = 1) = 1 and  > 1.
Let us start with the lower bounds on ergodic densities of KC , KMC , EC and EMC (these vari-
ables denote aggregate capital in economy with competitive banks, aggregate capital in economy with
monopolistically competitive banks, aggregate equity in economy with competitive banks, aggregate
28Observe that it may not be the case due to the monopolistic friction.
29It can be shown numerically that the analytical results presented in this section continue to hold for the non-
degenerate distribution of AI .
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equity in economy with monopolistically competitive banks, respectively).30 It is easy to show that
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6. The common lower bound on the supports of ergodic densities associated with EC and
EMC is E = 0.
To obtain this result I have used the Borel-Cantelli lemma and the law of motion for E. The next
proposition, that characterizes the lower bounds for KC , KMC , requires some more reﬁned arguments
than those used in the proof of Proposition 6:
Proposition 7. If P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then the common lower bound on the supports
of ergodic densities associated with KC and KMC is K =
(
Ψ
δ
) 1
1−α where Ψ is a function of parameters.
One remark is in order. Since the probability of the crisis pi(ZH) is signiﬁcantly lower than the
probability of a good shock pi(ZL) then the chance that the aggregate level of capital approaches
to K is extremely low. 31 This in turn means that the value of K has a negligible inﬂuence on the
moments associated with ergodic distributions of KC and KMC . It is therefore much more important
to study the upper bounds on K and E. The next proposition establishes the relationship between
the upper bounds on KCand KMC (let us denote them by K¯C and K¯MC):
Proposition 8. If P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then dK¯
MC
d evaluated at  = 1 is negative.
Proposition 8 says that the upper bound of the long-run distribution of capital decreases when
perfectly competitive market becomes monopolistic. On the one hand it is intuitive because when
 > 1 then intermediaries increase their proﬁts and less resources (consumption goods) is transferred
to investors that create new capital. On the other hand, one could argue that this eﬀect can be
mitigated (or even eliminated) because if banks have higher proﬁts then their long-run equity should
is, too (this intuition is conﬁrmed by Proposition 9). This in turn, together with Claim 2, could imply
that the negative eﬀect of the growth in  could be outweighed by the impact of higher equity (see
Hypothesis 2 presented in the Introduction). Proposition 8 states that this potentially mitigating
eﬀect is too weak and hence K¯MC decreases in . Since the pi(ZL) is signiﬁcantly larger than pi(ZH)
then the value of upper bounds of supports of ergodic densities will aﬀect the moments of ergodic
distributions.
The next proposition describes the impact of  on E¯MC . To prove this statement it is suﬃcient to
assume one additional requirement, i.e. that pi(ZL)β > α holds:
32
Proposition 9. If pi(ZL)β > α, P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then dE¯
MC
d evaluated at  = 1
is positive.
30Observe that I assume the existence of ergodic densities. If they do not exist (see for example the Radon-Nikodym
theorem) then all results in this section can be reformulated in terms of probability measures which is always possible.
31Simulations show that the number of consecutive realizations of Z = ZH required for the economy to ﬁnd itself in
the close neighborhood of the level K =
(
Ψ
δ
) 1
1−α
is ≈ 500.
32Observe that since ZH is a rare event then pi(ZL) is close to 1, the same is true for β. Since in the RBC literature
it is assumed that α ≈ 0.33 then this additional condition is not very restrictive.
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Figure 7: Ergodic distributions
Again, Proposition 9 shows which of the two forces aﬀecting E¯MC is stronger when  increases.
The ﬁrst force increases banks' proﬁts when  grows because intermediaries have a stronger impact on
prices qMCB . The second eﬀect implies that if  increases then (by Proposition 8) average K
MC drops
and hence the amount of intermediated capital kMCF is lower. This aﬀects intermediaries' proﬁts in a
negative way as
(
qMCB (Z)− qMCS
)
kMCF (seeHypothesis 1 presented in the Introduction). Proposition
9 shows that the latter eﬀect is dominated by the ﬁrst one. This in turn means that monopolistically
competitive industry accumulates higher equity buﬀer against adverse aggregate shocks.
To illustrate the consequences of Propositions 6-9 let us use numerical simulations. Results are
shown in Figure 7. I standardize the values of aggregate variables: aggregate capital is divided by the
upper bound K¯C and aggregate equity is divided by E¯C .33 Simulation conﬁrms the results presented
in Propositions 8 and 9. The upper bound on K is higher in the economy with perfectly competitive
banks and the upper bound on E is higher for the economy with monopolistically competitive banks.
As it has been expected, ergodic densities exhibit a signiﬁcant concentration in the neighborhood of
the upper bounds since pi(ZH) < pi(ZL).
Observe that the fact that E¯C < E¯MC (this relationship is certainly inherited by the means of
ergodic distributions) has an additional, important consequence. Since the aggregate equity of banks
tends to be higher in the economy with monopolistic intermediaries then the ﬁnancial system has
greater capacity to absorb adverse shocks ZH . Hence, not only is the variance of K (and hence the
variance of output) signiﬁcantly lower in the economy with monopolistic banks but also recessions
experienced by the economy with perfectly competitive banks are more severe. This property is in
33Standardized values of the upper bounds are denoted by: K¯Cstd =
K¯C
K¯C
= 1, K¯MCstd =
K¯MC
K¯C
, E¯Cstd =
E¯C
E¯C
= 1,
E¯MCstd =
E¯MC
E¯C
.
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Figure 8: Market structure and aggregate risk
line with evidence presented in Figure 1 and with considerations of [Gorton (2010)] concerning the
relationship between competition in the ﬁnancial sector and macroeconomic stability.
1.6 Market structure of the ﬁnancial sector and aggregate risk
In this section I study the impact of changes in aggregate risk on performance of diﬀerent market
structures of the banking sector. Similarly to the previous section I concentrate on the upper bounds
of supports of ergodic densities. In what follows I study the impact of changes in the magnitude of
adverse shock ZH on relative diﬀerence in performance between competitive ﬁnancial industry and
monopolistic banking sector. Proposition 10 shows that changes in aggregate uncertainty (in the value
of ZH) have no impact on the standardized diﬀerence in behavior between economy with competitive
banks and economy with monopolistic intermediaries in the neighborhood of the upper bound K¯C :
Proposition 10. If pi(ZL)β > α, P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then
(
dK¯MC
d
)
K¯MC
(evaluated at
 = 1) does not depend on ZH and its value is a function of parameters diﬀerent from ZH (denoted by
ν > 0).
I consider a standardized value of derivative dK¯
MC
d because changes in ZH aﬀect the value of
the upper bound K¯C (or K¯MC). The next proposition analyzes the impact in changes in aggregate
uncertainty on the diﬀerence in equity accumulation between the regime with competitive and with
monopolistic banks:
Proposition 11. If pi(ZL)β > α, P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then
(
dE¯MC
d
)
E¯MC
(evaluated at
 = 1) decreases in ZH .
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Proposition 11 shows that changes in aggregate risk do aﬀect the diﬀerence in accumulation of equity
between competitive and monopolistic banks. More precisely, if ﬁnancial disturbances are larger (i.e.
ZH increases) then the diﬀerence in ergodic distribution of equity buﬀer between two market structures
declines.
Let me interpret the results described by Propositions 10 and 11. It will be instructive to simulate
the model for the low value of ZH and high value of ZH and compare ergodic distributions for those two
cases. Figure 8 shows the results. Notice that simulation conﬁrms the ﬁnding described in Proposition
11: the standardized upper bounds for ergodic density of E when ZH is low (the bottom left panel)
are more distant from each other than those in the bottom right panel of Figure 8. In general, it
can be observed that both distributions converge to each other as ZH grows. This happens because
banks' behavior exhibits an increase in precautionary motives as ZH rises: intermediaries' risk exposure
grows (as the realized losses can be potentially higher) and hence they decide to channel less funds.
This precautionary component of banks' behavior is the same for both monopolistic and competitive
banks. In case of monopolistic banks there is additional important motive that inﬂuences their behavior
since they exercise their market power. The relative role of this monopolistic component declines
as ZH grows (i.e., as the precautionary component expands). This is why ergodic distributions for
monopolistic and competitive banks become more similar as ZH increases.
Now, let me point two additional remarks out. First, notice that the distance between the stan-
dardized upper bounds on capital for the competitive and monopolistic regimes is the same in the
top panels in Figure 8.34 This implies that the negative impact of the monopolistic wedge on capital
accumulation is persistent and it remains unaﬀected by changes in ZH . Second, observe that (quite
surprisingly) the economy with competitive banks does not exhibit much more severe recessions than
the monopolistic regime if aggregate adverse shocks become large. It is somewhat counterintuitive as
one could expect that competitive banks should not be able to absorb large losses during ﬁnancial
crises. This reasoning ignores the precautionary mechanism described above: as the magnitude of
ZH increases, competitive banks decide to channel less funds. This precautionary behavior makes
them similar to monopolistic intermediaries and hence the severity of recessions under both regimes is
very much alike.
1.7 Ineﬃciency of the RCE with competitive banks
In this section I show that the decentralized allocation in economy with competitive banks is ineﬃcient.
To simplify the exposition condition P(AI = 1) = 1 continues to hold. I do that to be able to
formulate the planner's problem in a tractable way.35 First, I point out an important feature of the
34Notice that ∆ is deﬁned as: ∆ ≡ − 1.
35More precisely: if I assume that f (the pdf associated with random variable AI) exists and has support of a strictly
positive measure (not necessarily unbounded) then the social planner should be able to transfer all consumption goods
he wants to transform into investment to the i-producer with highest productivity level A∗I (see [Kurlat (2013)]). This
gives rise to additional source of ineﬃciency of the RCE, as in case of competitive equilibrium there are i-producers with
productivity level strictly lower than A∗I that sell their entire capital and transform some part of consumption goods
they purchase into capital (there are such producers because in the RCE I > 0 - there is no trade in assets otherwise; if,
by contradiction, only i-producers with A∗I invest then I = 0 as point A
∗
I has measure zero for the measure associated
with f). I would like to isolate my analysis from this ineﬃciency so I assume that P(AI = 1) = 1.
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RCE allocation with competitive banks. Second, I formulate the social planner's problem and I solve
it. Finally, I compare both allocations and I identify sources of diﬀerences between them. In other
words I investigate the reasons for which the allocation associated with the RCE is ineﬃcient. To
shorten the exposition derivations are postponed to Appendix A.
Decentralized solution. As we shall see, the main diﬀerence between the decentralized solution
and the optimal outcome is the dependence of capital accumulation process on aggregate shocks Z.
Let us therefore derive the formula for aggregate investment in the decentralized economy in which
P(AI = 1) = 1 (it is assumed that condition 23 holds). First, by Proposition 1, we conclude that
individual investment satisfy:
i = k′ =
qSk
1 + φ
. (25)
Since the supply of capital in case for which P(AI = 1) = 1 is piIK (see Appendix A) then formula for
aggregate investment reads:
I(qS ,K) =
qS(E,K)
1 + φ
· piI ·K. (26)
Observe that from IqS > 0 and by Claim that can be found in Appendix A we can conclude that I
varies with aggregate level of banks' equity E. This means that aggregate shock Z (that inﬂuences E)
has an impact on aggregate investment and capital accumulation.
Eﬃcient allocation. Let us analyze the problem that is solved by the benevolent social planner
that attaches equal Pareto weights to all agents. Planner chooses investment and consumption of
i-producers, c-producers, workers and ﬁnancial intermediaries subject to the resource constraint:
piCcC + piIcI + cF + LcL + I = ACK
αL1−α
and subject to the law of motion for capital:
K ′ = (1− δ)K + I. (27)
Moreover, planner faces the same informational frictions as individual agents in the RCE: he makes
decisions about cI , cL K
′ and I before the realization of the preference shock Z. Hence his maximization
problem can be summarized by the system of two Bellman equations (I have used 27 to eliminate I):
P1(K) = max
cI ,cL,K′
EZ (P2(K,K ′, Z)) ,
P2(K,K
′, Z) = max
cC ,cF
{piC · Z · log cC + piI log cI + log cF + L log cL + βP1(K ′)} .
subject to :
piCcC + piIcI + cF + LcL +K
′ − (1− δ)K = ACKαL1−α
where P1 and P2 are value functions associated with planner's problem. Derivation of the solution to
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planner's problem is shown in Appendix A. It is characterized by the following equation:
βP
′
1(K
′) =
1 + EZZ · piC + L+ piI
ACKαL1−α −K ′ + (1− δ)K .
Notice that the equation above deﬁnes K ′ as an implicit function of K. This (together with the law of
motion for capital) implies that I is function of K and hence it is not aﬀected by the past realizations
of Z. This fact makes it very diﬀerent from the aggregate investment under the RCE with competitive
banks: planner's solution implies that capital K follows a deterministic path which is independent of
shocks to Z.
Except for the dissimilarity in aggregate investment levels there is and additional, signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the optimal outcome and the allocation associated with the RCE. Notice, that id-
iosyncratic shocks (both to AI and those associated with investment opportunities) and the fact that
entrepreneurs have only one instrument to smooth consumption (capital holdings) leads to a nonde-
generate distribution of asset holdings across producers. This coupled with Proposition 1 means that
producers of the same type (i.e., either c-entrepreneurs or i-entrepreneurs) have diﬀerent consumption
levels. This result diﬀers from the planner solution that assigns such consumption plans that each
category of entrepreneurs has the same consumption level. In other words, planner decides to in-
sure producers against the idiosyncratic shocks. The only diﬀerence between their consumption levels
(under the eﬃcient solution) results from the redistributional behavior of the planner that reacts to
changes in Z and decides to transfer more goods to c-producers at the cost of lower consumption of
ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Sources of ineﬃciency of the RCE allocation are discussed in Appendix A in a more detailed way.
One comment is in order here. Observe that the fact that aggregate capital follows a deterministic
path in planner's solution implies that its ergodic distribution is a mass point. This in turn means
that elimination of ﬂuctuations in output is socially desirable. As we have seen in Section 1.5.2, the
presence of the monopolistic banking sector dampens aggregate ﬂuctuations which could suggest that
it is welfare-improving in comparison to the competitive regime. This argument, however, ignores the
fact that the level of output tends to be higher when banks are competitive (Proposition 8). It is
therefore essential to ask what is the socially optimal level of output (or equivalently - capital) and
how it is related to the decentralized outcome?36 The following inequality provides a condition under
which the optimal level of capital is higher than the upper bound for ergodic distribution of capital in
economy with competitive banks:
Kopt = L
(
αAC
1
β
− 1 + δ
) 1
1−α
>
L
piC

{
pi(ZL)
β
1−β
1
κ(ZL)
+
(
pi(ZL) +
pi(ZH )
1−β
)
1
κ(ZH )
}
αAC
1
1−β
δ(1+φ)
piI

1
1−α
= K¯C
where κ(Z) = (1 + φZ) piIpiC +φZ. It can be checked that if piC is close to 1 or in the neighborhood of 0
then the inequality above holds (the latter case can be ignored since it is assumed that 23 is satisﬁed).37
This in turn means that if the idiosyncratic risk is suﬃciently low (i.e., if the chance that entrepreneur
36This question is not trivial because entrepreneurs that accumulate capital face an analogous problem to agents in
the setting introduced by [Aiyagari (1994)]: they make their decisions facing incomplete markets (their only instrument
to insure is stock of capital), borrowing constraints (capital holdings cannot be negative) and idiosyncratic risk (lack
of opportunity to produce consumption goods). This may lead to overaccumulation of capital which is not socially
desirable.
37The easiest way to verify this statement is to start with case in which there is no aggregate uncertainty: ZH = ZL.
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is able to generate consumption goods is high) then the overaccumulation of capital does not happen
and hence the level vs. volatilities trade-oﬀ between competitive and monopolistic regimes is likely
to occur.38
1.8 Conclusions
I have presented a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model with ﬁnancial sector that was applied
to study the business cycle consequences of changes in competition in the ﬁnancial sector. I have used
the model to investigate the dynamic properties of two regimes: the one with competitive banks and
the second with monopolistically competitive intermediaries.
More precisely, I have concentrated on two time horizons: the short-run perspective and the long-
run perspective. The ﬁrst one indicated that competitive banking industry guarantees higher level
of intermediation activities but at the same time it exhibits higher exposure to aggregate risk (losses
generated by competitive banks are larger than those incurred by monopolistic intermediaries). There-
fore if an adverse aggregate shock arrives, equity of competitive banks is drained more severely which
impedes intermediation in subsequent periods. This in turn means that negative impact of monopo-
listic wedge on the amount of channeled funds can be outweighed by greater intermediation ability of
monopolistic banks during economic downturns.
The long-run perspective concerned the analysis of ergodic distributions of aggregate variables. In
particular, I have shown that the short-run trade-oﬀ has its counterpart in the long-run: on the one
hand ergodic density of capital (and output) under competitive regime has its upper bound shifted
to the right in comparison to the upper bound of density associated with monopolistic regime. The
opposite relationship is true for the upper bounds of ergodic densities of banks' equity. This has
an important consequence: higher equity cushion of monopolistic banks cushions adverse aggregate
shocks more eﬀectively which in turn implies lower aggregate uncertainty induced by monopolistic
ﬁnancial sector. Moreover, I have studied the impact of changes in magnitude of preference shocks
on both market structures. Surprisingly, the presence of larger bad shocks does not deteriorate
the performance of competitive regime in comparison to monopolistic one. This happens because
intermediaries response with more precautionary behavior to increases in the size of bad shocks which
makes behavior of banks under two regimes very much alike. Therefore, the ability of competitive banks
to absorb aggregate shocks is similar to the one exhibited by monopolistic ﬁnancial institutions.
Last, I characterize the planner's solution and discuss its relationship to economies with monopo-
listic and competitive intermediaries. Optimal outcome exhibits no aggregate ﬂuctuations in the long
run. This qualitative feature makes it similar to economy with monopolistic banks. This, however,
does not mean that monopolistic market structure outperforms competitive one in terms of welfare
- it is because economy with competitive banks tends to have higher output level than the one with
38Observe that I have not addressed the issue of welfare under various market structures in a direct way (i.e., by
computing the value of welfare criterion that aggregates individual utilities). It is because there are three types of agents
in my model and a discretionary choice of Pareto weights could aﬀect the outcome of such an exercise substantially (e.g.,
high Pareto weights attached to bankers would make the monopolistic regime more socially-desirable in comparison to
the competitive one).
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monopolistic intermediaries.
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Appendix A
Discussion about the assumptions
Let us come back to the model in which the distribution of productivity AI is non-trivial. In this part,
I discuss the key assumptions that has been made so far.
Independent and identically distributed aggregate shock. This assumption is made for
three reasons.
First, I make it because I want to eliminate the inﬂuence of shocks' persistence on agents' decisions.
In particular, if I assumed that Z is Markovian then pi(ZL) and pi(ZH) would be replaced by pi(ZL|Z−1)
and pi(ZH |Z−1), respectively where pi(·|Z−1) is probability measure of current aggregate shock condi-
tional on the previous realization of Z - Z−1. Then it would imply that qS (and by market clearing
conditions kF , too) that is implicitly deﬁned by 13 depends not only on E but also on Z−1. Hence
it would be hard to isolate the inﬂuence of E on kF from the impact of agents' expectations about
the realization of Z (captured by pi(ZL|Z−1) and pi(ZH |Z−1)) on banks' decision about kF . Since the
former is the key force in my analysis and it is a channel that is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by changes in
the intermediaries' market structure then I wanted to keep it clear and isolated from inﬂuence of any
additional factors.
Second, if despite the assumption about i.i.d. shocks, the model is able to generate persistent
changes in economic aggregates then importance of the underlying acceleration mechanism (that works
through the eﬀect of E on kF and Y in my model) is shown. A similar argument for using i.i.d. shocks
is presented in [Bernanke and Gertler (1989)].
Third, this assumption enables me to calculate the closed-form solutions for the value function and
the associated policies of producers (i.e., functions presented in Proposition 1).
In Section ?? I add Markovian productivity shock to the model which makes it impossible to solve
the model analytically.
Non-degenerate distribution of productivity AI . Observe that if a continuous density f (with
support R+) characterizes the distribution of AI then supply of capital S(qS ,K) is an increasing and
diﬀerentiable function of qS with S(0,K) > 0. This implies that we do not need to make any additional
assumptions about parameters (analogous to condition 23) to guarantee the existence of RCE. This
in turn means that we do not impose any additional constraints on parameters that could constrain
parametrization/calibrations of the model. Moreover, this assumption gives rise to an additional
channel through which price qS (and conditions of banks' balance sheets) aﬀects the real economy (in
particular, the aggregate investment). This channel changes the extensive margin of investment since
qS aﬀects the investment decisions of i-producers. For instance, if qS jumps then more i-entrepreneurs
ﬁnd their investment opportunities proﬁtable and hence more producers sell their entire capital to
ﬁnance their investment project. This mechanism is absent if we consider the model with equal
investment opportunities (e.g., P(AI = 1) = 1).
C-producers and i-producers that switch their types over time. Similarly to [Bigio (2015b)]
I use a random and i.i.d. assignment of producer types. The randomness reduces the state space: if it
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is relaxed then we would have to keep track of both capital held by i-producers and c-producers. As-
sumption about the i.i.d. structure of these shocks could be replaced by the Markovian setup in which
distribution of entrepreneurs across the two types is stationary of the corresponding Markov chain.39
This would make the notation more complex and worsen the clarity of exposition. Since replacing
the assumption about i.i.d. assignments by Markovian ones would keep the qualitative features of my
results unaﬀected then I follow the simpler stochastic structure in this work.
Diﬀerent production technologies. Observe that there are two production technologies: a
linear one (given by formula AI ·i) and the Cobb-Douglas technology that is operated by c-entrepreneurs
(that uses two inputs: capital and labor). I assume this asymmetry (i.e., that investment goods are not
produced by means of the Cobb-Douglas technology) to create a channel through which the amount
of intermediation aﬀects real economy. Observe that if investment goods are produced directly from
consumption goods transferred by banks then this channel emerges in a natural way: the more capital
kF is transferred by banks from i-entrepreneurs to c-producers, the higher is the amount of resources
(consumption goods) that can be used for production of new capital by i-producers. It is because qS
increases together with kF and hence qS · kF grows as well.
Derivations from Section 1.5.2
Let us describe how the economy with P(AI = 1) = 1 looks like. I use Lemma 1 to conclude that all
i-entrepreneurs invest only if:
qS(K,E) ≥ 1− δ.
If this condition does not hold the none of them invest. This implies that the capital supply function
takes the following form:
S(qs,K) =
piI ·K if qS(K,E) ≥ 1− δ0 otherwise (28)
Observe that 28 and the market clearing for deposits imply that the amount of intermediated capital
is not dependent on E. The problem of c-producer remains unchanged so aggregate demand for capital
is:
D(qB ,K, Z) =
[
1
1 + φZ
· G(K)
qB
+
1
1 + φZ
− 1
]
· piC ·K.
Since S(qS ,K) is not a continuous function then we need an additional argument to show that equilib-
rium exists if P(AI = 1) = 1. This condition in shown in the main text, and is summarized by Lemma
3.
Intermediaries solve the same problem as before. We are in position to prove existence and unique-
ness of equilibrium in the simpliﬁed environment. Similarly to the more general case the equilib-
rium condition (i.e. bank's FOC combined with market clearing for deposits and capital sold to
c-entrepreneurs) plays crucial role (recall that if 23 holds then S(qS ,K) = S(K) = piIK; this implies,
additionally, that inverse demand function D−1 is independent of E):
39This assumption would be more realistic because producers would switch their types in a persistent manner.
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pi(ZL) · D
−1 (K,ZL)− qS
E + [D−1 (K,ZL)− qS ]piIK
pi(ZH) · D
−1 (K,ZH)− qS
E + [D−1 (K,ZH)− qS ]piIK = 0. (29)
The following theorem shows that qS that solves 29 exists and is unique.
Theorem. If 23 holds then solution to equation 29 exists and is unique.
It is clear that the amount of reallocated capital is independent of E as it is always equal to piIK.
This means that result analogous to Claim 1 does not hold. It does not mean however that qS is not
related to changes in E. This relationship is summarized by the following claim:
Claim. Price qS paid by banks for capital bought from i-producers increases in E (forK kept constant).
Ineﬃciency of the RCE with competitive banks
Solution to the planner's problem. Let us compute the solution to the second stage problem (it
is derived for given values of cI , cL, K
′ and K). Let us deﬁne the amount of resources available during
the second stage:
Ω (K,K ′, cI , cL) = ACKαL1−α − piIcI − LcL −K ′ + (1− δ)K. (30)
Combining the FOCs associated with cC and cF yields:
cC = ZcF .
Plugging into the resource constraint yields:
cF =
Ω (K,K ′, cI , cL)
1 + ZpiC
,
cC =
Z · Ω (K,K ′, cI , cL)
1 + ZpiC
.
We use these results to reformulate the ﬁrst stage problem:
P1(K) = max
cI ,cL,K′
EZ
(
piC · Z · log
(
Z · Ω (K,K ′, cI , cL)
1 + ZpiC
)
+ piI log cI
+ log
(
Ω (K,K ′, cI , cL)
1 + ZpiC
)
+ L log cL + βP1(K
′)
)
.
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Since we have log preferences we can extract terms Z1+ZpiC and
1
1+ZpiC
which simpliﬁes our further
calculations. FOCs associated with per capita consumption levels cI and cL yield:
cI = cL =
Ω (K,K ′, cI , cL)
1 + EZZ · piC .
First order condition for K ′ is:
βP
′
1(K
′) =
1 + EZZ · piC
Ω (K,K ′, cI(K), cL(K))
. (31)
Let us plug formulas for cI and cL into 30 and then combine it with 31 to get:
βP
′
1(K
′) =
1 + EZZ · piC + L+ piI
ACKαL1−α −K ′ + (1− δ)K . (32)
Sources of ineﬃciency of the RCE allocation. Observe that producers cannot fully insure
against the next period's value of idiosyncratic shock - they can use either deposits (if they are
i-entrepreneurs) or purchase capital from intermediaries (if they are c-producers) but none of these
options can insure them against being i-producer, insure them against becoming c-producer next period
and simultaneously protect them against shifts in Z.40 Incompleteness of insurance markets faced by
producers leads to a non-degenerate distribution of capital holdings and diﬀerent consumption levels
across entrepreneurs of the same type - this allocation feature is absent in case of the planner solution.
Incompleteness of insurance markets faced by intermediaries means that they cannot reduce the
aggregate risk associated with shifts in demand for assets caused by changes in Z. Observe that
if this risk is eliminated (e.g., by transfers that cover potential losses if the diﬀerence between the
value of assets sold and deposits that has to be repaid is negative) then price qS would move towards
qB(ZL). The latter price, by the previous discussion, does not depend on E and hence both the value
of reallocated capital and aggregate investment becomes independent of history Z which establishes
a qualitative similarity between the planner's solution and the RCE with transfers on the aggregate
level. Hence the market incompleteness faced by banks induces them to reduce their intermediating
activities which makes the reallocation of capital vulnerable to shifts in Z.
40Observe that in the baseline model in which P(AI = 1) = 1 does not hold there is an additional source of idiosyncratic
uncertainty - shocks that aﬀect the productivity level AI .
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Appendix B
Lemma 1
Suppose that i and kS solve 2. If AI > A
∗
I(qS) then i > 0 and kS = k. If AI ≤ A∗I(qS) then i = 0 and
0 < kS < k.
Proof. Suppose that AI > A
∗
I(qS) =
1−δ
qS
. By contradiction assume that optimal solution to 2 involves:
i ≥ 0 and 0 < kS < k. Consider the following deviation from the optimal plan: i-producers sells an
additional portion of its capital κ (0 < κ < k−ks) and spends a proportion x = 1−δAIqS of the proceedings
κqS from this transaction on additional investment. Proportion 1− x > 0 (it is positive as AI > 1−δqS
) is used for increasing consumption. The budget constraint is not violated. Observe that k′does not
change:
∆k′ = AI(i+ xκqS) + (1− δ)(k − kS − κ)−AI i− (1− δ)(k − kS)
= AIxκqS − (1− δ)κ = AI 1− δ
AIqS
κqS − (1− δ)κ = 0.
At the same time c increased so this means that plan that involved i ≥ 0 and 0 < kS < k was not
optimal.
Let us consider the case in which AI < A
∗
I(qS) =
1−δ
qS
. Again, by contradiction suppose that optimal
solution to 2 involves: i > 0 and 0 < kS ≤ k. Consider the following deviation from the optimal plan:
i-producer decreases investment by 0 < ι < i and to guarantee that it budget constraint holds it
decreases the amount of capital k that is sold (i.e., kS ) by
AqS
1−δ
ι
qS
. At the same time he consumes the
amount 1−δ−AqS1−δ ι of non-invested goods. As before, k
′ remains unaﬀected by this deviation:
∆k′ = AI(i− ι) + (1− δ)(k + AqS
1− δ
ι
qS
− kS)−AI i− (1− δ)(k − kS)
= −AIι+ (1− δ) AqS
1− δ
ι
qS
= 0.
At the same time, consumption increased so plan that involved i > 0 and 0 < kS ≤ k is not optimal.
Observe that i-producer remains indiﬀerent between actions that either increase/decrease i and
decrease/increase kS when AI = A
∗
I(qS) =
1−δ
qS
so that WLOG we set i = 0 and kS = k in such
situation.
Proposition 1
Decision rules and value function of an i-producer that has productivity level AI < A
∗
I(qS) are:
c = φ1+φωI0 , k
′
= 11+φ
(1−δ)ωI0
qS
, V I0 = ΨI0(K,E) +
(
1 + 1φ
)
logωI0 where ωI0 = qSk and φ =
1−β
β(Π(AL)+Π(AH)EZ) . Decision rules and value function of an i-producer that has productivity level
AI ≥ A∗I(qS) are: c = φ1+φωIP , k
′
= 11+φAIωIP , V
IP = ΨIP (K,E,AI) +
(
1 + 1φ
)
logωIP where
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ωIP = qSk. Decision rules and value function of a c-producer are: c =
φZ
1+φZωC , k
′
= 11+φZ
(1−δ)ωC
qB
,
V C = ΨC(K,E,Z) +
(
Z + 1φ
)
logωC where ωC = (G(K) + qB) k.
Proof. Let us prove the case of the i-producer that has productivity level AI ≥ A∗I(qS) . The remaining
cases are analogous and I will omit them.
First, calculate i from the law of motion and plug it into the budget constraint. I get:
c+
k′
AI
= qSk.
Let us denote ωIP = qSk. This transforms our problem into a standard consumption-savings problem
and enables me to use arguments presented by Alvarez and Stokey [Alvarez and Stokey (1998)] re-
garding dynamic programming problem with homogeneous objective function (in particular, solution
to Bellman equation is unique).
To prove the exact functional forms of policies listed in Proposition 1, I proceed by guess and
verify method. Let us substitute the guesses of V IP , V I0 V C into i-producer's (that has AI ≥ A∗I(qS))
Bellman equation:
V IP (k,K,E,AI) = max
c>0,i≥0,k′>0
{
log(c) + βEZ,Z′,A′
I
(
piI · PAI
(
AI ≥ A∗I (q′S)
) · (ΨIP (K′, E′, A′I) + (1 + 1φ
)
logω′IP
)
+piI · PAI
(
AI < A
∗
I (q
′
S)
) · (ΨI0 (K′, E′) + (1 + 1
φ
)
logω′I0
)
+piC ·
(
ΨC(K′, E′, Z′) +
(
Z′ +
1
φ
)
logω′C
)
|K,E
)}
.
subject to :
c+ k
′
AI
= qSk,
E′ = E′(K,E,Z),
K ′ = K ′(K,E),
By the fact that logω′IP = log q
′
s + log k
′ (similarly for logω′I0 and logω
′
C) I get:
V IP (k,K,E,AI) = max
c>0,k′
log(c) +
1
φ
log k′ + Ψ¯IP (K,E)
subject to :
c+
k′
AI
= ωIP .
FOC is:
k
′
=
1
1 + φ
·AIωIP .
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From the budget constraint we get:
c =
φ
1 + φ
ωIP ,
which conﬁrms our guess for decision rules. I plug solutions for c and k′ back to Bellman equation:
V IP = ΨIP (K,E,AI) +
(
1 +
1
φ
)
logωIP
which completes the proof.
Proposition 2
If A1 holds then decision rules and value function of intermediary are: c = (1 − β)ωF , e′ = βωF ,
W2 = Ψ
F (K,E,Z) + 11−β logωF , kF = Φ(K,E) · e, where ωF = e+ (qB − qS)kF .
Proof. The method used to prove Proposition 2 is analogous to one that was used to show that
Proposition 1 holds. There is however one additional issue that needs to be solved: we need to show
that the budget constraint
c+ e′ = e+ (qB − qS)kF
can be rearranged to the form of a constraint that is present in the standard consumption-savings
problem. To prove that, let us ﬁrst plug the guess for W2 into W1:
W1(e,K,E) = max
kF
EZ
(
ΨF (K,E,Z) +
1
1− β logωF
)
,
substituting ωF = e+ (qB(K,E,Z)− qS(K,E))kF I get:
W1(e,K,E) = max
kF
EZ
(
ΨF (K,E,Z) +
1
1− β log (e+ (qB(K,E,Z)− qS(K,E))kF )
)
.
The FOC under A1 reads:
pi(ZL) · qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)
e+ [qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)] kF
+ pi(ZH) · qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)
e+ [qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)] kF = 0. (33)
After a reformulation we get:
kF =
(
pi(ZH)
qS(K,E)− qB(K,E,ZL) −
pi(ZL)
qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)
)
e
= EZ
(
pi(Z)
qS(K,E)− qB(K,E,Z)
)
e
40
which veriﬁes my guess: kF = Φ(K,E) · e. Let us show that kF is positive. Observe that it is true iﬀ:
pi(ZH)
qS(K,E)− qB(K,E,ZL) >
pi(ZL)
qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E) ,
which is equivalent to:
pi(ZH) (qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)) + pi(ZL) (qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)) > 0. (34)
I will show later, that in equilibrium: qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E) < 0 and qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E) > 0.
Additionally, I can write the FOC 33 in the following form:
C1pi(ZH) (qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E))
+C2pi(ZL) (qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)) = 0,
where C1 > C2 (because qB(K,E,ZH)−qS(K,E) < 0 and qB(K,E,ZL)−qS(K,E) > 0 in equilibrium).
This implies that:
pi(ZH) (qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E))
+
C2
C1pi(ZL) (qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)) = 0,
where C2C1 < 1. But this means that 34 holds as the weight of 1 given to a positive term qB(K,E,ZL)−
qS(K,E) > 0 is higher than
C2
C1 in the equation above.
We are now in position to ﬁnish the proof in a standard way which was used for veriﬁcation of
policies and value functions of entrepreneurs. First note that since kF = Φ(K,E) · e then:
W2(kF , e,K,E,Z) = W˜2(e,K,E,Z).
This means that:
W˜2(e,K,E,Z) = max
c,e′
(log c+ βW1(e
′,K ′, E′))
subject to :
c+ e′ = (1 + (qB − qS)Φ(K,E)) e = ωF ,
E′ = e′.
K ′ = K ′(K,E).
I plug my guess for W2 into W1 and to the equation above:
W˜2(e,K,E,Z) = max
c,e′
(
log c+ βEZ′
(
ΨF (K ′, E′, Z ′) +
1
1− β log (e
′ + (qB − qS)Φ(K ′, E′)e′)
))
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subject to
c+ e′ = ωB .
E′ = e′
K ′ = K ′(K,E).
This means that:
W˜2(e,K,E,Z) = max
c,e′
(
log c+
β
1− β log e
′ + Ψ˜F (K,E,Z)
)
,
c+ e′ = ωF .
First order conditions are: e′ = βωF and c = (1− β)ωF . This conﬁrms my guess for policy functions.
We plug them back into Bellman equations to get:
W˜2(e,K,E,Z) =
1
1− β logωF + Ψ
F (K,E,Z),
but we know that ωF = e + (qB − qS)kF (i.e., ωF is a function of kF ) so I can return to the initial
formulation of W2:
W2(kF , e,K,E,Z) = Ψ
F (K,E,Z) +
1
1− β logωF
and this completes the proof.
Lemma 2
The following inequalities hold in equilibrium:
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) < qS ,
D−1(S(qS),K, ZL) > qS .
Proof. I will prove Lemma 2 by contradiction: Suppose that in equilibrium:
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) ≥ qS
D−1(S(qS),K, ZL) > qS .
This implies that (by the market clearing conditions in Deﬁnition 1): qB(ZH) ≥ qS and qB(ZL) > qS
(I omit arguments K,E of qB for clarity of exposition) but then banks have incentives to increase kF
which cannot happen in equilibrium.
Suppose that in equilibrium:
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D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) < qS
D−1(S(qS),K, ZL) ≤ qS .
This implies: qB(ZH) < qS and qB(ZL) ≤ qS but then banks have incentives to decrease kF which
cannot happen in equilibrium.
Suppose that in equilibrium:
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) > qS
D−1(S(qS),K, ZL) < qS .
This implies that D−1(S(qS),K, ZL) < D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) and contradicts the fact that D is strictly
decreasing in Z. Same argument excludes the possibility that:
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) = qS
D−1(S(qS),K, ZL) = qS .
This completes the proof.
Theorem 1
If A1 holds then solution to equation 13 exists and is unique.
Proof. Let us prove existence ﬁrst. I reformulate the equilibrium condition 13 to get:
piH
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
= −(1− piH)D
−1(S(qS),K, ZL)− qS
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS , (35)
where piL = pi(ZL) and piH = pi(ZH). I omit argument of S (i.e., argument K) to economize
on notation. This reformulation was possible since by Lemma 2 D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) − qS 6= 0 and
by the log speciﬁcation of preferences the non-zero consumption in problem 10 implies that e +
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS) 6= 0.
By qS denote qS that satisﬁes:
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS = 0.
This number exists because there exists value qS (because D(qS ,K, ZH) and S(qS) intersect only
once - see Figure 5) such that: S(qS) = D(qS ,K, ZH) (and this implies the existence of qS that solves
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) = qS). Notice that for qS converging to qS from above, the LHS of the reformulated
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Figure 9: Theorem 1 - existence, case q¯S,1 ≤ q¯S,2
Figure 10: Theorem 1 - existence, case q¯S,1 > q¯S,2
44
equilibrium condition 35 is a ﬁnite positive number and the RHS converges to +∞ (as the denominator
is negative by Lemma 2).
Now let us deﬁne two additional numbers that are strictly greater than qS : the ﬁrst one, q¯S,1solves:
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS) = 0. (36)
There exists such a number greater than qS because the LHS of 36 evaluated at qS is equal to e > 0.
On the other hand since limqS→+∞ S(qS) = piI ·K and hence limqS→+∞D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) is a ﬁnite
positive number, then the LHS of 36 converges to −∞ as qS → +∞. This means that q¯S,1 exists by
the Mean Value Property (since the LHS of 36 is continuous). Observe that if qS converges to q¯S,1
then the LHS approaches to +∞ and the RHS is a ﬁnite positive number. The second one is: q¯S,2that
solves:
D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)− qS = 0,
existence of which is guaranteed by identical reasons as those presented for qS (observe that if the
intersection of D(qS ,K, ZH) and S(qS) is well deﬁned then the intersection of D(qS ,K, ZL) and S(qS)
exists, too).
Let us consider two cases: q¯S,1 > q¯S,2 and q¯S,2 ≥ q¯S,1. If q¯S,2 ≥ q¯S,1 then from what was said
above the two continuous curves deﬁned by the RHS and the LHS of the reformulated FOC 35 must
intersect at some point q∗S ∈ (qS , q¯S,1) as one of them converges to +∞ at one end of this interval while
the other is positive (not necessarily strictly positive) and the situation is the other way round on the
other end of the interval. If q¯S,1 > q¯S,2 it can be observed that for qS converging to qS the RHS goes
to +∞ and the LHS is strictly positive. For qS converging to q¯S,2 the RHS converges to 0 while the
LHS approaches to a strictly positive number. Since the are both continuous for (qS , q¯S,2) then they
must intersect at some point q∗S ∈ (qS , q¯S,2). This means that a solution to 13 exists.
Let us prove uniqueness now. I will be using another form of 13:
(1− piH) D
−1(S(qS),K, ZL)− qS
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS) =
piH
qS −D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS) . (37)
Let us analyze the RHS of the reformulated FOC 37 now. It can be calculated that:
(
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
)′
=
1
(e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS))2
·
{(
S′(qS)
DqB (D
−1(S(qS),K, ZH), ZH)
− 1
)
· (e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS))
−
[
S′(qS) · (D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS) + S(qS) ·
(
S′(qS)
DqB (D
−1(S(qS),K, ZH), ZH)
− 1
)]
· (D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS)}
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=
1
(e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS))2
·
{(
S′(qS)
DqB (D
−1(S(qS),K, ZH), ZH)
− 1
)
· e− S′(qS)
(
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS
)2}
< 0 (38)
This is because e > 0, S′(qS) > 0 and DqB < 0. This implies that the RHS is an increasing function
of qS . It is easy to see that analogous calculations prove that the LHS is a decreasing function of qS .
This means that the RHS and the LHS of 37 intersect at most once. But by our previous consid-
erations we know that they do intersect so the point of the intersection is unique.
Claim 1
Aggregate reallocation of capital kF increases with E.
Proof. From the bank's FOC and E = e we get:
(1− piH) D
−1(S(qS),K, ZL)− qS
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
+ piH
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS) = 0. (39)
Let us denote the LHS of 39 by B(qs, E) (I can ignore the second state variable - K as it is chosen in
the ﬁrst stage of the previous period and hence it remains unaﬀected by the choice of E in the second
stage of the previous period) in From the proof of uniqueness we know that BqS (qs, E) < 0. Let us
check the sign of BE(qs, E) now. I calculate:
BE(qs, E)
= −(1− piH) D
−1(S(qS),K, ZL)− qS
(E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS))2
− piH D
−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS
(E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS))2
. (40)
Since BE(qs, E) is evaluated in equilibrium then bank's FOC must hold and then I can substitute
piH
D−1(S(qS),K,ZH)−qS
E+D−1(S(qS),K,ZH)S(qS)−qSS(qS) for (1− piH)
D−1(S(qS),K,ZL)−qS
E+D−1(S(qS),K,ZL)S(qS)−qSS(qS) in 40 to get:
BE(qs, E)
= piH
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
·
(
1
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS) −
1
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
)
.
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Observe that since by Lemma 2 D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS < 0 and by the fact that:
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS) > E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
value BE(qs, E) evaluated in equilibrium is positive. I use the Implicit Function Theorem to obtain:
k′F (E) > 0.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 3
Condition 24 holds for all parameter values.
Proof. Let us rewrite the condition that we want to prove:
∀K G(K)
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
> 1− δ. (41)
My strategy is the following: I ﬁnd the upper bound for K (I denote it by K˜) in the dynamic model.
Then I prove that 41 holds for K˜. Then I use the fact that G decreases in K and hence I get the result
for all K.
First, let us ﬁnd K˜. Observe that the rate of aggregate investment satisﬁes:
I(qS ,K) =
qSpiIK
1 + φ
<
qB(ZL)piIK
1 + φ
= I(qB(ZL),K).
It is because in equilibrium qS < qB(ZL). It is clear (from 28 and from 6) that qB(ZL) depends solely
on one state variable, i.e. K so we do not need to keep track of E in the further considerations.
Suppose that the economy experiences an inﬁnitely long path of good shocks Z = ZL. This means
that (if we assume that K0 is suﬃciently small) under investment I(qB(ZL),K) the aggregate capital
K converges to steady state characterized by the following equation:
I(qB(ZL),K) = δK. (42)
This steady state is our candidate K˜. We calculate (I use the inverse demand function to replace
qB(ZL)):
I(qB(ZL),K) =
qB(ZL)piIK
1 + φ
=
G(K)
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
· piIK
1 + φ
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=
(1− α) 1α
(
α
1−α
)
A
1
α
C (1− α)
α−1
α A
α−1
α
C (piCK)
α−1
L1−α
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
· piIK
1 + φ
.
We use 42 to compute K˜:
K˜ =
 αACpiI
δ
(
(1 + φZL)
piI
piC
+ φZL
)
(1 + φ)
 11−α L
piC
.
Now I show that 41 holds for K˜.
G(K˜)
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
> 1− δ
⇐⇒
[
(1 + φZL)
piI
piC
+ φZL
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
]
1 + φ
piI
>
1
δ
− 1
which is implied by our assumption about parameter values 23. Since K˜ is an upper bound for all
capital values then by the fact that G decreases with K we have:
∀K G(K)
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
> 1− δ
which completes the proof.
Theorem 1.8
If 23 holds then solution to equation 29 exists and is unique.
Proof. Let us rewrite the equilibrium condition 29:
pi(ZL) · D
−1 (K,ZL)− qS
E + [D−1 (K,ZL)− qS ]piIK
pi(ZH) · D
−1 (K,ZH)− qS
E + [D−1 (K,ZH)− qS ]piIK = 0. (43)
It is clear that we need to consider values of qS that satisfy: qS ∈
(
D−1 (K,ZH) , D−1 (K,ZL)
)
(by a similar reasoning to the one captured by Lemma 2). The LHS of 43 is continuous for qS ∈(
D−1 (K,ZH) ,min
{
D−1 (K,ZL) , q¯S
})
where q¯S solves:
E +
[
D−1 (K,ZH)− q¯S
]
piIK = 0
=⇒ q¯S = D−1 (K,ZH) + E
piIK
.
48
For qS = D
−1 (K,ZH) the LHS of 43 is positive. Suppose that min
{
D−1 (K,ZL) , q¯S
}
= D−1 (K,ZL)
then the LHS of 43 is negative. If min
{
D−1 (K,ZL) , q¯S
}
= q¯S then the LHS of 43 converges to −∞
for qS → q¯S . This means that by the Mean Value Theorem, solution to 43 exists.
Let us prove uniqueness now. Let us concentrate on the derivative of D
−1(K,Z)−qS
E+[D−1(K,Z)−qS ]piIK now:(
D−1 (K,Z)− qS
E + [D−1 (K,Z)− qS ]piIK
)′
=
−E
(E + [D−1 (K,Z)− qS ]piIK)2
< 0.
This means that the LHS of 43 is strictly decreasing. This and existence of qS that satisﬁes 43 means
that this solution is unique.
Claim 1.8
Price qS paid by banks for capital bought from i-producers increases in E (for K kept constant).
Proof. We will apply the Implicit Function Theorem to 29. From the proof of Theorem 1.8 we know
that the derivative of the LHS of 29 decreases with qS . Derivative of the LHS of 29 with respect to E
is:
−
{
piH
D−1 (K,ZH)− qS
E + [D−1 (K,ZH)− qS ]piIK
·
(
1
E + [D−1 (K,ZH)− qS ]piIK
− 1
E + [D−1 (K,ZL)− qS ]piIK
)}
< 0.
This implies that (qS(K,E))
′
E > 0.
Proposition 3
If A1 holds then decision rules and value function of monopolistic intermediary are: c = (1 − β)ωF ,
e′ = βωF , W2 = ΨF (K,E,Z) + 11−β logωF , kF,j = Φ˜(K,E) · e, where ωF = e+ (qB − qS) kF,j .
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that the FOC with respect to kF,j of the following expression:
W1(e,K,E) = max
kF,j
EZ
(
ΨF (K,E,Z) +
1
1− β log
(
e+
(
qB ·
(
kF
kF,j
)1− 1
− qS
)
kF,j
))
,
deﬁnes an implicit, linear relationship between e and kF,j - the rest of the proof is done exactly in the
same way as in proof of Proposition 2.
The FOC reads:
pi(ZL) ·
1
 qB(K,E,ZL)
(
kF,j
kF
) 1
−1 − qS(K,E)
e+
[
qB(K,E,ZL)
(
kF,j
kF
) 1
−1 − qS(K,E)
]
kF
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pi(ZH) ·
1
 qB(K,E,ZH)
(
kF,j
kF
) 1
−1 − qS(K,E)
e+
[
qB(K,E,ZH)
(
kF,j
kF
) 1
−1 − qS(K,E)
]
kF
= 0. (44)
Since I consider the symmetric case in which e = E and rational agents recognize that their decisions
are identical then they know that kF,j = kF and hence the FOC is:
pi(ZL) ·
1
 qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)
e+ [qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)] kF
pi(ZH) ·
1
 qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)
e+ [qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)] kF = 0. (45)
Observe that 45 implies that there exists a linear relationship between kF,j and e: kF,j = Φ˜(K,E) · e.
This in turn means that the budget constraint can be reformulated:
ωF = e+ (qB − qS) Φ˜(K,E) · e
and hence the problem of the monopolistic intermediary becomes a standard consumption-savings
problem.
Theorem 2
Under A1 solution to equation 20 exists and is unique.
Proof. First, observe that analogously to Lemma 2, marginal proﬁt from intermediation in state ZH :
MP (ZH) = pi(ZH) ·
1
 qB(K,E,ZH)−qS(K,E)
e+[qB(K,E,ZH)−qS(K,E)]kF is negative and marginal proﬁt from intermediation in
state ZL: MP (ZL) = pi(ZL) ·
1
 qB(K,E,ZL)−qS(K,E)
e+[qB(K,E,ZL)−qS(K,E)]kF is positive. If, by contradiction, MP (ZL) <
0 < MP (ZH) then it violates the relationship:
qB(K,E,ZH) = D
−1 (S(qS(K,E)),K, ZH) < D−1 (S(qS(K,E)),K, ZL) = qB(K,E,ZL) (46)
which is implied by DZ < 0. If, by contradiction MP (ZL) > 0 and MP (ZH) ≥ 0 or MP (ZL) < 0 and
MP (ZH) ≤ 0 then equality described by bank's FOC is violated. It is violated also for MP (ZL) = 0
and MP (ZH) < 0 and by MP (ZH) = 0 and MP (ZL) > 0. Observe that 46 excludes the possibility
that MP (ZH) = 0 and MP (ZL) = 0. This implies that if equilibrium exists then the following
relationship must hold:
MP (ZL) > 0 > MP (ZH). (47)
Since logarithmic preferences imply: e+[qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E)] kF > 0 and e+[qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E)] kF >
0 then 47 implies:
1

qB(K,E,ZL)− qS(K,E) > 0 > 1

qB(K,E,ZH)− qS(K,E).
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We are in position to prove existence of equilibrium. It can be done in an analogous way as in proof
of existence of solution to 13, with the only diﬀerence that qS is deﬁned as qs that satisﬁes:
S(qS ,K) = D(qS ,K, ZH)
and q¯S,2 is qs that solves:
S(qS ,K) = D(qS ,K, ZL).
This means that solution to 20 exists.
Let us consider uniqueness now. Reformulated equilibrium condition 20 is:
(1− piH)
1
D
−1(S(qS),K, ZL)− qS
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS) =
piH
qS − 1D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS) . (48)
Let us calculate: ( 1
D
−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
)′
=
1
(e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS))2
·
{(
1

S′(qS)
DqB (D
−1(S(qS),K, ZH), ZH)
− 1
)
· e
−S′(qS)
(
D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS
)2
−(1− 1

) ·D−1(S(qS),K, ZH) · S(qS)
+
(
1− 1

)
· qS · S(qS) · S
′(qS)
DqB (D
−1(S(qS),K, ZH), ZH)
}
< 0.
It is because all terms in braces are negative (by the fact that S′ > 0, DqB < 0, D
−1 > 0, S > 0 and
 > 1). This means that the LHS of 48 decreases in qS and the RHS increases in qS . Since we know
that they intersect (by existence) it means that solution to 48 is unique.
Claim 2
Aggregate reallocation of capital kF increases with E in RCE with monopolistically competitive inter-
mediaries.
Proof. Proof is almost identical to the case of RCE with perfectly competitive banks. Steps are the
same, the Implicit Function Theorem is used. I only show that the partial derivative of the LHS of 20
with respect to e reads:
piH
1

D(S(qS),K, ZH)− qS
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
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·
(
1
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
− 1
E +D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS)
)
> 0.
Since (by the proof of uniqueness) the partial derivative of the LHS of 20 with respect to qS is negative.
Hence by the Implicit Function Theorem k′F (E) > 0.
Proposition 4
If the initial value of aggregate intermediaries' equity E and aggregate capital K are the same in both
economies: the one with competitive banks and the one with monopolistically competitive intermedi-
aries, then the amount of intermediated capital is strictly higher in economy with competitive banks
than in economy with monopolistically competitive intermediaries.
Proof. It suﬃces to investigate equilibrium conditions 13 and 20. Let us reformulate them to get:
(1− piH)
1
D
−1(S(qS),K, ZL)− qS
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS) =
piH
qS − 1D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS) , (49)
for economy with monopolistically competitive banks and:
(1− piH) D
−1(S(qS),K, ZL)− qS
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZL)S(qS)− qSS(qS) =
piH
qS −D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)
e+D−1(S(qS),K, ZH)S(qS)− qSS(qS) , (50)
for economy with competitive intermediaries. From proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 we know that the LHS
of 50 can be treated as decreasing function of qS . On the other hand the RHS of 50 increases in qS .
Analogous results hold for the RHS and the LHS of 49. It is immediate that the curve deﬁned by the
LHS of 49 is strictly below the curve deﬁned by the LHS of 50 since 1 < 1. On the other hand the
curve deﬁned by the RHS of 49 is strictly above the one deﬁned by the RHS 50. This implies that the
point of intersection described by 49 - qMCS is smaller than q
C
S that solves 50. But this means that:
kMCF = S(q
MC
S ) < S(q
C
S ) = k
C
F ,
which completes the proof.
Proposition 6
The common lower bound on the supports of ergodic densities associated with EC and EMC is 0.
Proof. Let us assume that upper bounds on densities' supports of EC and EMC exist (this will be
shown in subsequent propositions). Let's denote them by E¯Cand E¯MC . Take an arbitrarily small
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number µ > 0. The idea of the proof (for the lower bounds E¯Cand E¯MC) is to show that with some
positive probability there exists a suﬃciently long path of adverse shocks {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH} that the
corresponding path of ECt (or WLOG the path of E
MC
t ) decreases below µ. Then it is argued (by
the Borel-Cantelli lemma) that for almost all trajectories {Zt}+∞t=0 there is an inﬁnite number of such
sequences {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH} and since the economy starts (i.e., when such sequence begins) from the
lower level of EC than E¯C then the corresponding path of ECt will decrease below µ as well. Then by
the fact that µ is arbitrary and that the number of these paths of {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH} is inﬁnite we can
argue that the value of density associated with the ergodic distribution of EC is strictly positive for
all positive numbers in the neighborhood of 0.
Let us consider the economy that starts at K¯C and E¯C in period 0. If it is aﬀected by an adverse
shock in this period then the next period's value of E is:
EC1 = β ·
(
E¯C + (qB,1 (ZH)− qS) · kF
)
< βE¯C .
This inequality follows because for Z = ZH margin qB,1 − qS is negative in equilibrium. Using the
same argument it is easy to see that:
ECt < β
tE¯C .
This means that there exists t = T such that ECT < β
T E¯C < µ (because β ∈ (0, 1)). This means
that with probability (P(Z = ZH))T > 0 economy that starts K¯C and E¯C in period 0 has bank's
equity lower than µ in period T . Now, by the Borel-Cantelli lemma we know that with probability 1
there is an inﬁnite number of sequences {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH} of length T (within the sequence {Zt}+∞t=0 )
such that EC falls below µ (at the end of the corresponding sequence of endogenous state variables)
for an inﬁnite number of times. This means that measure of the ergodic distribution of EC that is
accumulated in (0, µ) is positive. If the ergodic density exists then it means that it is positive for all
positive numbers in a small neighborhood of 0. The same reasoning applies for the lower bound of
ergodic density associated with EMC .
Proposition 7
If P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then the common lower bound on the supports of ergodic
densities associated with KC and KMC is K =
(
Ψ
δ
) 1
1−α where Ψ is a function of parameters.
Proof. The strategy of the proof is the following. Let us ﬁrst ﬁnd an intuitive candidate K for the
lower bound of the support of ergodic density of KC (the proof for KMC is the same). Then it is
argued that there is a positive probability that the economy experiences a suﬃciently long path of
bad shocks {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH} so that the aggregate capital in this economy falls below K + η where
η > 0 is an arbitrarily small positive number. At the end I use the Borel-Cantelli lemma again to
argue that the probability that {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH} occurs inﬁnitely many times (within the sequence
{Zt}+∞t=0 ) is 1 which implies that the measure of the ergodic distribution of KC that is accumulated
in (K,K + η) is positive.
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Let us ﬁrst notice that the market clearing for loans in the economy in which P (AI = 1) = 1 is:
piIK =
[
1
1 + φZ
· G (K)
qB
+
1
1 + φZ
− 1
]
· piC ·K
which implies the following formula for qB :
qB(K,Z) =
G (K)
(1 + φZ) piIpiC + φZ
. (51)
Additionally, notice that the formula for the aggregate output of new capital is:
I(qS ,K) =
qS(E,K)
1 + φ
piIK
which is implied by 2 and the fact that all i-entrepreneurs sell their entire stock of capital when
condition 23 holds. Now let us consider a hypothetical economy (which is signed by a subscript H) in
which the aggregate output of new capital is:
IH(K) =
qB(K,ZH)
1 + φ
piIK.
Since in equilibrium qB(K,ZH) < qS(E,K) then IH(K) < I(qS ,K). Let us now derive a more
tractable formula for IH(K):
IH(K) =
qB(K,ZH)
1 + φ
piIK
=
G (K)
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
piIK
1 + φ
=
αAC (piC/L)
α−1
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
piI
1 + φ
Kα = ΨKα
where I have used equation 51, the formula for G and I have deﬁned:
Ψ =
αAC (piC/L)
α−1
(1 + φZH)
piI
piC
+ φZH
piI
1 + φ
.
Now, it is easy to see that the hypothetical economy is deterministic and has two steady states: the
one that is a trivial one with KH,ss = 0 and the second with KH,ss that solves:
ΨKα = δK.
This means that the non-trivial steady state satisﬁesKH,ss =
(
Ψ
δ
) 1
1−α . This value becomes a candidate
for the lower bound K.
Let us come back to the economy in which the output of new capital is I(qS ,K). I will show that
for an arbitrarily small positive number η > 0 there exists a ﬁnite number N such that for the real-
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ization {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH}of length N the path of the economy's capital stock jumps into neighborhood
(KH,ss,KH,ss + η) .
41 Let us take two arbitrary, positive numbers η1 and η2 that satisfy:
η1 + η2 = η.
For η1 > 0 let us construct a curve I
η1
H (K) = s(η1) + IH(K) such that I
η1
H (K) intersects with δK
at KH,ss + η1. Suppose that I
η1
H (K) characterizes the investment rate in yet another hypothetical
economy called economy η1. It is obvious that since the aggregate amount of capital in economy η1
converges to KH,ss + η1 then for there exists a ﬁnite number of periods N1 during which economy η1
that starts at K ∈ [KH,ss, K¯C ] drops into (KH,ss,KH,ss + η1 + η2).
Now, for each K ∈ [KH,ss, K¯C ] let us deﬁne a number E˜(K) for which I
(
qS
(
E˜(K),K
)
,K
)
=
Iη1H (K). This number exists by the continuity of qS in E (which follows by the bank's FOC combined
with equilibrium conditions) and by the fact that limE→0 qS(E,K) = qB(K,ZH). It is easy to see
(again, by the bank's FOC combined with equilibrium conditions) that E˜(K) is continuous. This
means that it attains a minimum for K ∈ [KH,ss, K¯C ] (a compact set). Let us denote it by Kmin and
by N2(Kmin) let us denote a natural number that satisﬁes (by the proof of Proposition 6):
E˜(Kmin) > β
N2(Kmin)E¯.
This is clear that the output of new capital in economy that starts with anyK ∈ [KH,ss, K¯C ] and E¯ falls
below Iη1H (K) if it experiences a sequence {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH} of lengthN2(Kmin). Since I(qS ,K) remains
below Iη1H (K) if the sequence of bad shocks continues then it shrinks and it drops into the region
(KH,ss,KH,ss + η1 + η2) faster than the hypothetical economy η1. This means that the true economy
needs at most N1 + N2(Kmin) (a ﬁnite number) of periods to ﬁnd itself in (KH,ss,KH,ss + η1 + η2).
We set N = N1 +N2(Kmin) and notice that pi(ZH)
N is a strictly positive number. Now by the Borel-
Cantelli lemma we know that the number of sequences {ZH , ZH , ..., ZH} of length N within {Zt}+∞t=0
is inﬁnite with probability 1. Since η > 0 was an arbitrarily small positive number then we conclude
that ergodic density of K is positive in a neighborhood (KH,ss,KH,ss + η) of K = KH,ss.
Proposition 8
If P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then dK¯
MC
d evaluated at  = 1 is negative.
Proof. Let us study the limits K¯C and E¯C to which the economy with competitive banks converges
if the sequence of good shocks {ZL, ZL, ..., ZL} is inﬁnite. From the law of motion for capital and
from 26 we get that in the limit:
q¯CS =
δ(1 + φ)
piI
(52)
41I ignore the neighborhood
(
KH,ss − η,KH,ss
)
because if the economy drops into that region then it either converges
to KH,ss in a monotone manner (in case of an inﬁnite realization of ZH which occurs with probability 0 or it jumps
above KH,ss and never returns to
(
KH,ss − η,KH,ss
)
. Both cases imply that ergodic measure of
(
KH,ss − η,KH,ss
)
is
0.
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which means that q¯CS is a function of parameters. The market clearing condition for capital (loans)
implies:
piIK¯
C =
[
1
1 + φZ
· G
(
K¯C
)
q¯CB
+
1
1 + φZ
− 1
]
· piC · K¯C
which implies that:
q¯CB(Z, K¯
C) =
G
(
K¯C
)
(1 + φZ) piIpiC + φZ
. (53)
Let us denote κ(Z) = (1 + φZ) piIpiC +φZ. Observe that k¯
C
F = piIK¯
C so we can rewrite the bank's FOC
as:
0 = pi(ZL)
(
q¯CB(ZL, K¯
C)− q¯CS
) · (E¯C + (q¯CB(ZH , K¯C)− q¯CS )piIK¯C)
+ pi(ZH)
(
q¯CB(ZH , K¯
C)− q¯CS
) · (E¯C + (q¯CB(ZL, K¯C)− q¯CS )piIK¯C) . (54)
The last equation that characterizes the economy is the law of motion for banks' equity that is derived
from the bank's FOC:
E¯C = β
[
E¯C +
(
q¯CB(ZL, K¯
C)− q¯CS
)
piIK¯
C
]
(55)
If we plug 53 and 55 into 54 then we can calculate the long-run value of capital:
K¯C =
L
piC

{
pi(ZL)
β
1−β
1
κ(ZL)
+
(
pi(ZL) +
pi(ZH)
1−β
)
1
κ(ZH)
}
αA
1
1−β q¯
C
S

1
1−α
. (56)
Since q¯CS is a function of parameters then K¯
C is, too.
Observe that an analogous system of equations can be constructed for monopolistically competitive
banks. Equation that corresponds to combination of 54 and 55 in the monopolistic regime is:
0 = pi(ZL)
(
1

q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
)
· (E¯MC + (q¯MCB (ZH , K¯MC)− q¯MCS )piIK¯MC)
+ pi(ZH)
(
1

q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
)
· (E¯MC + (q¯MCB (ZL, K¯MC)− q¯MCS )piIK¯MC) . (57)
Since we can use the monopolistic equivalent of equation 53 to eliminate q¯MCB then it can be concluded
that equation 57 deﬁnes K¯MC as an implicit function of  (as 57 becomes an equation with one
endogenous variable). I use this fact together with the Implicit Function Theorem to check the sign
of dK¯
MC
d evaluated at  = 1 and K¯
MC = K¯C .
Let us deﬁne F (K¯MC , ) as the RHS of the equation above. I calculate (after plugging E¯C = E¯MC
from 55):
FK¯MC (K¯
MC ,  = 1) =
βpiL
1− β · q¯
MC
B,K(ZL, K¯
MC) · (q¯MCB (ZL, K¯MC)− q¯MCS )
+piL · q¯MCB,K(ZL, K¯MC) ·
(
q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
)
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+
βpiL
1− β · q¯
MC
B,K(ZL, K¯
MC) · (q¯MCB (ZL, K¯MC)− q¯MCS )
+piL · q¯MCB,K(ZH , K¯MC) ·
(
q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
)
+
piH · q¯MCB,K(ZH , K¯MC)
1− β ·
(
q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
)
+
piH · q¯MCB,K(ZL, K¯MC)
1− β ·
(
q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
)
,
observe that by 53 q¯MCB is a function of K¯
MC and hence q¯MCB,K denotes the derivative with respect to
K¯MC . Note that q¯MCS = q¯
C
S . We use 53, formula for G(·) and the deﬁnition of κ(Z) to obtain:
FK¯MC (K¯
MC ,  = 1) = G′
(
K¯MC
) ·{(pi(ZH)
1− β + pi(ZL)
)
·
[
q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
κ(ZL)
+
q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
κ(ZH)
]
+
2pi(ZL)β
1− β ·
q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯MCS
κ(ZL)
}
where I have used the fact that q¯MCB,K = G
′ (K¯MC) 1κ(Z) (see equation 53). Observe that from 54 and
55 we get:
q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯CS = −
(
1− β
β
+
1− pi(ZL)
βpi(ZL)
)[
q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯CS
]
. (58)
This relationship implies that:(
pi(ZH)
1− β + pi(ZL)
)
q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯CS
κ(ZL)
+
2pi(ZL)β
1− β ·
q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯CS
κ(ZL)
= −
[
pi(ZH)
1− β + pi(ZL)
]
q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯CS
κ(ZL)
> 0
because we know that in equilibrium q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯MCS > 0. Plugging back to the expression for
FK¯MC (K¯
MC ,  = 1) yields:
FK¯MC (K¯
MC ,  = 1) = G′
(
K¯MC
) · (pi(ZH)
1− β + pi(ZL)
)
·
[
q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯CS
κ(ZH)
− q¯
MC
B (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯CS
κ(ZL)
]
It is clear that sinceG′
(
K¯MC
)
< 0,
q¯MCB (ZL,K¯
MC)−q¯MCS
κ(ZH)
> 0,
q¯MCB (ZH ,K¯
MC)−q¯MCS
κ(ZL)
< 0 then FK¯MC (K¯
MC ,  =
1) < 0. Let us consider F(K¯
MC ,  = 1) now:
F(K¯
MC ,  = 1) = − 1
2
·
{
pi(ZL)β
1− β q¯
MC
B (ZL, K¯
MC) · (q¯MCB (ZL, K¯MC)− q¯CS )+ pi(ZL)q¯MCB (ZL, K¯MC) · (q¯MCB (ZH , K¯MC)− q¯CS )
+
pi(ZH)
1− β q¯
MC
B (ZH , K¯
MC) · (q¯MCB (ZL, K¯MC)− q¯CS )} .
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Let us use 58 again to calculate:
β
1− β ·
(
q¯MCB (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯CS
)
+
(
q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯CS
)
= − (q¯MCB (ZH , K¯MC)− q¯CS ) [ pi(ZH)pi(ZL) (1− β)
]
> 0.
Plugging back to the formula for F(K¯
MC ,  = 1) gives us:
F(K¯
MC ,  = 1) =
1
2
pi(ZH)
1− β G
(
K¯MC
)
·
[
− q¯
MC
B (ZL, K¯
MC)− q¯CS
κ(ZH)
+
q¯MCB (ZH , K¯
MC)− q¯CS
κ(ZL)
]
where I have used the formula 53. Since
q¯MCB (ZL,K¯
MC)−q¯MCS
κ(ZH)
> 0,
q¯MCB (ZH ,K¯
MC)−q¯MCS
κ(ZL)
< 0 then
F(K¯
MC ,  = 1) < 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem we get the following result:
dK¯MC
d
= − F(K¯
MC ,  = 1)
FK¯MC (K¯
MC ,  = 1)
< 0.
This completes the proof.42 It is useful, however, to compute a more precise expression for dK¯
MC
d (it
will be useful to prove next propositions):
dK¯MC
d
= − F(K¯
MC ,  = 1)
FK¯MC (K¯
MC ,  = 1)
= − 1
2
pi(ZH)
1−β
pi(ZL) +
pi(ZH)
1−β
1
1− αK¯
MC
Proposition 9
If pi(ZL)β > α, P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then dE¯
MC
d evaluated at  = 1 is positive.
Proof. Let us observe that by 55, the long run value of bank's equity can be rewritten as:
E¯C =
β
1− β
(
q¯CB(K¯
C , ZL)− q¯S
)
piIK¯
C
42Observe that I have not shown that there is an inﬁnite number of trajectories that approach K¯C for {Zt}+∞t=1 .
Analytic proof of this fact (like it was in the case for the lower bounds) is much harder to construct so I have used
a numerical veriﬁcation to show that the trajectory that corresponds to a suﬃciently long path of {ZL, ZL, ..., ZL}
converges to K¯C . Then by a similar argument (i.e., the Borel-Cantelli lemma) one can argue that the mass of the
ergodic distribution in the neighborhood of K¯C is positive.
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where q¯S is a function of parameters. I use 53 to reformulate the equation above:
E¯C =
βpiI
1− β
(
αACL
1−αpiα−1C
κ(ZL)
(
K¯C
)α − q¯SK¯C) .
This deﬁnes E¯C as a strictly concave function of K¯C . This function attains its maximum at:
K¯CE =
L
piC
(
α2AC
q¯Sκ(ZL)
) 1
1−α
and it decreases for K¯C > K¯CE . This inequality holds in our case. It is because (from 56):
K¯C =
L
piC

{
pi(ZL)
β
1−β
1
κ(ZL)
+
(
pi(ZL) +
pi(ZH)
1−β
)
1
κ(ZH)
}
αA
1
1−β q¯S

1
1−α
>
L
piC
(
α2AC
q¯Sκ(ZL)
) 1
1−α
which is equivalent to:
pi(ZL)β + [pi(ZL)(1− β) + pi(ZH)] κ (ZL)
κ (ZH)
> α
and since by assumption pi(ZL)β > α then the inequality above follows. Let us use Proposition
8: if  increases then K¯MC drops. Since the value of K¯MC that corresponds to  = 1 satisﬁes
K¯MC = K¯C > K¯CE and since E¯
C is strictly concave in K¯MC then if K¯MC drops in response to growth
in  then E¯MC grows.
Proposition 10
If pi(ZL)β > α,P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then
(
dK¯MC
d
)
K¯MC
(evaluated at  = 1) does not
depend on ZH .
Proof. This proof is immediate from what was shown in the proof of Proposition 8. Since:
dK¯MC
d
= − 1
2
pi(ZH)
1−β
pi(ZL) +
pi(ZH)
1−β
1
1− αK¯
MC
then indeed
(
dK¯MC
d
)
K¯MC
(evaluated at  = 1) does not depend on ZH , as:(
dK¯MC
d
)
K¯MC
= − 1
2
pi(ZH)
1−β
pi(ZL) +
pi(ZH)
1−β
1
1− α
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Proposition 11
If pi(ZL)β > α,P (AI = 1) = 1 and condition 23 hold then
(
dE¯MC
d
)
E¯MC
(evaluated at  = 1) decreases in
ZH .
Proof. First recall (from the proof of Proposition 9) that:
E¯C =
βpiI
1− β
(
αACL
1−αpiα−1C
κ(ZL)
(
K¯C
)α − q¯SK¯C) .
Since we want to calculate the expression
(
dE¯MC
d
)
E¯MC
for  = 1 then E¯C = E¯MC . Observe that:
dE¯MC
d
=
βpiI
1− β
(
Ψ · α · (K¯C)α−1 − q¯S) · dK¯MC
d
where Ψ =
αACL
α−1piα−1C
κ(ZL)
and since I evaluate all terms for  = 1 then K¯C = K¯MC . Let us calculate(
dE¯MC
d
)
E¯MC
now: (
dE¯MC
d
)
E¯MC
=
βpiI
1−β
(
Ψ · α · (K¯MC)α−1 − q¯S) · dK¯MCd
βpiI
1−β
(
Ψ · (K¯MC)α − q¯SK¯MC)
=
Ψ · α− q¯S
(
K¯MC
)1−α
Ψ− q¯S
(
K¯MC
)1−α ·
(
dK¯MC
d
K¯MC
)
.
Let us study the sign of the derivative of the expression above with respect to ZH . First recall that
dK¯MC
d
K¯MC
does not depend on ZH (by Proposition 10) and hence it is treated as a constant in further
calculations. Observe that Ψ, q¯S and K¯
MC all depend on ZH (see the formula for K¯
MC in equation
56, 52, Ψ =
αACL
1−αpiα−1C
κ(ZL)
and recall the deﬁnition of κ(Z) = (1 + φZ) piIpiC + φZ and the fact that
φ = 1−ββ(piI+piC [pi(ZL)ZL+pi(ZH)ZH ]) ). This means that:

(
dE¯MC
d
)
E¯MC

′
ZH
=
(
dK¯MC
d
K¯MC
)
· (1− α)
·
Ψ′ZH · q¯S
(
K¯MC
)1−α − q¯′S,ZH (K¯MC)1−α Ψ− q¯S(1− α) (K¯MC)−α Ψ(dK¯MCdZH )(
Ψ− q¯S
(
K¯MC
)1−α)2
 . (59)
Now it is easy to verify that: q¯
′
S,ZH
< 0 and Ψ
′
ZH
> 0. Let us concentrate on the sign of dK¯
MC
dZH
.
It is hard to calculate this derivative directly from the formula 56 as it contains q¯S , κ(ZH) and
κ(ZL) that are themselves functions of ZH . Let us do it in a diﬀerent way, instead. Suppose that
economies with two diﬀerent levels Z¯H and ZH (where Z¯H > ZH) satisfy K¯
C
(
Z¯H
)
> K¯C (ZH) and
that they start at the same initial values of K and E, i.e., K = K¯C (ZH) and E = E¯
C (ZH). The
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economy characterized by ZH exhibits the level of output of new capital IZH
(
K¯C (ZH) , E¯
C (ZH)
)
that
preserves the current level of capital (i.e., K ′ (ZH) = K¯
C (ZH) - which follows by the deﬁnition of the
upper bound of ergodic distributions - K¯C (ZH) and E¯
C (ZH)). Let us investigate the amount of new
capital associated with economy described by Z¯H . From our assumption we have K¯
C
(
Z¯H
)
> K¯C (ZH)
and hence K ′
(
Z¯H
)
> K ′ (ZH). This in turn implies that:
IZ¯H
(
K¯C (ZH) , E¯
C (ZH)
)
> IZH
(
K¯C (ZH) , E¯
C (ZH)
)
. (60)
On the other hand, however, equation 54 (with ZH = ZH and ZH = Z¯H , respectively) indicates that:
qS,ZH > qS,Z¯H .
It is because increase in ZH leads to a decrease in qB(ZH) (equation 53) which means that (by the
Implicit Function Theorem and the proof of Theorem 1) qS drops.
43 This implies that:
IZ¯H
(
K¯C (ZH) , E¯
C (ZH)
)
< IZH
(
K¯C (ZH) , E¯
C (ZH)
)
that contradicts 60. This in turn means that K¯C
(
Z¯H
)
< K¯C (ZH) which is a contradiction. This
means that (diﬀerentiability of K¯C with respect to ZH is assumed) that:
dK¯MC
dZH
< 0.
This all means that is negative (it is because
dK¯MC
d
K¯MC
< 0).
43Note that changes in ZH have an indirect impact on qB(ZL) through φ.This inﬂuence, though, has a second-order
inﬂuence on qS in comparison to qB(ZH).
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2 Frictional and Keynesian unemployment in European economies
Abstract
Knowledge of the unemployment structure (that consists of e.g. frictional and Keynesian
unemployment) is necessary for the policymakers to ﬁght it eﬀectively. The problem is that these
components are not directly observable. This paper develops the unemployment decomposition
method that is based on the DSGE model with two frictions (standard search frictions in the
labor market and in the market for products) and price stickiness that allows for distinction
between frictional and Keynesian unemployment. The model is used to study the structure of
unemployment in four largest economies in the Eurozone: Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
2.1 Introduction
It is well-understood that since the structure of unemployment is not homogenous, the policies that aim
at decreasing unemployment should be adjusted to its speciﬁc heterogeneity. For the unemployment's
components (like Keynesian or frictional unemployment) are not directly observable, there is a need
for a theoretical method that decomposes the recorded time series of unemployment. I develop a
framework that allows for such decomposition: I add two search frictions and price/wage rigidities
into otherwise standard RBC model. I use this construction to analyze the unemployment structure
in Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
[Michaillat and Saez (2015)] have recently shown that models with frictions in both labor and
product markets can be used to decompose total unemployment into three components: Keynesian,
classical and frictional unemployment. They develop a theoretical, continuous-time model with search
frictions both in the market for goods and the labor market, use their model to conduct a comparative-
statics analysis and study the sources of labor market ﬂuctuations in the US. They highlight the role
of sticky wages and sticky prices in the propagation of shocks: with ﬁxed prices, a drop in aggregate
demand decreases product market tightness (the ratio of demand on products and manufacturer's
capacity), which lowers sales made by producers and increases the idle time of hired employees. Since
workers remain idle a larger proportion of the time, they become less proﬁtable to employers, and the
demand for labor decreases. The drop in labor demand raises unemployment. With ﬂexible prices, a
decrease in demand causes a decline of price level and hence it absorbed, so it does not aﬀect either
product market tightness or unemployment. This analysis can be seen as an attempt to incorporate
the mechanism described by Michaillat and Saez into otherwise standard RBC framework.
[Michaillat (2012)] has conducted a decomposition of unemployment for the US economy and has
distinguished two main components: rationing unemployment and frictional unemployment. Rationing
unemployment emerges in the Mortensen-Pissarides framework used by Michaillat when wages remain
above the marketclearing level and its source is the combination of diminishing marginal returns to
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Figure 11: Decomposition method - intuition
labor and wage stickiness. Keynesian unemployment that is present in my analysis bears some concep-
tual similarities to those of rationing unemployment, but their source is diﬀerent: I assume constant
returns to scale and Keynesian unemployment arises as a result of three factors: price stickiness, wage
stickiness and frictions in the market for goods. My analysis is conducted in the standard DSGE frame-
work (contrary to the Mortensen-Pissarides model of labor market used by Michaillat) and therefore
allows for many potential extensions: e.g., studying ﬁscal and monetary policy.
My work is related to [Bai et al. (2011)], who show that demand shocks are responsible for the TFP
volatility if the product market frictions are in place. However, they abstract from frictions in the labor
market and from price rigidities which are present in our model and give rise to our decomposition
method.
The decomposition method presented in this work is based on the following intuitions: the presence
of recruitment/training costs, the fact that the hiring process is time-consuming and that the mismatch
of qualiﬁcations imply that some workers remain unemployed even if they actively search for jobs. This
gives rise to frictional unemployment. The frictions that cause frictional unemployment are captured
by the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework. Additionally, if prices and wages are sticky then
the labor market may cease to clear. On the top of that, changes in aggregate demand inﬂuence the
probability of selling manufactured goods and thus make ﬁrms adjust their workforce. Price rigidities
and changes in aggregate demand give rise to Keynesian unemployment.
To disentangle the two types of unemployment, I construct three DSGE models that are related
to each other in the following way (which is illustrated in Figure 11). First, in Section 2.2, I consider
a competitive economy with two frictional markets: product market and labor market. It is a more
general version of the benchmark model where no additional assumptions about prices and wages
are made. Second, in section 2.3, I consider a constrained-eﬃcient economy with two frictions and
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Figure 12: Unemployment accounting and the decomposition method
derive prices that make the allocation discussed in Section 2.2 equivalent to the planner's solution in
the non-stochastic steady state. Third, I analyze economy with a single friction that is present in
the labor market (Section 2.4). In the same section, I prove that the limit of constrainted-eﬃcient
economies with two frictions (when the friction described by parameter φ > 0 in the product market
decays φ → 0) is the economy with a single friction (which is summarized by Theorem 3). Fifth, I
calibrate and estimate the benchmark model to match empirical data and then I use the Kalman ﬁlter
to extract paths of stochastic shocks that adjust the model to the observed time series. Finally, I use
the extracted shocks to run the model with a single friction and I calculate the corresponding path of
unemployment. It is called frictional unemployment as it is associated with the model where the only
friction is the search friction in the labor market. By these considerations, the diﬀerence between the
unemployment rate observed in the data and the frictional unemployment can be attributed solely
to two factors: friction in the market for products (that gives rise to signiﬁcance of aggregate demand)
and price/wage stickiness. It is therefore called Keynesian unemployment. The intuition behind this
accounting method is presented in Figure 12.
2.2 Competitive allocation with two frictions
2.2.1 Households
The model is populated by identical, inﬁnitely-lived households (workers) of measure one. Similarly to
[Bai et al. (2011)], they have to exert eﬀort to purchase consumption goods. This process is modeled in
the following manner: households visit manufacturers to buy goods. A single worker makes v visits and
each of them is successful (i.e., results in a purchase of a unit of consumption good) with probability
qG(θG), where θG is the tightness of the product market (which is deﬁned later). This implies, that
the total number of purchased goods qG(θG)v is related to consumption in the following way:
c = qG(θG)v. (61)
I abstract from randomness at individual level - this means that every household makes qG(θG)v
successful visits and hence households' consumption levels and incomes are identical.44 There is a
44I abstract from randomness for individual ﬁrms, too.
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utility cost of making v visits that is captured by a convex function G(v) > 0 (more speciﬁcally, I
consider G(v) = φ2 v
2 where φ > 0). There are two stochastic, Markovian disturbances that aﬀect the
economy: the ﬁrst aﬀects consumer's demand - ad and the second inﬂuences the productivity level of
ﬁrms - az. By N−1 I denote the fraction of workers that were employed at the end of the previous
period. Each worker derives utility exp(ad) · u(c) from goods consumed in the current period where
u is twice diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. Worker's income consists of: nominal labor income wN ,
where w is wage expressed in terms of price of shares and income from selling shares s together with
dividends Πs associated with ﬁrms' proﬁts Π. Household uses its income to purchase shares that can
be sold in the following period s′ and to buy consumption goods.45 Let us denote the set of state
variables by Z = {ad, az, N−1} and let a = {ad, az} be a vector of exogenous states. It means that the
dynamic problem of a worker can be described by the following Bellman equation:
W (s, Z) = max
c,v,s′
{
exp(ad) · u(c) −G(v) + βEa′|aW (s′, Z′)
}
(62)
subject to :
c = qG (θG (Z)) v,
p(Z) · c+ s′ = s(1 + Π) + w(Z) ·N,
N = N(Z),
where by p I denote the price of consumption goods, θG, p, w are taken by workers as given.
46 The
second constraint is consumer's budget constraint and the third one is the perceived law of motion of
endogenous state variable.47 Let us eliminate c and s′ from the maximization problem. I substitute
c from 61 into the budget constraint and into Bellman equation. Then I plug s′ from the budget
constraint into Bellman equation and I derive the FOC with respect to v:
exp(ad)u
′(c)qG(θG)−G′(v) = pqG(θG)βEa′|aWs(s′, Z ′) (63)
The associated envelope condition is:
Ws(s, Z) = (1 + Π) · βEa′|aWs(s′, Z ′). (64)
I calculate βEa′|aWs(s′, Z ′) from 63 and plug into 64 to get the formula for Ws(s, Z). I take this
expression and plug it back into 63 to obtain the Euler equation:
1 = Ea′|a
β p · qG(θG)p′ · qG(θ′G)
qG(θ′G) exp
(
a
′
d
)
· u′(c′) −G(v′)
qG(θG) exp (ad) · u′(c) −G(v)
 · (1 + Π′)
 . (65)
45I use primes to denote forward lags of variables
46I suppress the arguments of pricing functions w and p and function θG to simplify notation.
47I.e., it captures the implicit assumption about workers' rational expectations.
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2.2.2 Firms
There is measure one of identical ﬁrms. They are owned by households and use labor as the only
input. Their production function is linear in labor and is aﬀected by multiplicative productivity
shocks exp(az).
48 Since there are search frictions present in the market for products, ﬁrms do not
sell their entire output - they sell only a proportion fG(θG) of it.
49 I assume that job destruction
takes place at the beginning of period so that the number of workers that remain in the workforce at
the beginning of the current period is (1 − σ)n−1, where 0 < σ < 1 is exogenous separation rate of
worker-employer relationship and n−1 is number of workers hired in the ﬁrm at the end of the previous
period. To recruit workers, ﬁrms post vacancies vL which are ﬁlled with probability qL(θL) where θL is
labor market tightness. A single vacancy costs κ units of ﬁrm's production capacity. Firms pay wages
w to workers they hire. This means that ﬁrm's problem can be easily summarized by the following
Bellman equation:
J(n−1, Z) = max
vL,n∈[0,1]
{p (Z) fG (θG (Z)) [exp(az)n− κvL]
−w (Z)n+ βEa′|a∆(Z ′, Z) · J(n,Z ′)
}
,
subject to :
n = (1− σ)n−1 + qL (θL (Z)) · vL,
N = N(Z),
where β∆(Z ′, Z) is the factor at which ﬁrms discount future proﬁts and ∆(Z ′, Z) is deﬁned as follows:
∆(Z ′, Z) =
p · qG(θG)
p′ · qG(θ′G)
qG(θ′G) exp
(
a
′
d
)
· u′(c′)−G(v′)
qG(θG) exp (ad) · u′(c)−G(v)
 . (66)
Firms take prices p (Z), wages w(Z), tightnesses θG (Z), θL (Z) and the discount factor ∆(Z
′, Z) as
given. Firms's FOC with respect to vL is:
p(Z) · fG (θG) [exp(az)qL(θL)− κ]− w(Z) · qL(θL) (67)
+qL(θL)βEa′|a∆(Z ′, Z) · Jn(n,Z ′) = 0
and the envelope condition reads:
Jn(n−1, Z) = pfG(θG) exp(az)(1− σ)− w(1− σ) (68)
+βEa′|a∆(Z ′, Z) · Jn(n,Z ′)(1− σ).
48I assume the linearity to avoid job rationing described by [Michaillat (2012)] so that Keynesian unemployment in
my model can be explained solely by the presence of frictions in the product market and price/wage stickiness.
49It is then assumed that the remaining proportion of output is wasted.
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Firm's current proﬁt is given by:
Π = p (Z) fG (θG (Z)) [exp(az)n− κvL]− w(Z) · n. (69)
2.2.3 Law of motion in the labor market and consistency conditions
The law of motion for employment is:
N = (1− σ)N−1 +ML(U, vL), (70)
where ML is the matching function and U = 1 − (1 − σ)N−1 denotes the aggregate number of
unemployed workers. A similar concept is present in the market for goods: there is a number of
MG(v, exp(az)N − κvL) successful trades given the number of visits v chosen by households and the
total amount of goods supplied by ﬁrms is:
T = exp(az)N − κvL. (71)
Tightness in the labor market and tightness in the market for goods are deﬁned as follows:
θL =
1− (1− σ)N−1
vL
, (72)
θG =
T
v
. (73)
I consider the following speciﬁcations of MG and ML:
MG (v, T ) =
vT
(vαG + TαG)
1
αG
,
ML (U, vL) =
vLU
(vαLL + U
αL)
1
αL
,
where αG > 1 and αL > 1. These speciﬁcations of matching functions were introduced by [Den Haan et al. (2000)]
and I use them because they are convenient from the perspective of the decomposition exercise.50 Since
both ML and MG are speciﬁed as constant returns to scale functions, then probabilities qL, qG, fG
can be expressed as functions of tightness that corresponds to a given market.51 Values qL, qG, fG
satisfy:
qL =
ML
vL
,
qG =
MG
v
,
50I do not use another common speciﬁcation - the Cobb-Douglas function - as the arrival rates of oﬀers in markets
(e.g., qL) may exceed 1. Matching function presented by [Den Haan et al. (2000)] standardizes these rates as numbers
from interval [0, 1] which is crucial for my decomposition method.
51I suppress the arguments of functions qL, qG, fG to economize on notation.
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fG =
MG
T
.
Additionally, individual decisions of ﬁrms are consistent with aggregate employment:
n = N.
I impose market clearing condition for the asset market:
s = 1. (74)
The resource constraint for the analyzed economy is:
c = fG(θG)T. (75)
Stochastic disturbances are described by the following autoregressive processes:
a
′
d = ρDad + 
′
d, (76)
a
′
z = ρZaz + 
′
z, (77)
where 0 < ρZ , ρD < 1 and
[
d
z
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,Σ2×2
)
, where Σ2×2 is variance-covariance matrix.
Equations 63 and 65-77 constitute a system of 15 equations that contains 17 variables. This means
that values of prices and wages have to be pinned down by two additional conditions - a situation
that emerges naturally as a consequence of the presence of frictions in markets. I derive the two
remaining equations by assuming that competitive equilibrium shares its steady state allocation with
the constrained-eﬃcient outcome (i.e. it is an allocation that is identical with the planner's solution
given two constraints: frictions in the labor market and frictions in the market for products).
2.3 Optimal allocation with two frictions and price-setting/wage-setting
formulas
In this section I compute the planner's solution that corresponds to the decentralized economy with
frictional labor and product markets discussed above. Planner's problem can be summarized by the
following Bellman equation:
V (Z) = max
c,vL,v,N
{
exp(ad) · u(c) −G(v) + βEa′|aV (Z′)
}
subject to :
68
c = MG (v, exp(az)N − κvL) , (78)
N = (1− σ)N−1 +ML (1− (1− σ)N−1, vL) , (79)
where V is the value function associated with the planner's problem. First order conditions are:52
MGv · exp(ad) · u′(c) = G′(v), (80)
βEa′|aVN (Z ′) ·MLvL + exp(ad) · u′(c) ·MGT ·
(
exp(az)M
L
vL − κ
)
= 0. (81)
The envelope condition is:
VN (Z) =
{
exp(ad) · u′(c) · exp(az) ·MGT + βEa′|aVN (Z ′)
}
(1− σ) [1−MLU ] . (82)
Equations 78-82 together with 72, 73, 76 and 77 characterize the planner's solution.
The following proposition presents formulas for prices and wages which guarantee that competitive
equilibrium allocation from Section 2.2 has the same steady state as the planner's solution discussed
above.53
Proposition 12. If the steady state value of price p is given by
p =
1
1 + θαGG
· u
′(c)
βWs
(83)
and wage w is characterized by the system:
w = β
fG(1 − σ) + (β(1 − σ) − 1) · 1u′(c) · fGMG
T
·
(
1− κ
qL
)
(
1− κ
MLvL
) · VN
 · p,
VN =
u′(c)·MGT (1−σ)[1−MLU ]
1+(1−σ)[1−MLU ]
,
(84)
then the competitive allocation has the same steady state as the constrained-eﬃcient outcome.
Proof. My strategy is to show, that the steady state allocation determined by equations 63-77, 83
and 84 satisﬁes conditions that characterize planner's solution. It is immediate that equations 78-
79, 82, conditions that characterize θL, θG and shocks appear both in the system that characterizes
competitive outcome and in the system that describes the optimal allocation. It means that it remains
to show that conditions that characterize the decentralized outcome imply 80 and 81 (observe that
planner's envelope condition is equivalent to the second equation of 84).
52FOCs are derived with respect to v and vL after substitution of c and N
′ from the constraints.
53All variables in Proposition 12 take their steady state values.
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Let us begin with equation 80. Observe that from 63:
u′(c)qG(θG)−G′(v) = pqG(θG)βWs
and from the formula for price: 1
1+θ
αG
G
· u′(c)βWs I get:54
MGv · u′(c) = G′(v),
which is identical to the steady state version of 80.
I derive 81 from conditions that describe the competitive allocation. The ﬁrst equation that char-
acterizes wages is:
w = β
fG(1− σ) + (β(1− σ)− 1) · 1
u′(c)
· fG
MGT
·
(
1− κqL
)
(
1− κ
MLvL
) · VN
 · p
and it is equivalent to:
w
β
+
p
u′(c)
· fG
MGT
·
(
1− κqL
)
(
1− κ
MLvL
) · VN = pfG(1− σ)
−w(1− σ) + β(1− σ) ·
w
β
+
p
u′(c)
· fG
MGT
·
(
1− κqL
)
(
1− κ
MLvL
) · VN

which in turn compared with the steady state version of 68 implies:
Jn =
w
β
+
p
u′(c)
· fG
MGT
·
(
1− κqL
)
(
1− κ
MLvL
) · VN .
I plug this formula into 67 (in steady state) and get:
βEa′|aVN (Z ′) ·MLvL = exp(ad) · u′(c)κ,
which is identical to 81.
2.3.1 Equilibrium
I deﬁne equilibrium in a similar way to [Michaillat and Saez (2015)] (it is the so-called Fixprice Equi-
librium):55
54I use the fact that: 1
1+θ
αG
G
= 1− M
G
v
qG
.
55I follow [Hall (2005)], [Michaillat and Saez (2015)] and I set perfectly sticky prices and wages (so that prices and
wages become parameters of the model). This assumption seems to be extremely strong at ﬁrst glance but on the
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Deﬁnition 2. A recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) is price function p(Z), wage function w(Z),
value functions J(n−1, Z) and W (s, Z), labor market tightness and product market tightness θL(Z),
θG(Z), policy functions c(s, Z), v(s, Z), s
′(s, Z), vL(n,Z) employment choice function n(n−1, Z), dis-
count factor ∆(Z ′, Z) and the law of motion N(Z) such that given Markovian processes that govern
ad and az:
1) Given prices, wages, law of motion and product market tightness W (s, Z) solves the worker's
problem and c(s, Z), v(s, Z), s′(s, Z) are the associated policy functions,
2) Given prices, wages, law of motion, product market tightness, labor market tightness and discount
factor J(n−1, Z) solves the ﬁrm's problem and vL(n,Z), n(n−1, Z) are the associated policy functions,
3) Worker's and ﬁrm's choices are consistent with aggregate employment, θL(Z) and θG(Z), i.e.:
N = n,
θL(Z) =
1− (1− σ)N
vL(Z)
,
θG(Z) =
exp(az)N − κvL(Z)
v(Z)
,
4) Markets clear:
s′(s, Z) = 1,
c(s, Z) = fG(θG(Z)) · [exp(az)N − κvL(Z)] ,
5) Law of motion for employment holds:
N(Z) = (1− σ)N−1 +ML(1− (1− σ)N−1, vL(n−1, Z)).
6) Prices and wages satisfy: 83 and 84.
Equations 63-77, 83 and 84 characterize the competitive equilibrium that has a constrained eﬃcient
steady state.
2.4 Optimal allocation with a single friction
In this section I describe the economy with a single friction (i.e., frictional labor market) which is
my candidate for the limit of constrained-eﬃcient economies as φ → 0 (recall that it is a parameter
associated with function G(v)). The social planner's problem that corresponds to the model with a
other hand there is no universal theory that would pin down the value of prices (wages) as long as they are elements of
bargaining sets when search frictions are in place. Moreover, as it is argued by [Hall (2005)], any ﬁxed values of wages
and prices that are elements of bargaining sets can be supported by the concept of Nash equilibrium of the Demand
game. The remaining issue is to choose the exact values for perfectly sticky prices and wages. I think that a natural
choice is to set their values at the levels that are consistent with steady state values of prices and wages that decentralize
the constrained-eﬃcient allocation in the non-stochastic steady state.
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single friction is:
V (Z) = max
c,vL,N
{
exp(ad) · u(c) + βEa′|aV (Z′)
}
subject to :
c = exp(az)N − κvL, (85)
N = (1− σ)N−1 +ML (1− (1− σ)N−1, vL) , (86)
where V is the value function associated with the planner's problem. I compute the ﬁrst order condition:
βEa′|aVN (Z ′) ·MLvL + exp(ad) · u′(c) ·
(
exp(az)M
L
vL − κ
)
= 0. (87)
The envelope condition reads:
VN (Z) =
{
exp(ad) · u′(c) · exp(az) + βEa′|aVN (Z ′)
}
(1− σ) [1−MLU ] . (88)
Equations 85-88 together with 72, 73, 76 and 77 characterize planner's solution.
I am in position to prove the result that is crucial for my decomposition exercise.56
Theorem 3. For φ → 0 the allocation corresponding to the constrained eﬃcient solution with two
frictions converges to the allocation associated with the optimal outcome with a single friction.
Proof. I need to show that equations that describe the constrained-eﬃcient outcome with two frictions
in the limit when φ→ 0 are identical to equations that characterize the optimal outcome with a single
friction. One can observe that this is true if: MGT → 1, MGv → 0, fG → 1 for φ→ 0.
Observe that if φ→ 0 then it is optimal for the planner (in the problem with two frictions) to set
v → +∞ as making visits becomes costless in terms of disutility. This in turn implies that:
MGT =
v(1− TαGTαG+vαG )
(TαG + vαG)
1
αG
→ 1, for v → +∞.
It holds because T is bounded: 0 ≤ T ≤ 157. Similarly, I have:
MGv =
T (1− vαGTαG+vαG )
(TαG + vαG)
1
αG
→ 0, for v → +∞,
56Notice, that the key assumption that is behind this outcome is the functional speciﬁcation of the matching function
MG.
57Observe that if I assumed the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of the matching functionMG(v, T ) = γGv
ηGT 1−ηG (where
γG > 0, 0 < ηG < 1) then M
G
T (v, T ) = (1− ηG)γG
(
v
T
)ηG and hence MGT (v, T )→ +∞ for v → +∞ which means that
limv→+∞MGT 6= 1. This implies that the limit of economies (when φ → 0) does not converge to the candidate for the
limit (which is a natural candidate for the case when φ = 0).
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The last thing that I need to show is:
fG(θG) =
v
(TαG + vαG)
1
αG
→ 1, for v → +∞.
which is trivial from what was observed above. This observation completes the proof.
Theorem 3 implies that economy described at the beginning of this section is indeed a limit of
constrained-eﬃcient economies with two frictions. This fact coupled with Proposition 12 means that
the only factors that account for the diﬀerence between the unemployment rate in benchmark model
and in economy with a single friction are sticky prices/wages and frictions in the product market.
2.4.1 Frictional and Keynesian unemployment
According to Keynesian tradition, the sources of periods characterized by long slumps and high un-
employment are: imperfect adjustment of prices, wages and insuﬃcient demand. Since wages do not
fall during recessions then demand for labor remains insuﬃcient for the employment level to recover.
Symmetrically, these two elements are responsible for ampliﬁcation of an increase in employment and
output during economic booms: prices adjust upwards too slowly which in turn boosts demand. Both
features appear in the model of competitive equilibrium with perfectly sticky wages and prices: ﬁrstly,
price stickiness is introduced by ascribing constant values to prices and wages. Secondly, I have an
object (i.e. the number of visits v) that can be interpreted as aggregate demand which may attain low
levels if the demand shock ad decreases.
All this means that if I want to isolate Keynesian underemployment or overemployment then
I need to compare allocation generated by the benchmark model with the model with one friction
(in the labor market). This implies the following order of the decomposition exercise. Firstly, I use
benchmark model and the Kalman ﬁlter to compute the values of shocks that make the model ﬁt the
data. Secondly, I use the extracted shocks to simulate the model with a single friction and ﬂexible
prices (wages), described at the beginning of Section 2.4 and I obtain the path of unemployment Uf
associated with that model. I call it frictional unemployment as its only source are frictions in the labor
market.58 The diﬀerence between the unemployment in model which describes the planner's problem
with one friction - Uf and the unemployment rate in the benchmark model - U is called Keynesian
overemployement (if the diﬀerence is positive) and Keynesian underemployment (if it is equal 0 or
negative): Keynesian overemployment = Uf − U, for Uf > U,Keynesian underemployment = Uf − U, for Uf ≤ U.
58It is easy to show that absent any frictions the unemployment rate is equal to σ.
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Figure 13: IRF, demand shock, France
2.5 Calibration and estimation
2.5.1 Missing speciﬁcations
I consider the following speciﬁcation for the utility function u:
u(c) = log(c).
2.5.2 Calibration
Calibrated parameters are: σ, β, αL, αG, κ, φ. The value of σ for Germany, France, Italy and Spain
is taken from [Hobijn and Sahin (2007)]. I set the quarterly discount rate β = 0.99 and αL = 1.27
as [Den Haan et al. (2000)]. I use the steady state version of system 78-82, 72, 73 to ﬁnd values
of four parameters αG, κ, φ for which the moments generated by the model match their empirical
equivalents.59 In particular, I take: rate of unemployment 1− (1−σ)N , capacity utilization of capital
MG
T and labor income share wNss/pfGN as criterions for the comparison.
6061
59Note, that since I consider steady state version of the competitive allocation with perfectly sticky wages and prices
and because I assume that sticky prices and wages are steady state values of prices and wages that decentralize the optimal
solution, then stationary allocations 78-82, 72, 73 and 65-75 are identical so I can consider the planner's allocation which
is more tractable.
60I transform the OECD data on the proportion of unemployed people who remain without a job less than one month
to get the quarterly hiring rate
MLss
Uss
.
61Observe that since the production technology is linear in labor then the capacity utilization of capital equals
MGss
Tss
.
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Table 1: Targeted moments, calibration of αG, κ, φ
Germany France Italy Spain
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
av. unemployment 9.1% 9.1% 8.9% 9.1% 8.9% 9.1% 15.3% 16.1%
av. cap. utilization 83.9% 83.2% 84.4% 84.7% 74.5% 75.1% 78.1% 78.3%
Labor income share 68% 66% 68% 69% 67% 63% 61% 59%
Figure 14: IRFs, productivity shocks, France
2.5.3 Solution method
I use the method suggested by P. Rendahl to solve the linearized version of the model, i.e. to obtain
the following characterization of the dynamical system described by equations 65 to 77:
Y+1 = Λ
∗ · Y,
where Y is a vector of steady state deviations (not necessarily in %) of all variables that appear in 65
to 77 and Λ∗is a transition matrix. The starting point of the algorithm is the linearized version of the
model:
A · Y+1 +B · Y + CY−1 = O. (89)
I take initial guess of transition matrix Λ0 and after making substitution Y+1 = Λ0Y in 89 I get:
Y = −(AΛ0 +B)−1 · C · Y−1.
Matrix −(AΛ0 +B)−1 ·C becomes our next candidate for the transition matrix and I denote it by Λ1.
Then I substitute Λ1 to 89 and obtain Λ2. I repeat this procedure until convergence, i.e. until I ﬁnd
n that satisﬁes maxi,j {|Λi,j,n − Λi,j,n−1|} < , where  is a small positive number.
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2.5.4 Impulse response functions
Figures 13 and 14 present the impulse response functions to a single demand/productivity shock that
inﬂuences the economy (i.e., benchmark model) in period t = 0. Observe that both shocks increase
consumption and decrease unemployment. However, they have a diﬀerent impact when one considers
the reaction of the capacity utilization (which is captured by the value of fG) and the number of
visits made by households. Demand shock increases v and (since the adjustment in capacity T is not
immediate) it causes an increase in capacity utilization. Productivity shock increases capacity T on
impact, boosts the availability of consumption goods and hence households decrease the number of
visits that are made (which is costly as it requires search eﬀort captured by disutility −G(v)).
2.5.5 Estimation
Bayesian methods are used for estimation of parameters that characterize stochastic processes: ρZ ,
ρD and Σ2×2. It means that I have to estimate four parameter values (as shocks are assumed to be
independent).62
Empirical paths of capacity utilization and unemployment are measured signals applied during
my estimation. The remaining issue is whether we are able to identify shocks given these two time
series. First, observe that impulse responses of unemployment are negative with respect to both shocks.
Second, notice that capacity utilization increases when economy is aﬀected by a demand shock and
decreases when the system is hit by a productivity shock (Figures 13 and 14). This implies that shocks
are orthogonal and hence they can be identiﬁed.
2.5.6 Unemployment decomposition
As I have already mentioned, I ﬁrst use the benchmark model and the Kalman ﬁlter to extract the
paths of ad,t and az,t from the data. Second, I use these shocks to simulate the model with a single
friction. This gives us the time path of frictional unemployment Uf presented in Figure 15. The
diﬀerence between these two paths is Keynesian underemployment/overemployment. Notice, that
frictional unemployment is procyclical which is intuitive: in periods when the labor market is slack
(i.e., recessions) it is easier for ﬁrms to ﬁnd workers and hence the frictional component is relatively
low. This result resembles the outcome obtained by [Michaillat (2012)].
In Table 2 one can analyze the structure of unemployment in Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
In the ﬁrst row, I present the steady state values of the total rate of unemployment which is equal to
frictional unemployment in my decomposition exercise. In the second row, I analyze the unemployment
structure in periods when Ut > 110%E(U) (which can be thought of as recessions characterized by high
unemployment rates).63 It seems that the economy which is the most severely aﬀected by Keynesian
unemployment during downturns is Spain: its unemployment structure during economic downturns is
diﬀerent from the one that can be observed in Italy, Germany and France.
62A standard MCMC algorithm is applied to obtain the posterior distributions of estimated parameters. More speciﬁc
results concerning my estimation can be found in the Appendix. The Kalman Filter is used for computations of the
likelihood of empirical data for each iteration of the MCMC procedure.
63To obtain these statistics I simulate the model for 100.000 periods.
76
Figure 15:
Table 2: Unemployment structure
Germany France Italy Spain
E (U) 9.1% 9.1% 8.9% 16.1%
E
(
Uf
U
)
in recession 69.3% 72.8% 71.0% 59.2%
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have developed a method that allows for the decomposition of unemployment into two
components: Keynesian and frictional. Since I conduct the analysis by means of the DSGE model, it
is relatively easy to extend this framework to study various issues associated with eﬀects of e.g. ﬁscal
policy or labor market policies on unemployment. My models were used to study the unemployment
structure in Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The analysis shows that Keynesian unemployment is
a more severe problem during recessions in Spain than in the remaining economies.
My decomposition exercise is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one presented in [Michaillat (2012)].
First, I use a modiﬁed RBC framework which makes place for the analysis of consumption/saving
decision made by households and can be extended to study various labor market institutions. Michaillat
used a standard DMP model which abstracts from these aspects of household's behavior and analyzes
economy with a single (productivity) shock. Second, I keep the cost of hiring workers κ constant
over time - the eﬀective cost of hiring workers is aﬀected solely by endogenous conditions in the labor
market captured by qL (probability of hiring workers). Michaillat assumes that changes in productivity
77
az have a direct eﬀect on the recruitment cost, i.e. it equals exp(az)κ. This means that in booms
exp(az)κ increases and hence it is more costly to hire workers. This gives rise to strong procyclical
movements in frictional unemployment in his model which are much more moderate in my case.
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Appendix
Table 3: Values of calibrated parameters
Parameter Germany France Italy Spain
β 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
σ 0.0315 0.0338 0.0206 0.0597
αG 2 2 1.4 2
φ 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.24
κ 4 3.5 5 2.3
Table 4: Values of estimated parameters: means of prior and posterior distributions
Parameter Distribution Ger (prior) Fr (prior) It (prior) Sp (prior) Ger (post.) Fr (post.) It (post.) Sp (post.)
ρD Beta 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.982 0.983 0.986 0.975
ρZ Beta 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.951 0.904 0.991 0.934
σD Inv. gamma 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.112 0.095 0.102 0.091
σZ Inv. gamma 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.014
Figure 16:
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Figure 17:
Figure 18:
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3 On the Positive Eﬀects of Wasteful Government Expenditures
Abstract
Standard macroeconomic models predict positive values of ﬁscal multiplier and sharp decreas-
ing relationship between private consumption and government expenditures. The latter result is
at odds with empirical evidence. Some recent studies suggest that this negative pattern between
private consumption and ﬁscal purchases is rather moderate or insigniﬁcant. More importantly,
however, other works indicate that this relationship is positive. I build a tractable, theoretical
model that accounts for the qualitative pattern observed in the data: positive government mul-
tiplier and increasing relationship between government spending and private consumption. To
explain these features I use two ingredients: search frictions in the product market and simple
supply chains. The latter element captures the fact that ﬁrms need to purchase goods produced
by other ﬁrms to generate output. It is shown that these two components - in isolation - give
rise to the standard prediction found in the theoretical literature: increase in ﬁscal expenditures
crowds out private consumption and increases output. However, the interaction of these elements
generates two equilibria and one of them features a positive ﬁscal multiplier and increasing re-
lationship between government spending and private consumption. This result holds despite the
fact that ﬁscal consumption is assumed to be wasteful and it does not enhance consumers' utility.
3.1 Introduction
I propose a simple framework that uses two ingredients: frictional product market and the presence of
supply chains within the ﬁrms' sector to study the impact of increase in government consumption on
aggregate output and private consumption. It is shown that these two mechanisms - treated separately
- imply that increase in ﬁscal expenditures leads to a drop in private consumption. The interaction
of these elements, however, generates two equilibria and one of them features a positive relationship
between government spending and private consumption and exhibits a positive ﬁscal multiplier. It
happens due to a novel mechanism: government expansion coordinates ﬁrms to scale up their capac-
ities which in turn increases the product market's slackness and decreases the eﬀective price paid by
households for consumption goods. This eﬀect is present despite the assumption that government
purchases exactly the same goods as those consumed by households and simply wastes them (e.g., by
throwing them into ocean).
The ﬁrst ingredient - frictions in the product market - is used because it gives a precise meaning to
the notion of tight markets. This in turn is important when one wants to confront conventional wisdom
(i.e., that government consumption crowds out private consumption by increasing market tightness)
with outcomes predicted by a theoretical model. Additionally, as discussed by [Bai et al. (2011)],
frictional product market gives rise to a situation in which aggregate output is determined not only
by the level of production factors but also by demand created by customers (e.g., meals in restaurants
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are prepared only if customers show up and order them). This is an intuitive channel through which
additional demand generated by government spending may increase output generated by ﬁrms.
The second ingredient - presence of supply chains within the ﬁrms' sector - accounts for the fact
that tighter markets (e.g., as a result of increase in government spending) are not always beneﬁcial
for ﬁrms. This may seem somewhat counterintuitive because, as discussed above, increased tightness
of product markets means that ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to sell their output. The situation is diﬀerent,
however, if one considers a model in which ﬁrms have to search for production factors in frictional
product markets: the higher is the market tightness the higher is the eﬀective price at which they
purchase production factors. As it is shown later, this channel is essential for the main result of this
paper (i.e., the increasing relationship between government spending and private consumption).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the literature associated with
my analysis. Section 3.3 lays out the model with frictional product market and shows that increase
in government spending crowds out private consumption. An analogous result obtains in the model
with supply chains that is presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 examines the model in which the two
ingredients are combined and analyzes expansion in ﬁscal consumption in this setting. Section 3.6
summarizes the main ﬁndings of the paper.
3.2 Literature
Empirical evidence. I do not discuss empirical studies that document positive ﬁscal multipliers as it
seems that there is a broad agreement on this issue. Instead, I concentrate on the strand of literature
that describes the relationship between public expenditures and private consumption. An overview
of empirical evidence concerning this issue is presented by [Gali et al. (2007)]. They conclude that
on the one hand some empirical works ﬁnd a large, positive and statistically signiﬁcant response of
private consumption to positive changes in ﬁscal expenditures. On the other hand there are papers
that uncover a negative response. The latter eﬀect, however, is generally found to be small and often
insigniﬁcant. [Blanchard and Perotti (2002)] and [Fatas and Mihov (2001)] use VAR model to study
the impact of a persistent rise in government expenditures. Both papers conclude that ﬁscal expansions
cause large increases in private consumption. [Ravn et al. (2012)] use panel structural VAR (applied
for four industrialized economies) and document that increase in government consumption raises pri-
vate consumption. [Fisher and Peters (2010)] identify government spending shocks with statistical
innovations to the accumulated excess returns of US military contractors. They document a positive
relationship between government spending and private consumption. [Mountford and Uhlig (2004)]
ﬁnd that government expenditures crowd out private investment but their hardly inﬂuence consump-
tion. [Ramey and Shapiro (1998)] identify shocks that raise military spending and show that the
nondurable consumption displays a small (and barely signiﬁcant) decline. They ﬁnd that the con-
sumption of durables exhibits a large increase that is followed by persistent decline. [Ramey (2011)]
reexamines the empirical evidence by comparing the two main empirical approaches to estimating
the eﬀects of government spending: the VAR approach and the RameyShapiro narrative approach
(based on identiﬁcation of war dates) and argues that VARs (used by e.g., Blanchard and Perotti) do
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not properly measure government spending shocks because changes in government spending are often
anticipated long before government spending actually changes.64 She presents the evidence that the
war dates Granger-cause the VAR shocks but the VAR shocks do not Granger-cause the war dates.
This in turn invalidates purely exogenous character of government spending shocks measured by VAR
approach and means that results reported by e.g. Blanchard and Perotti not necessarily reﬂect the
pure impact of changes in government spending.
Government expenditures in the RBC model. This strand of literature emphasizes the
impact of government consumption on hours worked. This channel plays a key role since in absence
of instantaneous adjustment of capital, output can increase (in the short-run) if number of hours
worked rises. [Aiyagari et al. (1992)] view jumps in government consumption as exogenous reductions
in income. They argue that if the income eﬀect on leisure is zero then changes in government spending
has no eﬀect on hours. Moreover, [Aiyagari et al. (1992)] study the impact of both transient and
persistent changes in government consumption on labor and ﬁnd that the contemporaneous eﬀect
on hours worked of a persistent rise in government consumption exceeds the impact of the transient
one.65 This paper, however, does not focus on the eﬀects of government spending on consumption.
This issue is discussed in an important work of [Baxter and King (1993)]. They investigate the impact
of permanent and temporary expansions in government spending and ﬁnd that the former can lead
to output multipliers (both short-run and long-run) that exceed one. As in [Aiyagari et al. (1992)],
[Baxter and King (1993)] highlight the role of increase in hours worked that gives rise to the multiplier
mechanism. Additionally, they notice that a rise in hours that follows a permanent ﬁscal expansion
increases the marginal productivity of capital. This in turn gives incentives to accumulate capital
which in turn boosts private investment. This eﬀect coupled with the standard eﬀect of absorption of
resources by the government leads to lower private consumption. This drop is particularly severe right
after the change in ﬁscal expenditures and it dampens as economy converges to the new steady state.
This happens because higher capital stock and increased number of hours worked generate greater
amount of resources in economy each period. I show that an increase in private consumption following
a ﬁscal expansion is possible in a model with search frictions in the market for products and simple
supply structure. Moreover, the associated rise in output occurs in absence of the dynamic hours
worked - capital interactions.
Government expenditures in the New Keynesian (NK) model. The fact that standard
DSGE models predicted a decreasing relationship between private consumption and expansions in
64War dates are episodes where Business Week suddenly began to forecast large rises in defense spending induced
by major political events that were unrelated to the state of the U.S. economy.
65This happens because agents faced by a transient increase in government consumption cut their investment expen-
ditures by more than in the situation when the increase is permanent. They decrease investment because jump in gov-
ernment consumption decreases the amount of resources available in economy and hence they do it for the consumption-
smoothing motives. The decline in investment is lower in case of persistent changes in government spending as agents
expect that the amount of resources will remain lower (due to persistent ﬁscal expansion) in the next period so they
decide not to cut investment by so much today as it leads to decrease in aggregate capacity tomorrow and to a further
shrinkage of the resource constraint. This in turn implies that the amount of resources available for consumption today
is lower in case of persistent change in government expenditures which in turn means that households decide to work
more today than in case of a transient ﬁscal expansion. This means that increase in hours worked is greater when the
growth in ﬁscal spending is more persistent.
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ﬁscal spending (which was at odds with empirical evidence) became a motivation for the paper of
[Gali et al. (2007)]. They study an extended version of the standard NK model. In particular, they
allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers that spend their entire labor income on consumption.
This assumption implies that expansion in government purchases is able to raise aggregate consumption
through the induced increase in employment and the rise in real wages. This is because the latter two
factors boost labor income and hence they raise consumption of hand-to-mouth consumers. This in
turn boosts aggregate demand, output, employment and wages even further so that multiplier eﬀects
emerge.
Government expenditures and the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). This literature analyzes
the impact of the government spending in the situation when the short-term nominal interest rate is
zero and the economy experiences excess deﬂation. This leads to higher real interest rates and makes
households postpone their consumption spending. Output becomes demand determined.
The ﬁrst channel through which various policies aﬀect the economy that ﬁnds itself at the ZLB is
the expected inﬂation channel. The idea (see, e.g., [Eggertsson (2010)]) is that policies that aim at
boosting aggregate supply are counterproductive as they reinforce deﬂationary expectations and hence
they increase real interest rates even further. The eﬀects of policies that rise the aggregate demand
(e.g., government expenditures) are just the opposite. Eggertsson uses a standard New Keynesian
model to show that a temporary increase by one dollar in ﬁscal spending directed at goods that are
imperfect substitutes with private consumption leads to output growth by 2.3 dollars. The key driving
force of this eﬀect is that expectations about future policy (government commits to sustain spending
until the recession characterized by the ZLB is over) in all future states in which the ZLB binds inﬂates
the price level in those periods. This in turn creates inﬂationary expectations in the current period
and causes a drop in the real interest rates which stimulates aggregate demand. Notice that in the NK
model without capital increase in output is splitted solely between private and public consumption.
This means that if the multiplier is higher than one then consumption increases when government
consumption rises. Increase in private consumption that follows ﬁscal expansion that is presented in
my analysis does not require the assumption about the ZLB. It is worth mentioning that Eggertsson
analysis implies that negative supply shocks are expansionary at the ZLB. This prediction was tested
by [Wieland (2016)]. He used the episodes of the Great East Japan earthquake and global oil supply
shocks that occurred in the ZLB environment to show that Eggertsson's results are not consistent with
empirical observations. Additionally, as shown by [Bachmann et al. (2015)], US households' readiness
to spend more in response to changes in inﬂation expectations is statistically insigniﬁcant inside a
liquidity trap. This implies that the empirical support for the expected inﬂation channel used by
Eggertsson in his theoretical analysis is not very strong.
The second channel described in the context of the ZLB is associated with equilibrium unemploy-
ment dynamics and was described by [Rendahl (2015)]. The mechanism that is present in his model
is based on two ingredients. First, he exploits the fact that when short-term interest rates are zero
then output is largely determined by demand. The second ingredient is frictional labor market. The
interplay between those two components and the increase in government spending works as follows:
since at the ZLB aggregate product is determined by demand then increase in government spending
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raises output and decreases unemployment rate in the present. Because of frictions in the labor market,
the decrease in unemployment is persistent and thus future unemployment rates fall, too. This in turn
means, that agents' income increases in the future. Since they exhibit consumption-smoothing behav-
ior then they a rise in future income feeds back to an increase in present consumption. This boosts
aggregate demand even further and decreases current and future unemployment rates even further.
Rendahl uses an extended version of the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model to calculate
the ﬁscal multiplier associated with mechanism described above and reports that its value is slightly
below 1.9. Moreover, similarly to my analysis, he ﬁnds that in case of a prolonged liquidity trap, hike
in government expenditures boosts private consumption. What is diﬀerent in my model is that the
increase in private consumption in response to jump in ﬁscal spending does not rely on any dynamic
interactions and the assumption about the ZLB.
Models with search frictions in the product market. One of the key ingredients in my
analysis is the frictional product market. This environment was studied by [Bai et al. (2011)] and
[Michaillat and Saez (2015)]. [Bai et al. (2011)] show that demand shocks are responsible for the TFP
volatility if the product market frictions are in place. [Michaillat and Saez (2015)] develop a theoretical,
continuous-time model with search frictions both in market for goods and in labor market, use it to
conduct a comparative-statics analysis and study the sources of labor market ﬂuctuations in the US.
Models with multiple equilibria. My work is also related to articles that describe models with
multiple equilibria. I propose a novel source of multiplicity that arises from the interaction between
search frictions on the product market and the fact that ﬁrms need to visit their suppliers and thus
they are subject to those frictions, too. In a large class of models ([Benhabib and Farmer (1994)],
[Farmer and Guo (1994)], [Diamond (1982)], [Diamond and Fudenberg (1989)]), multiplicity obtains
because of increasing returns to scale either in production or in matching. These features are absent
in my analysis. In what follows I concentrate on two papers that study the impact of ﬁscal spending
in environments that exhibit multiple equilibria.
In a seminal paper, [Diamond (1982)] proposes a model with search frictions that is subject to thick
market externality. This means that returns to participating in the market are higher when the number
of agents in the market increases.66 If an agent sees that the number of potential trading partners is
higher then the return on his output grows as search frictions in the market are lower. Therefore he
chooses a higher cutoﬀ for the cost of production opportunities drawn from a certain distribution. This
increases his output (on average) and means that he enters the market more frequently. This feedback
loop gives rise to multiple equilibria. He ﬁnds that government intervention that leads to higher cutoﬀ
value of the cost of production opportunities improves welfare in all steady state equilibria. This
is because there is only the thick market externality in Diamond's framework. This is the reason
for which policy recommendations are relatively straightforward. In my model, there is a role for
congestion eﬀect in addition to thick market externality: on the one hand, increase in market tightness
rises the probability that ﬁrms ﬁnd customers which increase the returns from output (thick market
externality); on the other hand, however, they ﬁnd it harder to get resources needed to generate output
66This mechanism hinges on the assumption made by Diamond that agents cannot consume their own output and
they need to ﬁnd trading partners in the market to exchange their product.
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(congestion eﬀect). This gives rise to situations in which interventions that result in increased market
tightness are not always desired. This happens also because higher tightness is always harmful for
households in my model.
[Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2015)] study the interaction between demand externalities and
non-convexities in production decisions that give rise to multiple equilibria in an otherwise standard
RBC model. They ﬁnd that once government spending have an impact on labor supply decisions of
households then they may result in welfare gains. The ﬁrst part of their story is familiar from the
standard RBC model: households decide to increase labor supply in response to government spending
(that decreases their income). This in turn puts a downward pressure on wages and hence ﬁrms are
more tempted to use high capacity (non-convex decision) which alleviates the coordination problem
(ﬁrms are more likely to choose higher capacity level). They do not discuss the impact of government
expenditures on private consumption, though.
3.3 Model with frictional product market
In this section I present a tractable static model with frictional product market and study the im-
pact of changes in government spending in this setting. It is based on framework presented by
[Michaillat and Saez (2015)].
General setting. Economy is populated by a continuum of households and ﬁrms of measure one
each. There are two types of goods traded in economy: a non-produced good (which is a numeraire)
and a good that is manufactured by ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm has capacity normalized to 1 and it is able to
generate output without costs. The non-produced good is traded on a perfectly competitive market,
whereas the market on which the produced good is traded is characterized by search frictions (speciﬁed
later).
Households. Households derive utility from consumption of both types of goods. In particular,
their preferences are speciﬁed as follows:
u(c,m) = log c+ χ logm (90)
where c denotes the consumed amount of manufactured goods and m denotes the number of units of
non-produced goods that are consumed. Logarithmic speciﬁcation of the utility function is assumed
to simplify calculations. Search frictions are modeled as in [Michaillat and Saez (2015)]: to purchase
produced goods, household has to visit ﬁrms - each visit costs φ > 0 units of the manufactured goods
and number of visits made by a household is v.67 Due to presence of search frictions some visits are
successful and some are not. If a visit is successful then the number of manufactured goods purchased
by household is one and it occurs with probability q(x) where x is tightness in the market for products
(deﬁned later) and it is taken by households as given. This means that the following relationship
67An alternative way of specifying search costs (i.e., in terms of disutility from search activities) is described in
[Bai et al. (2011)]. As I show in the Appendix, main results from the core text hold under their speciﬁcation of search
costs, too.
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between the number of visits and consumed goods holds:
c+ φv = q(x)v. (91)
I abstract from randomness at the individual level throughout the paper which means that all house-
holds get exactly q(x)v of produced goods (this assumption applies to ﬁrms, too). Let us deﬁne the
wedge in the market for manufactured goods as τ(x) = φq(x)−φ . Household's income consists of two
components: endowment µ of the non-produced good and proﬁts Π generated by ﬁrm(s) and it is
spend on m, c and to cover the costs associated with visits. This means that the budget constraint
reads:
pc+ pφv +m = µ+ Π (92)
where p is price of produced goods. By substituting 91 into 92 and using the deﬁnition of τ(x) we get:
p (1 + τ(x)) c+m = µ+ Π. (93)
Household maximizes 90 subject to 93 with respect to c andm. This, together with the market clearing
condition for the non-produced good (i.e., m = µ), yields the following formula for the optimal choice
of c:
c =
µ
χp (1 + τ(x))
. (94)
Firms. In this simple model ﬁrms have capacity normalized to 1. This means that they would like
to produce and sell one unit of produced goods. Since there are search frictions in place, they are able
to sell a proportion f(x) of their products. It is assumed that unsold goods are wasted. This means
that ﬁrm's proﬁt is:
Π = p · f(x) · 1.
Search frictions and price-setting mechanism. The aggregate number of successful trades on
the product market is given by: M(1, v), whereM is increasing in both arguments, it is strictly concave
and it exhibits constant returns to scale. This means that ﬁrms ﬁnds a customer with probability given
by:
f(x) =
M(1, v)
1
= M
(
1,
v
1
)
= M (1, x) .
since the tightness of the product market is deﬁned as x = v1 . Probability that household's visit is
successful reads:
q(x) =
M(1, v)
v
= M
(
1
v
, 1
)
= M
(
1
x
, 1
)
.
Since there is no universal theory that pins down the price in the situation when the trade is decen-
tralized, I assume that prices are perfectly rigid, i.e. p enters into the model as a strictly positive
parameter. This assumption is made for simplicity but the main result of the paper (i.e., private con-
sumption can increase with government expenditures) holds under more general conditions concerning
the price-setting mechanism, too.
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Figure 19: Model with frictional product market
Equilibrium. The resource constraint for the produced good is:
c+ φv = f(x) · 1. (95)
Using the deﬁnition of tightness in the product market and combining it with 94 and 95 yields:
µ
χp (1 + τ(x))
= f(x)− φx. (96)
Equation 96 characterizes the equilibrium value of x. Since 94 can be used to reformulate 95 to
obtain:68
µ
pχ
= f(x)
By assuming that f(x¯) > µpχ (where x¯ solves q (x¯) = φ) and by observing that f(0) = 0 and f
′ > 0
it is clear that solution x∗ ∈ (0, x¯) to 96 exists and is unique. First panel of Figure 19 illustrates
equilibrium condition 96.69
Eﬀects of an increase in ﬁscal spending. Let us analyze the impact of increase in govern-
ment spending from 0 to some positive number g > 0 that is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes levied on
households. I assume that government consumption is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes - it seems that it is
a natural benchmark for isolating the theoretical eﬀects of rise of government spending on aggregate
68The result that the total amount of goods purchased by households (i.e., c(1 + τ(x))) is constant (i.e., equal to µ
pχ
)
follows by the log speciﬁcation of preferences.
69I have used the following parameter values to prepare the plots in this section: φ = 0.3, µ = 1, χ = 1, p = 2, L = 2
(parameter associated with the Den Haan - Ramey - Watson speciﬁcation of the matching function), α = 0.5, g = 0.03.
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activity. It is assumed that government buys produced goods and they are thrown into ocean. Sym-
metrically to households, it is assumed that government has to visit ﬁrms on the decentralized and
frictional market to purchase goods. This means that if government wants to buy g of goods it has to
make vG visits where vG satisﬁes:
g + φvG = q(x) · vG.
We have to modify the deﬁnition of tightness x:
x =
v + vG
1
.
Using the deﬁnition of τ(x) enables us to reformulate expression for the gross ﬁscal expenditures:
g + φvG = g · (1 + τ (x)) ≡ G(x).
Household's budget constraint is:
p (1 + τ(x)) c+m+ T = µ+ Π
where T = p ·G(x) guarantees that government runs a balanced budget. The resource constraint for
economy with g > 0 becomes:
c+ φv + g + φvG = f(x) · 1.
This combined with the optimal policy of households yields:
µ
χp (1 + τ(x))
= f(x)− φx−G(x). (97)
Second panel of Figure 19 illustrates equation 97. This equilibrium condition can be reformulated to
get:
µ
pχ
+G(x) = f(x). (98)
Observe that since: G(x) is an increasing function on [0, x¯), limx→x¯G(x) = +∞, f(x¯) > µpχ holds and
by assuming that g is suﬃciently small means that equation 98 has two solutions. I denote them by
x∗1,g and x
∗
2,g. Without loss of generality I consider the situation when x
∗
1,g < x
∗
2,g. In what follows
I ignore the equilibrium characterized by x∗2,g. It is because response of the economy to increase in
g is discontinuous - an arbitrarily small value g > 0 leads to signiﬁcant change from x∗ to x∗2,g.
Additionally, comparison of x∗ and x∗2,g excludes the possibility of using comparative statics that is
based on calculus and smoothness of functions.
Let us concentrate on the relationship between x∗ and x∗1,g, then. A simple application of the
Implicit Function Theorem for equation 98 in the neighborhood of x∗ = x∗1,g=0 implies that:
dx∗1,g
dg
> 0
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which means that government intervention increases tightness on the product market. On the one
hand, a rise in tightness leads to growth in output since f(x) ·1 is an increasing function. The intuition
behind this outcome is straightforward: government spending boosts the demand for manufactured
goods and hence it increases the rate/probability at which ﬁrms sell their output. Since the capacity
of ﬁrms is ﬁxed then aggregate output rises. On the other hand, however, since τ(x) grows in x then
ﬁscal expansion causes a drop in private consumption (by equation 94). This occurs even despite the
increase in f(x) ·1 - the amount of goods available in economy. It happens partly because of the strong
assumption that government buys exactly the same type of goods (and throws them into ocean) as
those consumed by households. The absorption of resources that could have been used by the private
sector decreases the rate at which consumers purchase goods (i.e., q(x) falls) and raises the eﬀective
price of manufactured goods: p (1 + τ(x)).
One comment is in order here. Observe that if we change the assumption that the initial amount of
ﬁscal spending is zero and replace it with a positive value then the model with a single friction exhibits
two equilibria (see Figure 19). In equilibrium associated with higher tightness (i.e., x∗2,g), further
increases in g (government consumption) cause drops in tightness which rises private consumption (see
formula 94). One could argue that this fact indicates that the model with a single ingredient (search
friction on the product market) is able to reproduce the pattern observed in the data and hence the
addition of second element (supply networks) is redundant. To see why it is not the case observe that
the equivalent of aggregate output in this model is f(x) ·1 (with f ′ > 0). As it has been discussed, x∗2,g
drops when g rises which in turn implies a decrease in f(x) and hence causes a decline in output. So the
economy with a single ingredient (search frictions on the product market) is not able to reproduce the
pattern we want to obtain because it generates either negative ﬁscal multiplier and positive response
in private consumption or just the opposite pair of eﬀects.
3.4 Model with supply networks
In this section I describe a model in which each ﬁrm needs to purchase goods from other ﬁrms to
get resources needed to generate output. Contrary to the model presented in the preceding section,
environment developed in this part is characterized by the frictionless product market and ﬂexible
prices.
General setting. Types of agents, types of goods and sizes of populations remain unchanged in
comparison to the model presented in previous section. There are two important diﬀerences though.
First, both markets are perfectly competitive. Second, ﬁrms' production technology becomes more
complicated. In particular, they are not simple Lucas trees anymore. To generate output they need
to buy goods manufactured by other ﬁrms.
Households. Households' preferences are the same:
u(c,m) = log c+ χ logm (99)
The budget constraint is:
pc+m = µ+ Π (100)
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Figure 20: Model with simple supply chains
Household maximizes 99 subject to 100 with respect to c andm. This, together with the market clearing
condition for the non-produced good (i.e., m = µ), yields the following formula for the optimal choice
of c:
c =
µ
χp
. (101)
Firms. Firms operate the concave technology (described by parameter α ∈ (0, 1)) that transforms
y goods purchased from other ﬁrms into yα of their own product. Proﬁt function is:
Π = max
y
p · (yα − y)
and the associated FOC implies that:
yopt = α
1
1−α .
Equilibrium. Resource constraint for manufactured goods is:
c = yαopt − yopt. (102)
The RHS of 102 is the amount of ﬁnal goods available for households. It accounts for value added
created by all ﬁrms in the economy and hence it is an analog to the standard notion of GDP. Plugging
optimal polices into the model yields the following formula for p that characterizes the equilibrium in
this simple economy:
µ
χp
= α
α
1−α − α 11−α .
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First panel of Figure 20 presents a graphical illustration of this equation (I deﬁne Sα = α
α
1−α−α 11−α ).70
Since α ∈ (0, 1) then the RHS of the formula above is positive and there exists a unique price p∗ that
solves it.
Eﬀects of an increase in ﬁscal spending. Let us analyze the impact of increase in govern-
ment spending from 0 to some positive number g > 0 that is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes levied on
households. If we modify the resource constraint for the produced good we get:
c+ g = yαopt − yopt.
This equation combined with optimal plans of agents yields:
µ
χp
= α
α
1−α − α 11−α − g. (103)
The RHS of 103 is denoted by Sα,g and the impact of ﬁscal intervention is presented in Figure 20
(right panel). It is self-evident that since aggregate supply yαopt − yopt remains unaﬀected by changes
in g then increase in ﬁscal spending reduces the amount of goods available for households. It is a pure
crowding-out process and it is driven by the eﬀect of increase in g on prices - it leads to increase in
price (p∗ < p∗g) and by equation 101 private consumption drops.
3.5 Model with frictional product market and supply networks
In this section I study the interplay between two features that have been investigated separately so
far. As a result I obtain a model with two equilibria and each of them exhibits a diﬀerent reaction to
hikes in ﬁscal expenditures.
General setting. Types of agents, types of goods and sizes of populations remain unchanged in
comparison to models presented in previous sections. In this part, however, I combine two elements
that were studied separately before: I assume that there are search frictions in the product market
and that ﬁrms need to search for their suppliers.
Households. Consumers purchase non-produced goods on a perfectly competitive market and
manufactured good on the frictional market. Household's problem is the same as in Section 3.3. This
means that household's behavior can be summarized by the following FOC (see equation 94):
c =
µ
χp (1 + τ(x))
. (104)
Firms. In this section I assume that ﬁrms are visited not only by households that want to get
manufactured goods but part of their output is sold to other ﬁrms that search for resources needed to
generate their own products. This means that f(x) is probability that a ﬁrm is visited by consumers or
ﬁrms. Their production technology is described by the concave function that transforms y units of raw
materials purchased from other manufacturers into yα units of goods. Symmetrically to households,
70I have used the following parameter values to prepare the plots in this section: µ = 0.02, χ = 1, p = 2, α = 0.5,
g = 0.1.
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ﬁrms have to incur costs of visits vy when they seek for their inputs. This means that ﬁrm's problem
can be formalized as follows:
max
y,vy
(pf(x)yα − py − pφvy)
subject to :
y + φvy = q(x)vy. (105)
I use constraint 105 and the deﬁnition of τ(x) to eliminate vy from the maximization problem:
max
y
(pf(x)yα − p (1 + τ(x)) y) . (106)
Observe that increase in tightness x has two opposite eﬀects on the situation of ﬁrms. On the one
hand, higher x means that ﬁrms sell their output more easily. On the other hand, however, increase in
x means that the eﬀective price of inputs p (1 + τ(x)) increases. Optimal solution y∗ combines those
two eﬀects:
y∗ =
[
αf(x)
1 + τ(x)
] 1
1−α
. (107)
Equation 107 describes ﬁrm's demand for inputs.
Search frictions and price-setting mechanism. Search frictions are almost the same as in
Section 3.3. The only diﬀerence is the deﬁnition of tightness which becomes:
x =
v + vy
yα
.
Price p is ﬁxed and it is a positive parameter.
Equilibrium. Observe that the aggregate amount of resources available for households (ﬁnal goods
used by consumers for consumption and for covering search costs) is:
f(x) (y∗)α − (1 + τ(x)) y∗
=
(
α
α
1−α − α 11−α
)
(f(x))
1
1−α
(1 + τ (x))
α
1−α
≡ Y (x).
In the Appendix I show that Y ′(x) > 0 for x ∈ [0, xP ) and Y ′(x) ≤ 0 for x ∈ [xP , x¯] where 0 < xP < x¯
and x¯ solves q(x¯) = φ. Moreover, it is easy to see that: Y (x) > 0 (for x ∈ (0, x¯)), Y (0) = 0 and
limx→x¯ Y (x) = 0 (the latter follows by the deﬁnition of wedge τ(x)). From equation 104 we get:
c (1 + τ (x)) =
µ
χp
.
Market clearing condition for manufactured goods is thus:
µ
χp
= Y (x). (108)
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Figure 21: Static model with frictions and supply chains
From what was said about function Y (x) it is clear that 108 has two solutions provided that µ is
suﬃciently low (or, alternatively, χ is high enough). Let us denote them by x∗1 and x
∗
2 (without loss
of generality x∗1 < x
∗
2). To economize on notation I denote H ≡ µχp . Observe that aggregate output of
ﬁnal goods is equal in both equilibria. Condition 108 is presented in the left panel of Figure 21.71
Eﬀects of an increase in ﬁscal spending. In this part analyze the impact of an increase in
government expenditures on allocations associated with equilibira characterized by x∗1 and x
∗
2. Similarly
to the case analyzed in Section 3.3, government sets number g > 0 (amount of goods that are thrown
into ocean) and hence it has to purchase
G(x) = (1 + τ (x)) g
of manufactured goods and makes vG =
g
q(x)−φ visits. The resource constraint for this type of goods
is:
µ
χp
+G(x) = Y (x) (109)
and market tightness is redeﬁned in the following way:
x =
v + vy + vg
yα
Since G′ (x) > 0 then it is easy to see that (as long as g is suﬃciently small) the property that the model
has multiple equilibria is preserved. They are characterized by numbers x∗1,g and x
∗
2,g (without loss of
71I have used the following parameter values to prepare the plots in this section: φ = 0.3, µ = 1, χ = 1, p = 25, L = 2
(parameter associated with the Den Haan - Ramey - Watson speciﬁcation of the matching function), α = 0.5, g = 0.005.
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generality x∗1,g < x
∗
2,g). Equation 109 is shown in the right panel of Figure 21. Same as before, I ignore
the possibility that agents' expectations switch so that economy behaves in a non-continuous manner
after the intervention. For instance, I exclude the possibility that economy that is characterized by x∗1
when g = 0 exhibits value x∗2,g of product market tightness for g > 0.
First, observe that both equilibria exhibit positive ﬁscal multipliers as: Y (x∗1) < Y
(
x∗1,g
)
and
Y (x∗2) < Y
(
x∗2,g
)
. There is, however, an important qualitative diﬀerence between their reaction to
increase in g. Notice that x∗1,g > x
∗
1 - i.e., market tightness increases in g. This resembles the eﬀects
of ﬁscal expansion analyzed in Section 3.3: government consumption g reduces market slackness and
hence both ﬁrms and households ﬁnd it harder to purchase manufactured goods as their eﬀective price
p (1 + τ (x)) grows. By equation 104 it can be concluded that private consumption drops.
Let me concentrate on a more interesting case that pertains to equilibrium characterized by x∗2. As
I have already mentioned, aggregate output of ﬁnal goods grows (in this equilibrium) in response to
rise in government consumption g. More importantly and somewhat counterintuitively, an increase in
g causes a fall in tightness: x∗2,g < x
∗
2 (see Figure 21). To understand why it happens let us analyze
equation 107. In particular, observe that ﬁrm's demand for inputs can be reformulated in the following
way:
y∗(x) =
[
αf(x)
1 + τ(x)
] 1
1−α
=
Y (x)
1 + τ(x)
α
1
1−α(
α
α
1−α − α 11−α
) . (110)
Recall, that in equilibrium described by x∗2, ﬁscal intervention increases output of ﬁnal goods Y (x)
and decreases τ(x). These two forces work in the same direction and hence y∗(x) grows.72 It means
that in equilibrium characterized by x∗2 the reaction of output and capacity to change in g is so strong
that tightness (given by x =
v+vy+vg
yα ) falls despite the fact that vg increases. The drop in τ(x)
compensates the decrease in f(x) (the probability that ﬁrms sell their output successfully) and ﬁrms
decide to expand their output by scaling up their capacity y∗(x). This in turn decreases the eﬀective
price p(1 + τ(x)) faced by other ﬁrms that choose to increase their capacity, too. In short, an increase
in government expenditures coordinates ﬁrms to raise their capacities.
Let us take a closer look at technical aspects that are behind the mechanism described above. First,
let us rewrite the equation that describes ﬁrm's proﬁts for some level of y:
pf(x)yα − p (1 + τ(x)) y.
First, observe that f is concave. It is an immediate consequence of the assumption about concavity
of M . Second, notice that τ is convex. This fact requires more subtle argument which is provided in
the Appendix. These properties imply that in equilibrium characterized by x∗2 (i.e., when tightness is
relatively high) a downward change in x causes a small drop in f(x) which is compensated by a large
drop in p(1 + τ(x)). This makes ﬁrms expand their capacities by increasing their level of y.
72Notice that change in y∗(x) in case of equilibrium described by x∗1,g is ambiguous as both the numerator and the
denominator of 110 increase.
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3.6 Conclusions
I have presented a simple framework in which expansion in wasteful government expenditures can lead
to an increase in private consumption and a positive ﬁscal multiplier. To obtain this outcome I have
used two simple building blocks - search frictions on the product market characterized by the matching
technology that exhibits constant returns to scale and simple supply networks - to capture the fact that
ﬁrms generate output by using the resources produced by other enterprises. The result emerges because
government intervention coordinates ﬁrms to increase their capacities. This in turn relaxes their search
constraint that appear in the model as ﬁrms need to search for resources produced by other ﬁrms. It
is because a ﬁrm that faces a decrease in tightness on markets on which it buys resources needed for
its production activities (caused by a rise in capacities of its suppliers) incurs lower production costs.
This in turn creates incentives to scale up its own capacity despite the fact that the probability at
which To obtain this pattern of consumption response I have used two ingredients: search frictions in
the product market and the presence of simple supply chains structure among ﬁrms. Neither of them
is able to induce the positive relationship between private consumption and government spending if it
is isolated from the other one.
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Appendix
Properties of function Y (x). Let's calculate the derivative of Y (x):
Y ′(x) =
=
(
α
α
1−α − α 11−α
) 1
1−αf(x)
1
1−α−1f ′(x)(1 + τ(x))
α
1−α − α1−αf(x)
1
1−α τ ′(x)(1 + τ(x))
α
1−α−1
(1 + τ(x))
2α
1−α
.
We have to concentrate on the sign of expression:
f ′(x)
f(x)
− α τ
′(x)
1 + τ(x)
T 0.
as the remaining part of Y ′(x) is strictly positive. I use the fact that τ ′(x) = −φq
′(x)
(q(x)−φ)2 , the deﬁnition
of τ(x) and that q(x) = 1xf(x) to get:
1
x
T −αφ q
′(x)
f ′(x) · (q(x)− φ) .
It is easy to see that f ′(x) = M2(1, x) and q′(x) = M(1, x)−1x2 +
1
xM2(1, x). Using this fact yields:
q(x)− φ
αφ
T
M(1, x) 1x
M2(1, x)
− 1.
I use the CRS property of M and the fact that q(s) = M( 1x , 1) to obtain:
q(x)− φ
αφq(x)
+
1
q(x)
T 1
f ′(x)
.
It is easy to see that the LHS decreases in x and the RHS increases in x (by strict concavity of M).
This means that if solution to LHS = RHS exists then it is unique. Existence follows if we reformulate
the condition above:
f ′(x) =
αφq(x)
q(x)− φ(1− α) .
The LHS is decreasing (and its limit is +∞ at 0) and the RHS increases with x (and its limit is +∞ for
xαφ that solves q(xαφ) = φ(1−α)). This means that there exists xP ∈ (0, xαφ) such that Y ′(xP ) = 0.
Moreover, if α is suﬃciently low then xP < x¯.
Convexity of function τ(x). The easiest way to show this fact is to calculate τ ′′ and prove that
it is positive. First, notice that:
τ ′(x) =
−φq′(x)
(q(x)− φ)2
this follows directly from the deﬁnition of τ(x). It is clear that q′(x) < 0 which implies that τ ′(x) > 0.
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Second derivative reads:
τ ′′(x) =
−φq′′(x) · (q(x)− φ) + 2φ (q′(x))2
(q(x)− φ)3 .
Since q(x) = 1xM(1, x) then:
q′(x) = − 1
x2
M(1, x) +
1
x
M2(1, x).
q′′(x) =
2
x3
M(1, x)− 2
x2
M2(1, x) +
1
x
M22(1, x).
Since the denominator of τ ′′(x) is always positive let us focus on the numerator:
−φq′′(x) · (q(x)− φ) + 2φ (q′(x))2
= −φ
[
2
x3
M(1, x)− 2
x2
M2(1, x) +
1
x
M22(1, x)
]
·
(
1
x
M(1, x)− φ
)
+2φ
(
− 1
x2
M(1, x) +
1
x
M2(1, x)
)2
= −2φ
x3
M2(1, x)M(1, x) +
2φ2
x3
M(1, x)− 2φ
2
x2
M2(1, x)
+
2φ
x2
(M2(1, x))
2 − φ
x
M22(1, x) {q(x)− φ}
= M(1, x)
2φ
x3
(−M2(1, x) + φ)−M2(1, x)2φ
x2
(−M2(1, x) + φ)
−φ
x
M22(1, x) {q(x)− φ}
=
2φ
x2
{φ−M2(1, x)} ·
(
M(1, x)
1
x
−M2(1, x)
)
−φ
x
M22(1, x) {q(x)− φ}
=
2φ
x2
{φ−M2(1, x)} · (q(x)−M2(1, x))
−φ
x
M22(1, x) {q(x)− φ}
>
2φ
x2
{φ−M2(1, x)}2 − φ
x
M22(1, x) {q(x)− φ} > 0
where the ﬁrst inequality follows by the fact that q(x) > φ for x ∈ (0, x¯) and the last inequality holds
because M22(1, x) < 0 (by the strict concavity of M).
Alternative speciﬁcation of search costs. To show that the main result of my analysis (about
the possibility of coexistence of a positive government multiplier and positive response of private
consumption to government spending) does not depend on the speciﬁcation of search costs, I analyze
the model with disutility from search, as in [Bai et al. (2011)]. Let us start with the model that is
98
analogous to the one presented in Section 3.3. The problem that is solved by households reads:
max
c,m,v
log c+ χ logm−G(v)
subject to :
c = q(x)v
pc+m = µ+ f(x) · 1
where the notation is the same as in the core text and G is a function that describes disutility from
making visits. In particular, it is assumed that G is linear, i.e.:
G(v) = χvv
and χv > 0. Observe, that households are producers of goods and hence there are no ﬁrms in this
version of the model. The reason for this reformulation is discussed later. I solve the household's
maximization problem in a similar way to the one presented in Section 3.3 and I obtain the following
FOC:
c(x) =
1
χp
µ +
χv
q(x)
that describes the consumer's demand for goods (recall that p is a parameter and hence the demand
is a function that depends solely on x). Observe that c′(x) < 0. The resource constraint (and at the
same time the equilibrium condition) for this economy is:
c(x) = f(x) · 1.
Since f ′(x) > 0, f(0) = 0, f(x) > 0 for x > 0 and since q(0) > 0, limx→+∞ q(x) = 0 then the
equation above has a unique solution. It is easy to show that government intervention (in this case
government does not bear any search costs as it is hard to deﬁne the concept of government's search
disutility) characterized by the purchase of g > 0 goods leads to the following modiﬁcation of the
resource constraint:
c(x) + g = f(x) · 1
and a simple use of the Implicit Function Theorem implies that x′(g) > 0 which implies that private
consumption drops and output f(x) · 1 increases.
Let us turn to a model with search frictions where agents purchase goods from each other to
generate their own output. In what follows I consider households that not only consume but also are
able to produce goods. This formulation is motivated by the fact that considering a situation in which
ﬁrms and households are separate entities and the former have to make visits to buy inputs implies
that one has to deﬁne ﬁrm's disutility from search activities so that it is symmetric to consumer's
search process. To avoid this methodological problem I assume WLOG that households are producers
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at the same time. This means that consumer's-producer's problem reads:
max
c,m,vs,vf ,y
log c+ χ logm−G(vs)−G(vf )
c = q(x)vs
y = q(x)vf
pc+m = µ+ pf(x)yα − py
where vs is the number of visits made by households to get consumption goods and vf are visits made
to get inputs for the household's factory. Moreover, it is assumed that G(v) = χv · v with χv > 0.
There are two FOCs that describe household's solution and implicitly deﬁne the demand side and the
supply side of economy:
Figure 22: Two equilibria in the model with search disutility
c(x) =
1
χp
µ +
χv
q(x)
y(x) =
(
αf(x)
1 + χvµpχq(x)
) 1
1−α
.
100
The resource constraint combined with c(x) and y(x) yields:
c(x) = f(x)y(x)α − y(x).
Since the analytic argument that shows the existence of two solutions in equation above is hard to
formulate, I rely on numerical simulation, instead. Figure 22 shows that the equilibrium condition
has two solutions and government intervention.73 This shows that the main result of this work is
independent of speciﬁcation of search costs.
73I have chosen the following parameter values for the simulation: µ = 0.45, χ = 1, χv = 1, p = 9, L = 2 (parameter
associated with the Den Haan - Ramey - Watson speciﬁcation of the matching function), α = 0.8.
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